GHSA-875V-7M49-8X88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 00:07 – Updated: 2026-04-14 00:07Summary
A SQL injection in the Commerce TotalRevenue widget can lead to remote code execution through a chain of four vulnerabilities:
-
SQL Injection -- The TotalRevenue stat interpolates unsanitized widget settings directly into a sprintf-based SQL Expression. Any control panel user can create any widget type without permission checks.
-
PDO Multi-Statement Queries -- PHP
PDO MySQLenablesCLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTSby default. Neither Yii2 nor Craft CMS disables it. This allows stacking an INSERT statement after the injected SELECT , writing a maliciously serialized PHP object into the queue table. -
Unrestricted
unserialize()-- The yii2-queue PhpSerializer callsunserialize()with no allowed_classes restriction on every queue job. When the queue consumer processes the injected job, it instantiates the attacker-controlled object. -
Gadget Chain (FileCookieJar) --
GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar(a standard Guzzle dependency) has an unguarded__destruct()method that callsfile_put_contents(). The attacker’s serialized payload writes a PHP webshell to the server’s webroot. PHP tags survivejson_encode()because Guzzle usesoptions=0(noJSON_HEX_TAG).
The complete chain requires 3 HTTP requests and achieves arbitrary command execution as the PHP process user. Queue processing is triggered via GET /actions/queue/run, an endpoint that requires no authentication ($allowAnonymous = ['run']).
RCE Exploitation Steps
- Authenticate as any control panel user
- POST to
/admin/actions/dashboard/create-widgetwith stacked SQL injection: settings[type]contains the stacked INSERT with the serialized gadget chain- Response: HTTP 500 (expected -- INSERT already committed)
- Trigger queue processing:
GET /actions/queue/run - Queue consumer deserializes the gadget chain
FileCookieJar::__destruct()writes webshell to webroot- Access the webshell:
GET /poc_rce.php?c=id - Response:
uid=1000(home) gid=1000(home) groups=1000(home)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.10.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/commerce"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.5.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/commerce"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T00:07:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-13T21:16:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA SQL injection in the Commerce TotalRevenue widget can lead to remote code execution through a chain of four vulnerabilities:\n\n* SQL Injection -- The TotalRevenue stat interpolates unsanitized widget settings directly into a sprintf-based SQL Expression. Any control panel user can create any widget type without permission checks.\n\n* PDO Multi-Statement Queries -- PHP `PDO MySQL` enables `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS` by default. Neither Yii2 nor Craft CMS disables it. This allows stacking an INSERT statement after the injected SELECT , writing a maliciously serialized PHP object into the queue table.\n\n* Unrestricted `unserialize()` -- The yii2-queue PhpSerializer calls `unserialize()` with no allowed_classes restriction on every queue job. When the queue consumer processes the injected job, it instantiates the attacker-controlled object.\n\n* Gadget Chain (FileCookieJar) -- `GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar` (a standard Guzzle dependency) has an unguarded `__destruct()` method that calls `file_put_contents()`. The attacker\u2019s serialized payload writes a PHP webshell to the server\u2019s webroot. PHP tags survive `json_encode()` because Guzzle uses `options=0` (no `JSON_HEX_TAG`).\n\nThe complete chain requires 3 HTTP requests and achieves arbitrary command execution as the PHP process user. Queue processing is triggered via GET `/actions/queue/run`, an endpoint that requires no authentication (`$allowAnonymous = [\u0027run\u0027]`).\n\n## RCE Exploitation Steps\n\n* Authenticate as any control panel user\n* POST to `/admin/actions/dashboard/create-widget` with stacked SQL injection:\n* `settings[type]` contains the stacked INSERT with the serialized gadget chain\n* Response: HTTP 500 (expected -- INSERT already committed)\n* Trigger queue processing: `GET /actions/queue/run`\n* Queue consumer deserializes the gadget chain\n* `FileCookieJar::__destruct()` writes webshell to webroot\n* Access the webshell: `GET /poc_rce.php?c=id`\n* Response: `uid=1000(home) gid=1000(home) groups=1000(home)`",
"id": "GHSA-875v-7m49-8x88",
"modified": "2026-04-14T00:07:34Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T00:07:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/security/advisories/GHSA-875v-7m49-8x88"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/commit/6d2d24b3a2b0c06593856d05446f82bd8af92d72"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craft Commerce has a SQL Injection can lead to Remote Code Execution via TotalRevenue Widget"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.