GHSA-6VQF-6FHM-7RC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 14:35 – Updated: 2026-04-21 14:35The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (str_replace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Simple bypass pattern |
| Privileges Required (PR) | High | Requires admin authentication |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No additional user interaction needed |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Can read sensitive system files |
| Integrity (I) | None | Read-only vulnerability |
| Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability |
Affected Products
- OpenMage LTS versions < 20.16.1
- All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths
Affected Files
| File | Line | Vulnerable Code |
|---|---|---|
app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php |
67 | str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...)) |
app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php |
63 | str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...)) |
Vulnerability Details
The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The files parameter specifies which file to import from the var/import/ directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses str_replace() to remove ../ sequences:
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
However, str_replace() only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:
Bypass Examples
| Input | After str_replace('../', '', ...) |
Result |
|---|---|---|
..././ |
../ |
Bypass |
....// |
../ |
Bypass |
..././..././..././etc/passwd |
../../../etc/passwd |
File read |
Attack Scenario
- Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.)
- Navigate to System > Import/Export > Dataflow Profiles
- Create or modify an import profile
- Set the
filesparameter to:..././..././..././etc/passwd - Run the profile to read the contents of
/etc/passwd
Proof of Concept
# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern
GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd
# The str_replace removes '../' leaving:
# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd
# Final path resolves to:
# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwd
Remediation
Replace the weak str_replace() filter with basename() to extract only the filename:
// Before (vulnerable)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
// After (fixed)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
Using basename() ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.
Workarounds
If immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Restrict admin access: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only
- Disable Dataflow: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely
- Web Application Firewall: Block requests containing path traversal patterns
- File permissions: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions
- Monitor admin activity: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution
Impact
An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:
/etc/passwd- System user informationapp/etc/local.xml- Database credentials.envfiles - Environment secrets- Log files - Potentially sensitive application data
- Configuration files - Server and application configuration
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by blackhat2013 through HackerOne.
Timeline
- 2025-12-31: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne
- 2026-01-21: Fix developed and tested
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "openmage/magento-lts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25525"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-184",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T14:35:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T17:16:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (`str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $input)`) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like `..././` or `....//`, which after the replacement still result in `../`. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.\n\n\n| Metric | Value | Justification |\n| ------------------------ | --------- | ------------------------------------- |\n| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel |\n| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Simple bypass pattern |\n| Privileges Required (PR) | High | Requires admin authentication |\n| User Interaction (UI) | None | No additional user interaction needed |\n| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component |\n| Confidentiality (C) | High | Can read sensitive system files |\n| Integrity (I) | None | Read-only vulnerability |\n| Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability |\n\n## Affected Products\n\n- OpenMage LTS versions \u003c 20.16.1\n- All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths\n\n## Affected Files\n\n| File | Line | Vulnerable Code |\n| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ---- | ---------------------------------------- |\n| `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php` | 67 | `str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, urldecode(...))` |\n| `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php` | 63 | `str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, urldecode(...))` |\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nThe Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The `files` parameter specifies which file to import from the `var/import/` directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses `str_replace()` to remove `../` sequences:\n\n```php\n$file = Mage::app()-\u003egetConfig()-\u003egetTempVarDir() . \u0027/import/\u0027\n . str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, urldecode(Mage::app()-\u003egetRequest()-\u003egetParam(\u0027files\u0027)));\n```\n\nHowever, `str_replace()` only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:\n\n### Bypass Examples\n\n| Input | After `str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, ...)` | Result |\n| ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------- | --------- |\n| `..././` | `../` | Bypass |\n| `....//` | `../` | Bypass |\n| `..././..././..././etc/passwd` | `../../../etc/passwd` | File read |\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.)\n2. Navigate to System \u003e Import/Export \u003e Dataflow Profiles\n3. Create or modify an import profile\n4. Set the `files` parameter to: `..././..././..././etc/passwd`\n5. Run the profile to read the contents of `/etc/passwd`\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\n```\n# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern\nGET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd\n\n# The str_replace removes \u0027../\u0027 leaving:\n# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -\u003e ../../../etc/passwd\n\n# Final path resolves to:\n# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -\u003e /etc/passwd\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nReplace the weak `str_replace()` filter with `basename()` to extract only the filename:\n\n```php\n// Before (vulnerable)\n$file = Mage::app()-\u003egetConfig()-\u003egetTempVarDir() . \u0027/import/\u0027\n . str_replace(\u0027../\u0027, \u0027\u0027, urldecode(Mage::app()-\u003egetRequest()-\u003egetParam(\u0027files\u0027)));\n\n// After (fixed)\n$file = Mage::app()-\u003egetConfig()-\u003egetTempVarDir() . \u0027/import/\u0027\n . basename(urldecode(Mage::app()-\u003egetRequest()-\u003egetParam(\u0027files\u0027)));\n```\n\nUsing `basename()` ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf immediate upgrade is not possible:\n\n1. **Restrict admin access**: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only\n2. **Disable Dataflow**: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely\n3. **Web Application Firewall**: Block requests containing path traversal patterns\n4. **File permissions**: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions\n5. **Monitor admin activity**: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:\n\n- `/etc/passwd` - System user information\n- `app/etc/local.xml` - Database credentials\n- `.env` files - Environment secrets\n- Log files - Potentially sensitive application data\n- Configuration files - Server and application configuration\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by [blackhat2013](https://hackerone.com/blackhat2013) through HackerOne.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2025-12-31**: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne\n- **2026-01-21**: Fix developed and tested",
"id": "GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6",
"modified": "2026-04-21T14:35:03Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T14:35:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/security/advisories/GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/pull/5445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/3482926"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/releases/tag/v20.17.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenMage LTS has a Path Traversal Filter Bypass in Dataflow Module"
}
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