GHSA-6F54-QJVM-WWQ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 01:37 – Updated: 2026-04-16 01:37
VLAI?
Summary
wger has Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields
Details

Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields

Summary

The AbstractLicenseModel.attribution_link property in wger/utils/models.py constructs HTML strings by directly interpolating user-controlled fields (license_author, license_title, license_object_url, license_author_url, license_derivative_source_url) without any escaping. The resulting HTML is rendered in the ingredient view template using Django's |safe filter, which disables auto-escaping. An authenticated user can create an ingredient with a malicious license_author value containing JavaScript, which executes when any user (including unauthenticated visitors) views the ingredient page.

Severity

High (CVSS 3.1: ~7.6)

  • Low-privilege attacker (any authenticated non-temporary user)
  • Stored XSS — persists in database
  • Triggers on a public page (no authentication needed to view)
  • Can steal session cookies, perform actions as other users, redirect to phishing

CWE

CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Affected Components

Vulnerable Property

File: wger/utils/models.py:88-110

@property
def attribution_link(self):
    out = ''
    if self.license_object_url:
        out += f'<a href="{self.license_object_url}">{self.license_title}</a>'
    else:
        out += self.license_title  # NO ESCAPING
    out += ' by '
    if self.license_author_url:
        out += f'<a href="{self.license_author_url}">{self.license_author}</a>'
    else:
        out += self.license_author  # NO ESCAPING
    out += f' is licensed under <a href="{self.license.url}">{self.license.short_name}</a>'
    if self.license_derivative_source_url:
        out += (
            f'/ A derivative work from <a href="{self.license_derivative_source_url}">the '
            f'original work</a>'
        )
    return out

Unsafe Template Rendering

File: wger/nutrition/templates/ingredient/view.html

  • Line 171: {{ ingredient.attribution_link|safe }}
  • Line 226: {{ image.attribution_link|safe }}

Writable Entry Point

File: wger/nutrition/views/ingredient.py:154-175

class IngredientCreateView(WgerFormMixin, CreateView):
    model = Ingredient
    form_class = IngredientForm  # includes license_author field

URL: login_required(ingredient.IngredientCreateView.as_view()) — any authenticated non-temporary user.

Form fields (from wger/nutrition/forms.py:295-313): includes license_author (TextField, max_length=3500) — no sanitization.

Models Affected

6 models inherit from AbstractLicenseModel: - Exercise, ExerciseImage, ExerciseVideo, Translation (exercises module) - Ingredient, Image (nutrition module)

Only the Ingredient and nutrition Image models' attribution links are currently rendered with |safe in templates.

Root Cause

  1. attribution_link constructs raw HTML by string interpolation of user-controlled fields without calling django.utils.html.escape() or django.utils.html.format_html()
  2. The template renders the result with |safe, bypassing Django's auto-escaping
  3. The license_author field in IngredientForm has no input sanitization
  4. The set_author() method only sets a default value if the field is empty — it does not sanitize user-provided values

Reproduction Steps (Verified)

Prerequisites

  • A wger instance with user registration enabled (default)
  • An authenticated user account (non-temporary)

Steps

  1. Register/login to a wger instance

  2. Create a malicious ingredient via the web form at /en/nutrition/ingredient/add/:

  3. Set Name to any valid name (e.g., "XSS Form Verified")
  4. Set Energy to 125, Protein to 10, Carbohydrates to 10, Fat to 5 (energy must approximately match macros)
  5. Set Author(s) (license_author) to: <img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)">
  6. Submit the form — the form validates and saves successfully with no sanitization

  7. View the ingredient page (public URL, no auth needed):

  8. Navigate to the newly created ingredient's detail page
  9. The XSS payload executes in the browser

Verified PoC Output

The rendered HTML in the ingredient detail page (line 171 of ingredient/view.html) contains:

<small>
     by <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> is licensed under <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en">CC-BY-SA 3</a>
</small>

The <img> tag with onerror handler is injected directly into the page DOM and executes JavaScript when the browser attempts to load the non-existent image.

Alternative API Path (ExerciseImage)

For users who are "trustworthy" (account >3 weeks old + verified email):

# Upload exercise image with XSS in license_author
curl -X POST https://wger.example.com/api/v2/exerciseimage/ \
  -H "Authorization: Token <token>" \
  -F "exercise=1" \
  -F "image=@photo.jpg" \
  -F 'license_author=<img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)">' \
  -F "license=2"

Note: ExerciseImage's attribution_link is not currently rendered with |safe in exercise templates, but the data is stored with XSS payloads and would execute if any template renders it with |safe in the future. The API serializer also returns the unescaped attribution_link data, which could cause XSS in API consumers (mobile apps, SPAs).

