GHSA-77GG-4HMH-HWXC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-03-25 12:30
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop

When a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device (e.g., "ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies it as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination prefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback nexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving nhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this nexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and panics.

Simplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject routes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback promotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by ip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave as follows:

  1. Explicit reject route ("ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64"): RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init(). No behavior change.

  2. Implicit loopback reject route ("ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo"): RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is harmless.

  3. Standalone nexthop object ("ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"): RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23300"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:25Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop\n\nWhen a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device\n(e.g., \"ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo\"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies\nit as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination\nprefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback\nnexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving\nnhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this\nnexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and\npanics.\n\nSimplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject\nroutes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback\npromotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by\nip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave\nas follows:\n\n1. Explicit reject route (\"ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64\"):\n   RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init().\n   No behavior change.\n\n2. Implicit loopback reject route (\"ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo\"):\n   RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is\n   called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject\n   afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is\n   harmless.\n\n3. Standalone nexthop object (\"ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo\"):\n   RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is\n   called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash\n   when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop.",
  "id": "GHSA-77gg-4hmh-hwxc",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T12:30:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T12:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23300"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21ec92774d1536f71bdc90b0e3d052eff99cf093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8650db85b4259d2885d2a80fbc2317ce24194133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b299121e7453d23faddf464087dff513a495b4fc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3b5a037d520afe3d5276e653bc0ff516bbda34c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b5062fc2150614c9ea8a611c2e0cb6e047ebfa3a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7c9f8e3607440fe39300efbaf46cf7b5eecb23f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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