Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-7M5H-W69J-QGGG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:32 – Updated: 2026-04-10 21:32

Summary

SiYuan: Publish Reader Can Arbitrarily Delete Attribute View Files via `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView`

Details

Summary

An authenticated publish-service reader can invoke /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView and cause persistent deletion of arbitrary attribute view (AV) definition files from the workspace.

The route is protected only by generic CheckAuth, which accepts publish RoleReader requests. The handler forwards a caller-controlled id directly into a model function that deletes data/storage/av/<id>.json without verifying either:

that the caller is allowed to perform write/destructive actions; or
that the target AV is actually unused.

This is a persistent integrity and availability issue reachable from the publish surface.

Root Cause

1. Publish users are issued a `RoleReader` JWT

kernel/model/auth.go

ClaimsKeyRole: RoleReader,

2. The publish reverse proxy forwards that token upstream

3. `CheckAuth` accepts `RoleReader`

kernel/model/session.go

if role := GetGinContextRole(c); IsValidRole(role, []Role{
    RoleAdministrator,
    RoleEditor,
    RoleReader,
}) {
    c.Next()
    return
}

4. The route is exposed with `CheckAuth` only

kernel/api/router.go

ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView", model.CheckAuth, removeUnusedAttributeView)

There is no CheckAdminRole and no CheckReadonly.

5. The handler forwards attacker-controlled `id` directly to the delete sink

kernel/api/av.go

avID := arg["id"].(string)
model.RemoveUnusedAttributeView(avID)

6. The model deletes the AV file unconditionally

kernel/model/attribute_view.go

func RemoveUnusedAttributeView(id string) {
    absPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av", id+".json")
    if !filelock.IsExist(absPath) {
        return
    }
    ...
    if err = filelock.RemoveWithoutFatal(absPath); err != nil {
        ...
        return
    }
    IncSync()
}

Crucially, this function does not verify that the supplied AV is actually unused. The name of the function suggests a cleanup helper, but the implementation is really "delete AV file by id if it exists".

Attack Prerequisites

Publish service enabled
Attacker can access the publish service
If publish auth is enabled, attacker has valid publish-reader credentials
Attacker knows an avID

Obtaining `avID`

avID is not secret. It is exposed extensively in frontend markup as data-av-id.

Examples:

Any publish-visible database/attribute view can therefore disclose a valid avID to the attacker.

Exploit Path

Attacker browses published content containing an attribute view.
Attacker extracts the data-av-id value from the page/DOM.
Attacker sends a POST request to /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView through the publish service.
Publish proxy injects a valid RoleReader token.
CheckAuth accepts the request.
The handler passes the attacker-controlled avID to model.RemoveUnusedAttributeView.
The backend deletes data/storage/av/<avID>.json.

Proof of Concept

Request:

POST /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView HTTP/1.1
Host: <publish-host>:<publish-port>
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Basic <publish-account-creds-if-enabled>

{
  "id": "<exposed-data-av-id>"
}

Expected result:

HTTP 200
backend increments sync state
the target attribute view file is removed from data/storage/av/
published and local workspace behavior for that AV becomes broken until restored from history or recreated

Impact

This gives a low-privileged publish reader a destructive persistent write primitive against workspace data.

Practical consequences include:

deletion of live attribute view definitions
corruption/breakage of published database views
breakage of local workspace rendering and AV-backed relationships
operational disruption until restore or manual repair

The bug affects integrity and availability, not merely UI state.

Recommended Fix

At minimum:

Block publish/read-only users from this route.
Require admin/write authorization.
Re-validate that the target AV is actually unused before deletion.

Safe router fix:

ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView",
    model.CheckAuth,
    model.CheckAdminRole,
    model.CheckReadonly,
    removeUnusedAttributeView,
)

And inside the model or handler, reject deletion unless the target id is present in UnusedAttributeViews(...).

Severity ?

