GHSA-6XVM-J4WR-6V98

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:09 – Updated: 2026-03-11 05:46
VLAI?
Summary
Quinn affected by unauthenticated remote DoS via panic in QUIC transport parameter parsing
Details

Summary

A remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger a denial of service in applications using vulnerable quinn versions by sending a crafted QUIC Initial packet containing malformed quic_transport_parameters. In quinn-proto parsing logic, attacker-controlled varints are decoded with unwrap(), so truncated encodings cause Err(UnexpectedEnd) and panic. This is reachable over the network with a single packet and no prior trust or authentication.

Details

The issue is panic-on-untrusted-input in QUIC transport parameter parsing. In quinn-proto (observed in quinn-proto 0.11.13), parsing of some transport parameters uses a fallible varint decode followed by unwrap(). For malformed/truncated parameter values, decode returns UnexpectedEnd, and unwrap() panics.

Observed output:

thread 'tokio-rt-worker' (2366474) panicked at quinn-proto/src/transport_parameters.rs:473:67:
called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: UnexpectedEnd

PoC

Reproduces against the upstream Quinn server example.

  1. Start server:
cargo run --example server -- ./
  1. Prepare PoC client environment:
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install aioquic
  1. Run PoC script attack.py against server QUIC listener (default example target shown):
python attack.py

Observed output

thread 'tokio-rt-worker' (2366903) panicked at quinn-proto/src/transport_parameters.rs:473:67:
called `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: UnexpectedEnd

Impact

Vulnerability type: Remote Denial of Service (panic/crash) Attack requirements: Network reachability to UDP QUIC listener Authentication/privileges: None Who is impacted: Any server/application using affected quinn/quinn-proto versions where this parse path is reachable; process-level impact depends on integration panic handling policy

This vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "quinn-proto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31812"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:09:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T22:16:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker can trigger a denial of service in applications using vulnerable `quinn` versions by sending a crafted QUIC Initial packet containing malformed `quic_transport_parameters`. `In quinn-proto` parsing logic, attacker-controlled varints are decoded with `unwrap()`, so truncated encodings cause `Err(UnexpectedEnd)` and `panic`. This is reachable over the network with a single packet and no prior trust or authentication.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is panic-on-untrusted-input in QUIC transport parameter parsing.\nIn `quinn-proto` (observed in `quinn-proto 0.11.13`), parsing of some transport parameters uses a fallible varint decode followed by `unwrap()`. For malformed/truncated parameter values, decode returns `UnexpectedEnd`, and `unwrap()` panics.\n\n#### Observed output:\n```\nthread \u0027tokio-rt-worker\u0027 (2366474) panicked at quinn-proto/src/transport_parameters.rs:473:67:\ncalled `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: UnexpectedEnd\n```\n\n### PoC\n#### Reproduces against the upstream Quinn server example.\n1. Start server:\n```\ncargo run --example server -- ./\n```\n2. Prepare PoC client environment:\n```\npython3 -m venv .venv\nsource .venv/bin/activate\npip install aioquic\n```\n3. Run PoC script [attack.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25741713/attack.py) against server QUIC listener (default example target shown):\n```\npython attack.py\n```\n#### Observed output\n```\nthread \u0027tokio-rt-worker\u0027 (2366903) panicked at quinn-proto/src/transport_parameters.rs:473:67:\ncalled `Result::unwrap()` on an `Err` value: UnexpectedEnd\n```\n\n\n\n### Impact\nVulnerability type: Remote Denial of Service (panic/crash)\nAttack requirements:  Network reachability to UDP QUIC listener\nAuthentication/privileges: None\nWho is impacted: Any server/application using affected `quinn/quinn-proto` versions where this parse path is reachable; process-level impact depends on integration panic handling policy\n\n\nThis vulnerability was originally submitted by @revofusion to the Ethereum Foundation bug bounty program",
  "id": "GHSA-6xvm-j4wr-6v98",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T05:46:01Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T00:09:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/security/advisories/GHSA-6xvm-j4wr-6v98"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn/pull/2559"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/quinn-rs/quinn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0037.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Quinn affected by unauthenticated remote DoS via panic in QUIC transport parameter parsing"
}


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