GHSA-66HX-CHF7-3332
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:38 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:38Summary
pyLoad caches role and permission in the session at login and continues to authorize requests using these cached values, even after an admin changes the user's role/permissions in the database.
As a result, an already logged-in user can keep old (revoked) privileges until logout/session expiry, enabling continued privileged actions.
This is a core authorization/session-consistency issue and is not resolved by toggling an optional security feature.
Details
The WebUI auth flow stores authorization state in session:
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:187-200set_session(...)writes:"role": user_info["role"]"perms": user_info["permission"]
Authorization checks later trust cached session values:
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:134-151parse_permissions(...)readssession.get("role")/session.get("perms")src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:225-230is_authenticated(...)only verifiesauthenticatedandapi.user_exists(user)(existence), not fresh role/permissionsrc/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:267-275login_required(...)usesparse_permissions(s)for allow/deny decisionssrc/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:356-365- API session auth path also trusts
s["role"]ands["perms"]
Role/permission updates are written to DB but active sessions are not invalidated/refreshed:
src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:389-434update_users(...)callsapi.set_user_permission(...)and returnssrc/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1643-1645set_user_permission(...)updates DB role/permission only
Default exposure window is long:
src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:47session_lifetime = 44640minutes (~31 days)
Therefore, privilege revocation is not enforced immediately for active sessions.
Note on duplicates: - This appears distinct from CVE-2023-0227 (session validity after user deletion) because this report is about stale authorization after role/permission changes while the user still exists.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Repro: stale session privilege after role/permission changes.
This PoC is source-based and leaves no persistent state.
It validates that:
1) Role/permission are cached into session at login.
2) Authorization checks read role/permission from session, not fresh DB values.
3) User updates write DB permission/role without invalidating active sessions.
4) Default session lifetime is long, increasing stale-privilege exposure window.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pathlib
import re
from typing import Iterable
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "pyload" / "src" / "pyload"
def read(rel: str) -> str:
return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def has_any(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
return all(re.search(p, text, re.MULTILINE) for p in patterns)
def main() -> None:
helpers = read("webui/app/helpers.py")
json_blueprint = read("webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py")
api_init = read("core/api/__init__.py")
default_cfg = (ROOT / "core/config/default.cfg").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
checks = {
"set_session_caches_role_perms": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+set_session\\(',
r'"role"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["role"\\]',
r'"perms"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["permission"\\]',
],
),
"is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+is_authenticated\\(',
r'api\\s*=\\s*flask\\.current_app\\.config\\["PYLOAD_API"\\]',
r'return\\s+authenticated\\s+and\\s+api\\.user_exists\\(user\\)',
],
),
"parse_permissions_reads_session_cache": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+parse_permissions\\(',
r'session\\.get\\("role"\\)\\s*==\\s*Role\\.ADMIN',
r'session\\.get\\("perms"\\)',
],
),
"login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+login_required\\(',
r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
r'perms\\s*=\\s*parse_permissions\\(s\\)',
],
),
"api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
r'"role"\\s*:\\s*s\\["role"\\]',
r'"permission"\\s*:\\s*s\\["perms"\\]',
],
),
"update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation": has_any(
json_blueprint,
[
r'def\\s+update_users\\(',
r'api\\.set_user_permission\\(name,\\s*data\\["permission"\\],\\s*data\\["role"\\]\\)',
r'return\\s+jsonify\\(True\\)',
],
),
"set_user_permission_only_updates_db": has_any(
api_init,
[
r'def\\s+set_user_permission\\(',
r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_permission\\(user,\\s*permission\\)',
r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_role\\(user,\\s*role\\)',
],
),
"default_session_lifetime_long": re.search(
r'session_lifetime\\s*:\\s*"Session lifetime \\(minutes\\)"\\s*=\\s*44640',
default_cfg,
re.MULTILINE,
)
is not None,
}
for name, ok in checks.items():
print(f"{name}={ok}")
stale_privilege_repro_success = all(checks.values())
print(f"stale_privilege_repro_success={stale_privilege_repro_success}")
# Cleanup: this PoC creates/modifies no runtime/data files.
print("cleanup_done=True")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
set_session_caches_role_perms=True
is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists=True
parse_permissions_reads_session_cache=True
login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session=True
api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms=True
update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation=True
set_user_permission_only_updates_db=True
default_session_lifetime_long=True
stale_privilege_repro_success=True
cleanup_done=True
Impact
- Privilege revocation is not immediate for active sessions.
- A user can continue using stale, previously granted privileges (including admin) after downgrade/restriction.