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40259"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:32:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn authenticated publish-service reader can invoke `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView` and cause persistent deletion of arbitrary attribute view (`AV`) definition files from the workspace.\n\nThe route is protected only by generic `CheckAuth`, which accepts publish `RoleReader` requests. The handler forwards a caller-controlled `id` directly into a model function that deletes `data/storage/av/\u003cid\u003e.json` without verifying either:\n\n- that the caller is allowed to perform write/destructive actions; or\n- that the target AV is actually unused.\n\nThis is a persistent integrity and availability issue reachable from the publish surface.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n### 1. Publish users are issued a `RoleReader` JWT\n\n- [kernel/model/auth.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/model/auth.go#L105)\n\n```go\nClaimsKeyRole: RoleReader,\n```\n\n### 2. The publish reverse proxy forwards that token upstream\n\n- [kernel/server/proxy/publish.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/server/proxy/publish.go#L131)\n- [kernel/server/proxy/publish.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/server/proxy/publish.go#L186)\n\n### 3. `CheckAuth` accepts `RoleReader`\n\n- [kernel/model/session.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/model/session.go#L201)\n\n```go\nif role := GetGinContextRole(c); IsValidRole(role, []Role{\n    RoleAdministrator,\n    RoleEditor,\n    RoleReader,\n}) {\n    c.Next()\n    return\n}\n```\n\n### 4. The route is exposed with `CheckAuth` only\n\n- [kernel/api/router.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/api/router.go#L507)\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView\", model.CheckAuth, removeUnusedAttributeView)\n```\n\nThere is no `CheckAdminRole` and no `CheckReadonly`.\n\n### 5. The handler forwards attacker-controlled `id` directly to the delete sink\n\n- [kernel/api/av.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/api/av.go#L32)\n\n```go\navID := arg[\"id\"].(string)\nmodel.RemoveUnusedAttributeView(avID)\n```\n\n### 6. The model deletes the AV file unconditionally\n\n- [kernel/model/attribute_view.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/model/attribute_view.go#L49)\n\n```go\nfunc RemoveUnusedAttributeView(id string) {\n    absPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, \"storage\", \"av\", id+\".json\")\n    if !filelock.IsExist(absPath) {\n        return\n    }\n    ...\n    if err = filelock.RemoveWithoutFatal(absPath); err != nil {\n        ...\n        return\n    }\n    IncSync()\n}\n```\n\nCrucially, this function does **not** verify that the supplied AV is actually unused. The name of the function suggests a cleanup helper, but the implementation is really \"delete AV file by id if it exists\".\n\n## Attack Prerequisites\n\n- Publish service enabled\n- Attacker can access the publish service\n- If publish auth is enabled, attacker has valid publish-reader credentials\n- Attacker knows an `avID`\n\n## Obtaining `avID`\n\n`avID` is not secret. It is exposed extensively in frontend markup as `data-av-id`.\n\nExamples:\n\n- [app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts](/root/audit/siyuan/app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts#L117)\n- [app/src/protyle/render/av/layout.ts](/root/audit/siyuan/app/src/protyle/render/av/layout.ts#L120)\n- [app/src/protyle/render/av/groups.ts](/root/audit/siyuan/app/src/protyle/render/av/groups.ts#L52)\n\nAny publish-visible database/attribute view can therefore disclose a valid `avID` to the attacker.\n\n## Exploit Path\n\n1. Attacker browses published content containing an attribute view.\n2. Attacker extracts the `data-av-id` value from the page/DOM.\n3. Attacker sends a POST request to `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView` through the publish service.\n4. Publish proxy injects a valid `RoleReader` token.\n5. `CheckAuth` accepts the request.\n6. The handler passes the attacker-controlled `avID` to `model.RemoveUnusedAttributeView`.\n7. The backend deletes `data/storage/av/\u003cavID\u003e.json`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nRequest:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cpublish-host\u003e:\u003cpublish-port\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\nAuthorization: Basic \u003cpublish-account-creds-if-enabled\u003e\n\n{\n  \"id\": \"\u003cexposed-data-av-id\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n- HTTP 200\n- backend increments sync state\n- the target attribute view file is removed from `data/storage/av/`\n- published and local workspace behavior for that AV becomes broken until restored from history or recreated\n\n## Impact\n\nThis gives a low-privileged publish reader a destructive persistent write primitive against workspace data.\n\nPractical consequences include:\n\n- deletion of live attribute view definitions\n- corruption/breakage of published database views\n- breakage of local workspace rendering and AV-backed relationships\n- operational disruption until restore or manual repair\n\nThe bug affects integrity and availability, not merely UI state.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAt minimum:\n\n1. Block publish/read-only users from this route.\n2. Require admin/write authorization.\n3. Re-validate that the target AV is actually unused before deletion.\n\nSafe router fix:\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView\",\n    model.CheckAuth,\n    model.CheckAdminRole,\n    model.CheckReadonly,\n    removeUnusedAttributeView,\n)\n```\n\nAnd inside the model or handler, reject deletion unless the target `id` is present in `UnusedAttributeViews(...)`.",
  "id": "GHSA-7m5h-w69j-qggg",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T21:32:45Z",
  "published": "2026-04-10T19:32:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-7m5h-w69j-qggg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Publish Reader Can Arbitrarily Delete Attribute View Files via `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView`"
}