Impact

  • Session hijacking: Steal admin session cookies to gain full control
  • Account takeover: Modify other users' passwords or email addresses
  • Data theft: Access other users' workout plans, nutrition data, and personal measurements
  • Worm-like propagation: Malicious ingredient could inject XSS that creates more malicious ingredients
  • Phishing: Redirect users to fake login pages

Suggested Fix

Replace the attribution_link property with properly escaped HTML using Django's format_html():

from django.utils.html import format_html, escape

@property
def attribution_link(self):
    parts = []

    if self.license_object_url:
        parts.append(format_html('<a href="{}">{}</a>', self.license_object_url, self.license_title))
    else:
        parts.append(escape(self.license_title))

    parts.append(' by ')

    if self.license_author_url:
        parts.append(format_html('<a href="{}">{}</a>', self.license_author_url, self.license_author))
    else:
        parts.append(escape(self.license_author))

    parts.append(format_html(
        ' is licensed under <a href="{}">{}</a>',
        self.license.url, self.license.short_name
    ))

    if self.license_derivative_source_url:
        parts.append(format_html(
            '/ A derivative work from <a href="{}">the original work</a>',
            self.license_derivative_source_url
        ))

    return mark_safe(''.join(str(p) for p in parts))

Alternatively, remove the |safe filter from the templates and escape in the property, though this would break the anchor tags.

