GHSA-7VF8-2CR6-54MF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 20:12 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:51
VLAI
Summary
Argo vulnerable to exposure of artifact repository credentials
Details

Summary

The workflow executor logs all artifact repository credentials (S3 access keys, secret keys, GCS service account keys, Azure account keys, Git passwords, etc.) in plaintext on artifact operation. Any user with read access to workflow pod logs can extract these credentials.

Note: This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-62157

Details

The logging driver passes the entire ArtifactDriver struct to the structured logger, for example: https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/59f1089b9875723ddffd524513e6bd5cb37e5e31/workflow/artifacts/logging/driver.go#L24

Exposed credential fields: - S3 (workflow/artifacts/s3/s3.go): AccessKey, SecretKey, SessionToken, ServerSideCustomerKey - OSS (workflow/artifacts/oss/oss.go): AccessKey, SecretKey, SecurityToken - GCS (workflow/artifacts/gcs/gcs.go): ServiceAccountKey

PoC

  1. Create template
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
  name: cred-leak-test
  namespace: argo
spec:
  entrypoint: main
  templates:
  - name: main
    container:
      image: alpine:3.13
      command: [sh, -c]
      args: ["echo 'hello' > /tmp/output.txt"]
    outputs:
      artifacts:
      - name: output
        path: /tmp/output.txt
        s3:
          endpoint: minio:9000
          insecure: true
          bucket: my-bucket
          key: test-output.txt
          accessKeySecret:
            name: my-minio-cred
            key: accesskey
          secretKeySecret:
            name: my-minio-cred
            key: secretkey
  1. Then check the logs kubectl -n argo logs "cred-leak-test" -c wait image

Impact

Any user with Kubernetes RBAC permissions to read pod logs in the workflow namespace can extract artifact repository credentials.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42295"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T20:12:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T04:16:25Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe workflow executor logs all artifact repository credentials (S3 access keys, secret keys, GCS service account keys, Azure account keys, Git passwords, etc.) in plaintext on artifact operation. Any user with read access to workflow pod logs can extract these credentials.\n\n**Note:** This is an incomplete fix of [CVE-2025-62157](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-c2hv-4pfj-mm2r)\n### Details\nThe logging driver passes the entire ArtifactDriver struct to the structured logger, for example:\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/59f1089b9875723ddffd524513e6bd5cb37e5e31/workflow/artifacts/logging/driver.go#L24\n\nExposed credential fields:\n- S3 (workflow/artifacts/s3/s3.go): AccessKey, SecretKey, SessionToken, ServerSideCustomerKey\n- OSS (workflow/artifacts/oss/oss.go): AccessKey, SecretKey, SecurityToken\n- GCS (workflow/artifacts/gcs/gcs.go): ServiceAccountKey\n\n### PoC\n1. Create template\n```yml\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata:\n  name: cred-leak-test\n  namespace: argo\nspec:\n  entrypoint: main\n  templates:\n  - name: main\n    container:\n      image: alpine:3.13\n      command: [sh, -c]\n      args: [\"echo \u0027hello\u0027 \u003e /tmp/output.txt\"]\n    outputs:\n      artifacts:\n      - name: output\n        path: /tmp/output.txt\n        s3:\n          endpoint: minio:9000\n          insecure: true\n          bucket: my-bucket\n          key: test-output.txt\n          accessKeySecret:\n            name: my-minio-cred\n            key: accesskey\n          secretKeySecret:\n            name: my-minio-cred\n            key: secretkey\n```\n\n2. Then check the logs\n`kubectl -n argo logs \"cred-leak-test\" -c wait`\n\u003cimg width=\"1248\" height=\"322\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a5cf6d66-7d67-408d-8583-27d11ecf1507\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\nAny user with Kubernetes RBAC permissions to read pod logs in the workflow namespace can extract artifact repository credentials.",
  "id": "GHSA-7vf8-2cr6-54mf",
  "modified": "2026-07-21T13:51:11Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T20:12:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-7vf8-2cr6-54mf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-c2hv-4pfj-mm2r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42295"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/bdd40908580f727c590c8743836e338b04fe4a87"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/59f1089b9875723ddffd524513e6bd5cb37e5e31/workflow/artifacts/logging/driver.go#L24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v4.0.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Argo vulnerable to exposure of artifact repository credentials"
}



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