GHSA-8423-W5WX-H2R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 20:44 – Updated: 2026-02-23 22:27Impact
The hot spot attributes configuration property allowed any attribute to be set, including HTML event handler attributes, allowing for potential XSS attacks. This affects websites hosting the standalone viewer HTML file and any other use of untrusted JSON config files (bypassing the protections of the escapeHTML parameter). As certain events fire without any additional user interaction, visiting a standalone viewer URL that points to a malicious config file—without additional user interaction—is sufficient to trigger the vulnerability and execute arbitrary JavaScript code, which can, for example, replace the contents of the page with arbitrary content and make it appear to be hosted by the website hosting the standalone viewer HTML file.
Patches
This has been fixed both in v2.5.7 and in the current development branch.
Workarounds
Setting the Content-Security-Policy header to script-src-attr 'none' will block execution of inline event handlers, mitigating this vulnerability. Don't host pannellum.htm on a domain that shares cookies with user authentication to mitigate XSS risk.
Acknowledgments
Reported both by luminary (@lumin9ry), Visvge (@Sicclord1 / @Visvge), and sutol (@0x5a6163 / @SUT0L) and by another researcher who wishes not to be named at this time.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pannellum"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27210"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T20:44:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-21T06:17:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe hot spot `attributes` configuration property allowed any attribute to be set, including HTML event handler attributes, allowing for potential XSS attacks. This affects websites hosting the standalone viewer HTML file and any other use of untrusted JSON config files (bypassing the protections of the `escapeHTML` parameter). As certain events fire without any additional user interaction, visiting a standalone viewer URL that points to a malicious config file\u0026mdash;without additional user interaction\u0026mdash;is sufficient to trigger the vulnerability and execute arbitrary JavaScript code, which can, for example, replace the contents of the page with arbitrary content and make it appear to be hosted by the website hosting the standalone viewer HTML file.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been fixed both in v2.5.7 and in the current development branch.\n\n### Workarounds\nSetting the `Content-Security-Policy` header to `script-src-attr \u0027none\u0027` will block execution of inline event handlers, mitigating this vulnerability. Don\u0027t host `pannellum.htm` on a domain that shares cookies with user authentication to mitigate XSS risk.\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nReported both by luminary (@lumin9ry), Visvge (@Sicclord1 / @Visvge), and sutol (@0x5a6163 / @SUT0L) and by another researcher who wishes not to be named at this time.",
"id": "GHSA-8423-w5wx-h2r6",
"modified": "2026-02-23T22:27:55Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T20:44:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mpetroff/pannellum/security/advisories/GHSA-8423-w5wx-h2r6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27210"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mpetroff/pannellum/commit/9391ef8da6a6a98c6a9f8c97f101adb900523681"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mpetroff/pannellum"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Pannellum has a XSS vulnerability in hot spot attributes"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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