GHSA-77GG-4HMH-HWXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop
When a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device (e.g., "ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies it as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination prefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback nexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving nhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this nexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and panics.
Simplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject routes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback promotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by ip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave as follows:
-
Explicit reject route ("ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64"): RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init(). No behavior change.
-
Implicit loopback reject route ("ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo"): RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is harmless.
-
Standalone nexthop object ("ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"): RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23300"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop\n\nWhen a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device\n(e.g., \"ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo\"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies\nit as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination\nprefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback\nnexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving\nnhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this\nnexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and\npanics.\n\nSimplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject\nroutes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback\npromotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by\nip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave\nas follows:\n\n1. Explicit reject route (\"ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64\"):\n RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init().\n No behavior change.\n\n2. Implicit loopback reject route (\"ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo\"):\n RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is\n called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject\n afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is\n harmless.\n\n3. Standalone nexthop object (\"ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo\"):\n RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is\n called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash\n when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop.",
"id": "GHSA-77gg-4hmh-hwxc",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T12:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23300"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21ec92774d1536f71bdc90b0e3d052eff99cf093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/607e68c1b7c5a30c795571be1906d716e989a644"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8650db85b4259d2885d2a80fbc2317ce24194133"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b299121e7453d23faddf464087dff513a495b4fc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3b5a037d520afe3d5276e653bc0ff516bbda34c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5062fc2150614c9ea8a611c2e0cb6e047ebfa3a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c11d7c56c2076ee9cd72004f1976fe0734df2ae9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7c9f8e3607440fe39300efbaf46cf7b5eecb23f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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