GHSA-7VJW-7J3V-C8GX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: dwc: ep: Flush MSI-X write before unmapping its ATU entry
Endpoint drivers use dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() to raise an MSI-X interrupt to the host using a writel(), which generates a PCI posted write transaction. There's no completion for posted writes, so the writel() may return before the PCI write completes. dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() also unmaps the outbound ATU entry used for the PCI write, so the write races with the unmap.
If the PCI write loses the race with the ATU unmap, the write may corrupt host memory or cause IOMMU errors, e.g., these when running fio with a larger queue depth against nvmet-pci-epf:
arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000010000000010 arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000020000000000 arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x000000090000f040 arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000000000000000 arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: event: F_TRANSLATION client: 0000:01:00.0 sid: 0x100 ssid: 0x0 iova: 0x90000f040 ipa: 0x0 arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: unpriv data write s1 "Input address caused fault" stag: 0x0
Flush the write by performing a readl() of the same address to ensure that the write has reached the destination before the ATU entry is unmapped.
The same problem was solved for dw_pcie_ep_raise_msi_irq() in commit 8719c64e76bf ("PCI: dwc: ep: Cache MSI outbound iATU mapping"), but there it was solved by dedicating an outbound iATU only for MSI. We can't do the same for MSI-X because each vector can have a different msg_addr and the msg_addr may be changed while the vector is masked.
[bhelgaas: commit log]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23361"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI: dwc: ep: Flush MSI-X write before unmapping its ATU entry\n\nEndpoint drivers use dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() to raise an MSI-X\ninterrupt to the host using a writel(), which generates a PCI posted write\ntransaction. There\u0027s no completion for posted writes, so the writel() may\nreturn before the PCI write completes. dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq() also\nunmaps the outbound ATU entry used for the PCI write, so the write races\nwith the unmap.\n\nIf the PCI write loses the race with the ATU unmap, the write may corrupt\nhost memory or cause IOMMU errors, e.g., these when running fio with a\nlarger queue depth against nvmet-pci-epf:\n\n arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000010000000010\n arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000020000000000\n arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x000000090000f040\n arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: 0x0000000000000000\n arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: event: F_TRANSLATION client: 0000:01:00.0 sid: 0x100 ssid: 0x0 iova: 0x90000f040 ipa: 0x0\n arm-smmu-v3 fc900000.iommu: unpriv data write s1 \"Input address caused fault\" stag: 0x0\n\nFlush the write by performing a readl() of the same address to ensure that\nthe write has reached the destination before the ATU entry is unmapped.\n\nThe same problem was solved for dw_pcie_ep_raise_msi_irq() in commit\n8719c64e76bf (\"PCI: dwc: ep: Cache MSI outbound iATU mapping\"), but there\nit was solved by dedicating an outbound iATU only for MSI. We can\u0027t do the\nsame for MSI-X because each vector can have a different msg_addr and the\nmsg_addr may be changed while the vector is masked.\n\n[bhelgaas: commit log]",
"id": "GHSA-7vjw-7j3v-c8gx",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:25Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T12:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23361"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d35fc94cd723ae27371a31f404685a24b097d71"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e2fc90018635fc982d39f8c11cd3b368fdaf3b7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f60a783860c77b309f7d81003b6a0c73feca49e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7afb8f810c04845fdfc58c57d9cf0cc5f23ced0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22533c66ccae10511ad6a7afc34bb26c47577e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eaa6a56801ddd2d9b4980f19e7fe002b00994804"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.