GHSA-7G9X-CP9G-92MR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 15:16 – Updated: 2026-02-23 22:21Summary
The batch resource creation endpoints of both Kargo's legacy gRPC API and newer REST API accept multi-document YAML payloads. When either endpoint creates a Project resource, creation of subsequent resources from that same payload belonging in that Project's underlying Kubernetes namespace, by design, proceeds using the API server's own permissions. The creator of a new Project automatically becomes its administrator, but those permissions are granted asynchronously by the management controller. The design choice to create the affected resources using the API server's own permissions averts a race and is contextually appropriate.
Specially crafted payloads can manifest a bug present in the logic of both endpoints to inject arbitrary resources (of specific types only) into the underlying namespace of an existing Project using the API server's own permissions when that behavior was not intended. Critically, an attacker may exploit this as a vector for elevating their own permissions, which can then be leveraged to achieve remote code execution or secret exfiltration. Exfiltrated artifact repository credentials can be leveraged, in turn, to execute further attacks.
In some configurations of the Kargo control plane's underlying Kubernetes cluster, elevated permissions may additionally be leveraged to achieve remote code execution or secret exfiltration using kubectl. This can reduce the complexity of the attack, however, worst case scenarios remain entirely achievable even without this.
Base Metrics
The following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4's base metrics.
Attack Vector (AV): Network
The affected endpoints are served by the Kargo API server over HTTP/HTTPS. No local or physical access is required.
Attack Complexity (AC): Low
Exploitation requires only a specially crafted YAML payload sent to an affected API endpoint.
Attack Requirements (AT): None
No specific environmental conditions are required beyond those that are typical for any Kargo instance.
Privileges Required (PR): Low
The attack relies only on the ability to authenticate to the Kargo API server along with basic permissions that are typically granted to all Kargo users.
User Interaction (UI): None
The attack is fully automated via API calls. No other user needs to take any action.
Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): High
Elevated permissions enable secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project.
Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): High
Elevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the integrity of the vulnerable system, including Kargo Projects, Kargo control plane components, and the Kargo control plane's underlying Kubernetes cluster.
Note: Because it is an integral component of Kargo's control plane, the underlying Kubernetes cluster has been counted as a component of the vulnerable system instead of a subsequent system.
Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): High
Elevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the availability of the vulnerable system, including Kargo control plane components and the Kargo control plane's underlying Kubernetes cluster.
Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): High
Secrets exfiltrated from Project namespaces typically contain credentials for external systems. These may enable exfiltration of further confidential information from those systems.
Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): High
Elevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the integrity of subsequent systems.
Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): High
Elevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the availability of subsequent systems.
Mitigating Factors
-
Exploitation requires authentication to the Kargo API server. Anonymous access is not sufficient.
-
The most severe consequences of this vulnerability depend on a privilege escalation path (via
RoleBindinginjection) that was not identified by the original reporter, suggesting it is not immediately obvious from the bug alone. -
There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/akuity/kargo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.9.0-rc.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/akuity/kargo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.8.0-rc.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/akuity/kargo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T15:16:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T22:16:29Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe batch resource creation endpoints of both Kargo\u0027s legacy gRPC API and newer REST API accept multi-document YAML payloads. When either endpoint creates a `Project` resource, creation of subsequent resources from that same payload belonging in that Project\u0027s underlying Kubernetes namespace, by design, proceeds using the API server\u0027s own permissions. The creator of a new Project automatically becomes its administrator, but those permissions are granted asynchronously by the management controller. The design choice to create the affected resources using the API server\u0027s own permissions averts a race and is contextually appropriate.\n\nSpecially crafted payloads can manifest a bug present in the logic of both endpoints to inject arbitrary resources (of specific types only) into the underlying namespace of an _existing_ Project using the API server\u0027s own permissions when that behavior was _not_ intended. Critically, an attacker may exploit this as a vector for elevating their own permissions, which can then be leveraged to achieve remote code execution or secret exfiltration. Exfiltrated artifact repository credentials can be leveraged, in turn, to execute further attacks.\n\nIn some configurations of the Kargo control plane\u0027s underlying Kubernetes cluster, elevated permissions may additionally be leveraged to achieve remote code execution or secret exfiltration using `kubectl`. This can reduce the complexity of the attack, however, worst case scenarios remain entirely achievable even without this.\n\n## Base Metrics\n\nThe following sections provide the rationale for the values selected for each of CVSS v4\u0027s base metrics.\n\n### Attack Vector (AV): Network\n\nThe affected endpoints are served by the Kargo API server over HTTP/HTTPS. No local or physical access is required.\n\n### Attack Complexity (AC): Low\n\nExploitation requires only a specially crafted YAML payload sent to an affected API endpoint.\n\n### Attack Requirements (AT): None\n\nNo specific environmental conditions are required beyond those that are typical for any Kargo instance.\n\n### Privileges Required (PR): Low\n\nThe attack relies only on the ability to authenticate to the Kargo API server along with basic permissions that are typically granted to all Kargo users.\n\n### User Interaction (UI): None\n\nThe attack is fully automated via API calls. No other user needs to take any action.\n\n### Confidentiality Impact to Vulnerable System (VC): High\n\nElevated permissions enable secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project.\n\n### Integrity Impact to Vulnerable System (VI): High\n\nElevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the integrity of the vulnerable system, including Kargo Projects, Kargo control plane components, and the Kargo control plane\u0027s underlying Kubernetes cluster.\n\nNote: Because it is an integral component of Kargo\u0027s control plane, the underlying Kubernetes cluster has been counted as a component of the vulnerable system instead of a subsequent system.\n\n### Availability Impact to Vulnerable System (VA): High\n\nElevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the availability of the vulnerable system, including Kargo control plane components and the Kargo control plane\u0027s underlying Kubernetes cluster.\n\n### Confidentiality Impact to Subsequent Systems (SC): High\n\nSecrets exfiltrated from Project namespaces typically contain credentials for external systems. These may enable exfiltration of further confidential information from those systems.\n\n### Integrity Impact to Subsequent Systems (SI): High\n\nElevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the integrity of subsequent systems.\n\n### Availability Impact to Subsequent Systems (SA): High\n\nElevated permissions enable tampering, up to and including remote code execution, as well as secret exfiltration from any Kargo Project. Project secrets often include credentials having write permissions to GitOps repositories. Such secrets may enable pushing configurations that impact the availability of subsequent systems.\n\n## Mitigating Factors\n\n- Exploitation requires authentication to the Kargo API server. Anonymous access is not sufficient.\n\n- The most severe consequences of this vulnerability depend on a privilege escalation path (via `RoleBinding` injection) that was not identified by the original reporter, suggesting it is not immediately obvious from the bug alone.\n\n- There is no evidence of exploitation in the wild.",
"id": "GHSA-7g9x-cp9g-92mr",
"modified": "2026-02-23T22:21:26Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T15:16:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/akuity/kargo/security/advisories/GHSA-7g9x-cp9g-92mr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/akuity/kargo/commit/155c6852ffbffa2902f18e6c7add91a846e8d344"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/akuity/kargo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Kargo has an Authorization Bypass Vulnerability in Batch Resource Creation API Endpoints"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.