GHSA-7JPG-53Q7-H4W6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-27 21:31 – Updated: 2024-04-10 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues
efx->xdp_tx_queue_count is initially initialized to num_possible_cpus() and is later used to allocate and traverse efx->xdp_tx_queues lookup array. However, we may end up not initializing all the array slots with real queues during probing. This results, for example, in a NULL pointer dereference, when running "# ethtool -S ", similar to below
[2570283.664955][T4126959] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f8 [2570283.681283][T4126959] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [2570283.695678][T4126959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [2570283.710013][T4126959] PGD 0 P4D 0 [2570283.721649][T4126959] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [2570283.734108][T4126959] CPU: 23 PID: 4126959 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G O 5.10.20-cloudflare-2021.3.1 #1 [2570283.752641][T4126959] Hardware name: [2570283.781408][T4126959] RIP: 0010:efx_ethtool_get_stats+0x2ca/0x330 [sfc] [2570283.796073][T4126959] Code: 00 85 c0 74 39 48 8b 95 a8 0f 00 00 48 85 d2 74 2d 31 c0 eb 07 48 8b 95 a8 0f 00 00 48 63 c8 49 83 c4 08 83 c0 01 48 8b 14 ca <48> 8b 92 f8 00 00 00 49 89 54 24 f8 39 85 a0 0f 00 00 77 d7 48 8b [2570283.831259][T4126959] RSP: 0018:ffffb79a77657ce8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [2570283.845121][T4126959] RAX: 0000000000000019 RBX: ffffb799cd0c9280 RCX: 0000000000000018 [2570283.860872][T4126959] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff96dd970ce000 RDI: 0000000000000005 [2570283.876525][T4126959] RBP: ffff96dd86f0a000 R08: ffff96dd970ce480 R09: 000000000000005f [2570283.892014][T4126959] R10: ffffb799cd0c9fff R11: ffffb799cd0c9000 R12: ffffb799cd0c94f8 [2570283.907406][T4126959] R13: ffffffffc11b1090 R14: ffff96dd970ce000 R15: ffffffffc11cd66c [2570283.922705][T4126959] FS: 00007fa7723f8740(0000) GS:ffff96f51fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [2570283.938848][T4126959] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [2570283.952524][T4126959] CR2: 00000000000000f8 CR3: 0000001a73e6e006 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [2570283.967529][T4126959] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [2570283.982400][T4126959] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [2570283.997308][T4126959] PKRU: 55555554 [2570284.007649][T4126959] Call Trace: [2570284.017598][T4126959] dev_ethtool+0x1832/0x2830
Fix this by adjusting efx->xdp_tx_queue_count after probing to reflect the true value of initialized slots in efx->xdp_tx_queues.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-46947"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-27T19:04:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsfc: adjust efx-\u003exdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues\n\nefx-\u003exdp_tx_queue_count is initially initialized to num_possible_cpus() and is\nlater used to allocate and traverse efx-\u003exdp_tx_queues lookup array. However,\nwe may end up not initializing all the array slots with real queues during\nprobing. This results, for example, in a NULL pointer dereference, when running\n\"# ethtool -S \u003ciface\u003e\", similar to below\n\n[2570283.664955][T4126959] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f8\n[2570283.681283][T4126959] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n[2570283.695678][T4126959] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n[2570283.710013][T4126959] PGD 0 P4D 0\n[2570283.721649][T4126959] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI\n[2570283.734108][T4126959] CPU: 23 PID: 4126959 Comm: ethtool Tainted: G O 5.10.20-cloudflare-2021.3.1 #1\n[2570283.752641][T4126959] Hardware name: \u003credacted\u003e\n[2570283.781408][T4126959] RIP: 0010:efx_ethtool_get_stats+0x2ca/0x330 [sfc]\n[2570283.796073][T4126959] Code: 00 85 c0 74 39 48 8b 95 a8 0f 00 00 48 85 d2 74 2d 31 c0 eb 07 48 8b 95 a8 0f 00 00 48 63 c8 49 83 c4 08 83 c0 01 48 8b 14 ca \u003c48\u003e 8b 92 f8 00 00 00 49 89 54 24 f8 39 85 a0 0f 00 00 77 d7 48 8b\n[2570283.831259][T4126959] RSP: 0018:ffffb79a77657ce8 EFLAGS: 00010202\n[2570283.845121][T4126959] RAX: 0000000000000019 RBX: ffffb799cd0c9280 RCX: 0000000000000018\n[2570283.860872][T4126959] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff96dd970ce000 RDI: 0000000000000005\n[2570283.876525][T4126959] RBP: ffff96dd86f0a000 R08: ffff96dd970ce480 R09: 000000000000005f\n[2570283.892014][T4126959] R10: ffffb799cd0c9fff R11: ffffb799cd0c9000 R12: ffffb799cd0c94f8\n[2570283.907406][T4126959] R13: ffffffffc11b1090 R14: ffff96dd970ce000 R15: ffffffffc11cd66c\n[2570283.922705][T4126959] FS: 00007fa7723f8740(0000) GS:ffff96f51fac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n[2570283.938848][T4126959] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n[2570283.952524][T4126959] CR2: 00000000000000f8 CR3: 0000001a73e6e006 CR4: 00000000007706e0\n[2570283.967529][T4126959] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n[2570283.982400][T4126959] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n[2570283.997308][T4126959] PKRU: 55555554\n[2570284.007649][T4126959] Call Trace:\n[2570284.017598][T4126959] dev_ethtool+0x1832/0x2830\n\nFix this by adjusting efx-\u003exdp_tx_queue_count after probing to reflect the true\nvalue of initialized slots in efx-\u003exdp_tx_queues.",
"id": "GHSA-7jpg-53q7-h4w6",
"modified": "2024-04-10T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2024-02-27T21:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-46947"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99ba0ea616aabdc8e26259fd722503e012199a76"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebeac958b690123a0b40aa61f688f2f170035fad"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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