CVE-2026-40259 (GCVE-0-2026-40259)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-16 22:49 – Updated: 2026-04-20 14:59

Title

SiYuan: Publish Reader Can Arbitrarily Delete Attribute View Files via removeUnusedAttributeView API

Summary

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and below, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint is protected only by generic authentication that accepts publish-service RoleReader tokens. The handler passes a caller-controlled id directly to a model function that unconditionally deletes the corresponding attribute view file from the workspace without verifying that the caller has write privileges or that the target attribute view is actually unused. An authenticated publish-service reader can permanently delete arbitrary attribute view definitions by extracting publicly exposed data-av-id values from published content, causing breakage of database views and workspace rendering until manually restored. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4.

Severity ?

8.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-285 - Improper Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/ta…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	siyuan-note	siyuan	Affected: < 0.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1 Affected: < 3.6.4

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-40259",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-04-17T14:40:48.459708Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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              "type": "ssvc"
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        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-04-20T14:59:59.417Z",
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          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-7m5h-w69j-qggg"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "siyuan",
          "vendor": "siyuan-note",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.0.0-20260407035653-2f416e5253f1"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.6.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.3 and below, the /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView endpoint is protected only by generic authentication that accepts publish-service RoleReader tokens. The handler passes a caller-controlled id directly to a model function that unconditionally deletes the corresponding attribute view file from the workspace without verifying that the caller has write privileges or that the target attribute view is actually unused. An authenticated publish-service reader can permanently delete arbitrary attribute view definitions by extracting publicly exposed data-av-id values from published content, causing breakage of database views and workspace rendering until manually restored. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.4."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.1,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
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          }
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-16T22:50:20.441Z",
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-7m5h-w69j-qggg",
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      "title": "SiYuan: Publish Reader Can Arbitrarily Delete Attribute View Files via removeUnusedAttributeView API"
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    "dateReserved": "2026-04-10T17:31:45.787Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-7M5H-W69J-QGGG

Summary

Root Cause

1. Publish users are issued a RoleReader JWT

2. The publish reverse proxy forwards that token upstream

3. CheckAuth accepts RoleReader

4. The route is exposed with CheckAuth only

5. The handler forwards attacker-controlled id directly to the delete sink

6. The model deletes the AV file unconditionally

Attack Prerequisites

Obtaining avID

Exploit Path

Proof of Concept

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-40259 (GCVE-0-2026-40259)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

1. Publish users are issued a `RoleReader` JWT

3. `CheckAuth` accepts `RoleReader`

4. The route is exposed with `CheckAuth` only

5. The handler forwards attacker-controlled `id` directly to the delete sink

Obtaining `avID`