GHSA-774G-V4GM-8H6V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-01 15:30 – Updated: 2026-05-03 09:33
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: krb5enc - fix async decrypt skipping hash verification

krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt() sets req->base.complete as the skcipher callback, which is the caller's own completion handler. When the skcipher completes asynchronously, this signals "done" to the caller without executing krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash(), completely bypassing the integrity verification (hash check).

Compare with the encrypt path which correctly uses krb5enc_encrypt_done as an intermediate callback to chain into the hash computation on async completion.

Fix by adding krb5enc_decrypt_done as an intermediate callback that chains into krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash() upon async skcipher completion, matching the encrypt path's callback pattern.

Also fix EBUSY/EINPROGRESS handling throughout: remove krb5enc_request_complete() which incorrectly swallowed EINPROGRESS notifications that must be passed up to callers waiting on backlogged requests, and add missing EBUSY checks in krb5enc_encrypt_ahash_done for the dispatch_encrypt return value.

Unset MAY_BACKLOG on the async completion path so the user won't see back-to-back EINPROGRESS notifications.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31719"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-01T14:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: krb5enc - fix async decrypt skipping hash verification\n\nkrb5enc_dispatch_decrypt() sets req-\u003ebase.complete as the skcipher\ncallback, which is the caller\u0027s own completion handler. When the\nskcipher completes asynchronously, this signals \"done\" to the caller\nwithout executing krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash(), completely bypassing\nthe integrity verification (hash check).\n\nCompare with the encrypt path which correctly uses\nkrb5enc_encrypt_done as an intermediate callback to chain into the\nhash computation on async completion.\n\nFix by adding krb5enc_decrypt_done as an intermediate callback that\nchains into krb5enc_dispatch_decrypt_hash() upon async skcipher\ncompletion, matching the encrypt path\u0027s callback pattern.\n\nAlso fix EBUSY/EINPROGRESS handling throughout: remove\nkrb5enc_request_complete() which incorrectly swallowed EINPROGRESS\nnotifications that must be passed up to callers waiting on backlogged\nrequests, and add missing EBUSY checks in krb5enc_encrypt_ahash_done\nfor the dispatch_encrypt return value.\n\n\nUnset MAY_BACKLOG on the async completion path so the user won\u0027t\nsee back-to-back EINPROGRESS notifications.",
  "id": "GHSA-774g-v4gm-8h6v",
  "modified": "2026-05-03T09:33:09Z",
  "published": "2026-05-01T15:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31719"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07cbb1bd424370671814a862913c99a6e1441588"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bfbf5f0a99c991769ec562721285df7ab69240b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e51f42114abbdf47f29dda43e7826be28907fcd2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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