References

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "wger"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40353"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T01:37:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields\n\n## Summary\n\nThe `AbstractLicenseModel.attribution_link` property in `wger/utils/models.py` constructs HTML strings by directly interpolating user-controlled fields (`license_author`, `license_title`, `license_object_url`, `license_author_url`, `license_derivative_source_url`) without any escaping. The resulting HTML is rendered in the ingredient view template using Django\u0027s `|safe` filter, which disables auto-escaping. An authenticated user can create an ingredient with a malicious `license_author` value containing JavaScript, which executes when any user (including unauthenticated visitors) views the ingredient page.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: ~7.6)\n\n- Low-privilege attacker (any authenticated non-temporary user)\n- Stored XSS \u2014 persists in database\n- Triggers on a public page (no authentication needed to view)\n- Can steal session cookies, perform actions as other users, redirect to phishing\n\n## CWE\n\nCWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (\u0027Cross-site Scripting\u0027)\n\n## Affected Components\n\n### Vulnerable Property\n**File:** `wger/utils/models.py:88-110`\n\n```python\n@property\ndef attribution_link(self):\n    out = \u0027\u0027\n    if self.license_object_url:\n        out += f\u0027\u003ca href=\"{self.license_object_url}\"\u003e{self.license_title}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027\n    else:\n        out += self.license_title  # NO ESCAPING\n    out += \u0027 by \u0027\n    if self.license_author_url:\n        out += f\u0027\u003ca href=\"{self.license_author_url}\"\u003e{self.license_author}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027\n    else:\n        out += self.license_author  # NO ESCAPING\n    out += f\u0027 is licensed under \u003ca href=\"{self.license.url}\"\u003e{self.license.short_name}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027\n    if self.license_derivative_source_url:\n        out += (\n            f\u0027/ A derivative work from \u003ca href=\"{self.license_derivative_source_url}\"\u003ethe \u0027\n            f\u0027original work\u003c/a\u003e\u0027\n        )\n    return out\n```\n\n### Unsafe Template Rendering\n**File:** `wger/nutrition/templates/ingredient/view.html`\n\n- **Line 171:** `{{ ingredient.attribution_link|safe }}`\n- **Line 226:** `{{ image.attribution_link|safe }}`\n\n### Writable Entry Point\n**File:** `wger/nutrition/views/ingredient.py:154-175`\n\n```python\nclass IngredientCreateView(WgerFormMixin, CreateView):\n    model = Ingredient\n    form_class = IngredientForm  # includes license_author field\n```\n\n**URL:** `login_required(ingredient.IngredientCreateView.as_view())` \u2014 any authenticated non-temporary user.\n\n**Form fields (from `wger/nutrition/forms.py:295-313`):** includes `license_author` (TextField, max_length=3500) \u2014 no sanitization.\n\n### Models Affected\n\n6 models inherit from `AbstractLicenseModel`:\n- `Exercise`, `ExerciseImage`, `ExerciseVideo`, `Translation` (exercises module)\n- `Ingredient`, `Image` (nutrition module)\n\nOnly the **Ingredient** and nutrition **Image** models\u0027 attribution links are currently rendered with `|safe` in templates.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n1. `attribution_link` constructs raw HTML by string interpolation of user-controlled fields without calling `django.utils.html.escape()` or `django.utils.html.format_html()`\n2. The template renders the result with `|safe`, bypassing Django\u0027s auto-escaping\n3. The `license_author` field in `IngredientForm` has no input sanitization\n4. The `set_author()` method only sets a default value if the field is empty \u2014 it does not sanitize user-provided values\n\n## Reproduction Steps (Verified)\n\n### Prerequisites\n- A wger instance with user registration enabled (default)\n- An authenticated user account (non-temporary)\n\n### Steps\n\n1. **Register/login** to a wger instance\n\n2. **Create a malicious ingredient** via the web form at `/en/nutrition/ingredient/add/`:\n   - Set `Name` to any valid name (e.g., \"XSS Form Verified\")\n   - Set `Energy` to `125`, `Protein` to `10`, `Carbohydrates` to `10`, `Fat` to `5` (energy must approximately match macros)\n   - Set `Author(s)` (license_author) to:\n     ```\n     \u003cimg src=x onerror=\"alert(document.cookie)\"\u003e\n     ```\n   - Submit the form \u2014 **the form validates and saves successfully with no sanitization**\n\n3. **View the ingredient page** (public URL, no auth needed):\n   - Navigate to the newly created ingredient\u0027s detail page\n   - The XSS payload executes in the browser\n\n### Verified PoC Output\n\nThe rendered HTML in the ingredient detail page (line 171 of `ingredient/view.html`) contains:\n\n```html\n\u003csmall\u003e\n     by \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e is licensed under \u003ca href=\"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en\"\u003eCC-BY-SA 3\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/small\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003cimg\u003e` tag with `onerror` handler is injected directly into the page DOM and executes JavaScript when the browser attempts to load the non-existent image.\n\n### Alternative API Path (ExerciseImage)\n\nFor users who are \"trustworthy\" (account \u003e3 weeks old + verified email):\n\n```bash\n# Upload exercise image with XSS in license_author\ncurl -X POST https://wger.example.com/api/v2/exerciseimage/ \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Token \u003ctoken\u003e\" \\\n  -F \"exercise=1\" \\\n  -F \"image=@photo.jpg\" \\\n  -F \u0027license_author=\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"alert(document.cookie)\"\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -F \"license=2\"\n```\n\nNote: ExerciseImage\u0027s `attribution_link` is not currently rendered with `|safe` in exercise templates, but the data is stored with XSS payloads and would execute if any template renders it with `|safe` in the future. The API serializer also returns the unescaped `attribution_link` data, which could cause XSS in API consumers (mobile apps, SPAs).\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking**: Steal admin session cookies to gain full control\n- **Account takeover**: Modify other users\u0027 passwords or email addresses\n- **Data theft**: Access other users\u0027 workout plans, nutrition data, and personal measurements\n- **Worm-like propagation**: Malicious ingredient could inject XSS that creates more malicious ingredients\n- **Phishing**: Redirect users to fake login pages\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nReplace the `attribution_link` property with properly escaped HTML using Django\u0027s `format_html()`:\n\n```python\nfrom django.utils.html import format_html, escape\n\n@property\ndef attribution_link(self):\n    parts = []\n\n    if self.license_object_url:\n        parts.append(format_html(\u0027\u003ca href=\"{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027, self.license_object_url, self.license_title))\n    else:\n        parts.append(escape(self.license_title))\n\n    parts.append(\u0027 by \u0027)\n\n    if self.license_author_url:\n        parts.append(format_html(\u0027\u003ca href=\"{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027, self.license_author_url, self.license_author))\n    else:\n        parts.append(escape(self.license_author))\n\n    parts.append(format_html(\n        \u0027 is licensed under \u003ca href=\"{}\"\u003e{}\u003c/a\u003e\u0027,\n        self.license.url, self.license.short_name\n    ))\n\n    if self.license_derivative_source_url:\n        parts.append(format_html(\n            \u0027/ A derivative work from \u003ca href=\"{}\"\u003ethe original work\u003c/a\u003e\u0027,\n            self.license_derivative_source_url\n        ))\n\n    return mark_safe(\u0027\u0027.join(str(p) for p in parts))\n```\n\nAlternatively, remove the `|safe` filter from the templates and escape in the property, though this would break the anchor tags.\n\n## References\n\n- [Django Security: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) protection](https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/5.0/topics/security/#cross-site-scripting-xss-protection)\n- [Django `format_html()` documentation](https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/5.0/ref/utils/#django.utils.html.format_html)\n- [OWASP: Stored Cross-Site Scripting](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/#stored-xss-attacks)",
  "id": "GHSA-6f54-qjvm-wwq3",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T01:37:21Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T01:37:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-6f54-qjvm-wwq3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "wger has Stored XSS via Unescaped License Attribution Fields"
}


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Nomenclature

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