GHSA-8H8Q-4WVG-MHGM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-31 12:30 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

inet: frags: drop fraglist conntrack references

Jakub added a warning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() to make debugging leaked skbs/conntrack references more obvious.

syzbot reports this as triggering, and I can also reproduce this via ip_defrag.sh selftest:

conntrack cleanup blocked for 60s WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2512 [..]

conntrack clenups gets stuck because there are skbs with still hold nf_conn references via their frag_list.

net.core.skb_defer_max=0 makes the hang disappear.

Eric Dumazet points out that skb_release_head_state() doesn't follow the fraglist.

ip_defrag.sh can only reproduce this problem since commit 6471658dc66c ("udp: use skb_attempt_defer_free()"), but AFAICS this problem could happen with TCP as well if pmtu discovery is off.

The relevant problem path for udp is: 1. netns emits fragmented packets 2. nf_defrag_v6_hook reassembles them (in output hook) 3. reassembled skb is tracked (skb owns nf_conn reference) 4. ip6_output refragments 5. refragmented packets also own nf_conn reference (ip6_fragment calls ip6_copy_metadata()) 6. on input path, nf_defrag_v6_hook skips defragmentation: the fragments already have skb->nf_conn attached 7. skbs are reassembled via ipv6_frag_rcv() 8. skb_consume_udp -> skb_attempt_defer_free() -> skb ends up in pcpu freelist, but still has nf_conn reference.

Possible solutions: 1 let defrag engine drop nf_conn entry, OR 2 export kick_defer_list_purge() and call it from the conntrack netns exit callback, OR 3 add skb_has_frag_list() check to skb_attempt_defer_free()

2 & 3 also solve ip_defrag.sh hang but share same drawback:

Such reassembled skbs, queued to socket, can prevent conntrack module removal until userspace has consumed the packet. While both tcp and udp stack do call nf_reset_ct() before placing skb on socket queue, that function doesn't iterate frag_list skbs.

Therefore drop nf_conn entries when they are placed in defrag queue. Keep the nf_conn entry of the first (offset 0) skb so that reassembled skb retains nf_conn entry for sake of TX path.

Note that fixes tag is incorrect; it points to the commit introducing the 'ip_defrag.sh reproducible problem': no need to backport this patch to every stable kernel.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23016"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-31T12:16:04Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ninet: frags: drop fraglist conntrack references\n\nJakub added a warning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() to make debugging\nleaked skbs/conntrack references more obvious.\n\nsyzbot reports this as triggering, and I can also reproduce this via\nip_defrag.sh selftest:\n\n conntrack cleanup blocked for 60s\n WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:2512\n [..]\n\nconntrack clenups gets stuck because there are skbs with still hold nf_conn\nreferences via their frag_list.\n\n   net.core.skb_defer_max=0 makes the hang disappear.\n\nEric Dumazet points out that skb_release_head_state() doesn\u0027t follow the\nfraglist.\n\nip_defrag.sh can only reproduce this problem since\ncommit 6471658dc66c (\"udp: use skb_attempt_defer_free()\"), but AFAICS this\nproblem could happen with TCP as well if pmtu discovery is off.\n\nThe relevant problem path for udp is:\n1. netns emits fragmented packets\n2. nf_defrag_v6_hook reassembles them (in output hook)\n3. reassembled skb is tracked (skb owns nf_conn reference)\n4. ip6_output refragments\n5. refragmented packets also own nf_conn reference (ip6_fragment\n   calls ip6_copy_metadata())\n6. on input path, nf_defrag_v6_hook skips defragmentation: the\n   fragments already have skb-\u003enf_conn attached\n7. skbs are reassembled via ipv6_frag_rcv()\n8. skb_consume_udp -\u003e skb_attempt_defer_free() -\u003e skb ends up\n   in pcpu freelist, but still has nf_conn reference.\n\nPossible solutions:\n 1 let defrag engine drop nf_conn entry, OR\n 2 export kick_defer_list_purge() and call it from the conntrack\n   netns exit callback, OR\n 3 add skb_has_frag_list() check to skb_attempt_defer_free()\n\n2 \u0026 3 also solve ip_defrag.sh hang but share same drawback:\n\nSuch reassembled skbs, queued to socket, can prevent conntrack module\nremoval until userspace has consumed the packet. While both tcp and udp\nstack do call nf_reset_ct() before placing skb on socket queue, that\nfunction doesn\u0027t iterate frag_list skbs.\n\nTherefore drop nf_conn entries when they are placed in defrag queue.\nKeep the nf_conn entry of the first (offset 0) skb so that reassembled\nskb retains nf_conn entry for sake of TX path.\n\nNote that fixes tag is incorrect; it points to the commit introducing the\n\u0027ip_defrag.sh reproducible problem\u0027: no need to backport this patch to\nevery stable kernel.",
  "id": "GHSA-8h8q-4wvg-mhgm",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-01-31T12:30:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23016"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/088ca99dbb039c444c3ff987c5412a73f4f0cbf8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ef02ac38d3c17f34a00c4b267d961a8d4b45d1a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.