- This can allow continued access to privileged WebUI/API actions until session expiry or manual logout/session reset.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0b3.dev97"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:38:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\npyLoad caches `role` and `permission` in the session at login and continues to authorize requests using these cached values, even after an admin changes the user\u0027s role/permissions in the database.\n\nAs a result, an already logged-in user can keep old (revoked) privileges until logout/session expiry, enabling continued privileged actions.\n\nThis is a core authorization/session-consistency issue and is not resolved by toggling an optional security feature.\n\n### Details\nThe WebUI auth flow stores authorization state in session:\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:187-200`\n - `set_session(...)` writes:\n - `\"role\": user_info[\"role\"]`\n - `\"perms\": user_info[\"permission\"]`\n\nAuthorization checks later trust cached session values:\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:134-151`\n - `parse_permissions(...)` reads `session.get(\"role\")` / `session.get(\"perms\")`\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:225-230`\n - `is_authenticated(...)` only verifies `authenticated` and `api.user_exists(user)` (existence), not fresh role/permission\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:267-275`\n - `login_required(...)` uses `parse_permissions(s)` for allow/deny decisions\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:356-365`\n - API session auth path also trusts `s[\"role\"]` and `s[\"perms\"]`\n\nRole/permission updates are written to DB but active sessions are not invalidated/refreshed:\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:389-434`\n - `update_users(...)` calls `api.set_user_permission(...)` and returns\n- `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1643-1645`\n - `set_user_permission(...)` updates DB role/permission only\n\nDefault exposure window is long:\n\n- `src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:47`\n - `session_lifetime = 44640` minutes (~31 days)\n\nTherefore, privilege revocation is not enforced immediately for active sessions.\n\nNote on duplicates:\n- This appears distinct from CVE-2023-0227 (session validity after **user deletion**) because this report is about stale authorization after **role/permission changes** while the user still exists.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nRepro: stale session privilege after role/permission changes.\n\nThis PoC is source-based and leaves no persistent state.\nIt validates that:\n1) Role/permission are cached into session at login.\n2) Authorization checks read role/permission from session, not fresh DB values.\n3) User updates write DB permission/role without invalidating active sessions.\n4) Default session lifetime is long, increasing stale-privilege exposure window.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport pathlib\nimport re\nfrom typing import Iterable\n\n\nROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / \"pyload\" / \"src\" / \"pyload\"\n\n\ndef read(rel: str) -\u003e str:\n return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\n\ndef has_any(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -\u003e bool:\n return all(re.search(p, text, re.MULTILINE) for p in patterns)\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n helpers = read(\"webui/app/helpers.py\")\n json_blueprint = read(\"webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py\")\n api_init = read(\"core/api/__init__.py\")\n default_cfg = (ROOT / \"core/config/default.cfg\").read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\n checks = {\n \"set_session_caches_role_perms\": has_any(\n helpers,\n [\n r\u0027def\\\\s+set_session\\\\(\u0027,\n r\u0027\"role\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*user_info\\\\[\"role\"\\\\]\u0027,\n r\u0027\"perms\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*user_info\\\\[\"permission\"\\\\]\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists\": has_any(\n helpers,\n [\n r\u0027def\\\\s+is_authenticated\\\\(\u0027,\n r\u0027api\\\\s*=\\\\s*flask\\\\.current_app\\\\.config\\\\[\"PYLOAD_API\"\\\\]\u0027,\n r\u0027return\\\\s+authenticated\\\\s+and\\\\s+api\\\\.user_exists\\\\(user\\\\)\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"parse_permissions_reads_session_cache\": has_any(\n helpers,\n [\n r\u0027def\\\\s+parse_permissions\\\\(\u0027,\n r\u0027session\\\\.get\\\\(\"role\"\\\\)\\\\s*==\\\\s*Role\\\\.ADMIN\u0027,\n r\u0027session\\\\.get\\\\(\"perms\"\\\\)\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session\": has_any(\n helpers,\n [\n r\u0027def\\\\s+login_required\\\\(\u0027,\n r\u0027if\\\\s+is_authenticated\\\\(s\\\\):\u0027,\n r\u0027perms\\\\s*=\\\\s*parse_permissions\\\\(s\\\\)\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms\": has_any(\n helpers,\n [\n r\u0027if\\\\s+is_authenticated\\\\(s\\\\):\u0027,\n r\u0027\"role\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*s\\\\[\"role\"\\\\]\u0027,\n r\u0027\"permission\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*s\\\\[\"perms\"\\\\]\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation\": has_any(\n json_blueprint,\n [\n r\u0027def\\\\s+update_users\\\\(\u0027,\n r\u0027api\\\\.set_user_permission\\\\(name,\\\\s*data\\\\[\"permission\"\\\\],\\\\s*data\\\\[\"role\"\\\\]\\\\)\u0027,\n r\u0027return\\\\s+jsonify\\\\(True\\\\)\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"set_user_permission_only_updates_db\": has_any(\n api_init,\n [\n r\u0027def\\\\s+set_user_permission\\\\(\u0027,\n r\u0027self\\\\.pyload\\\\.db\\\\.set_permission\\\\(user,\\\\s*permission\\\\)\u0027,\n r\u0027self\\\\.pyload\\\\.db\\\\.set_role\\\\(user,\\\\s*role\\\\)\u0027,\n ],\n ),\n \"default_session_lifetime_long\": re.search(\n r\u0027session_lifetime\\\\s*:\\\\s*\"Session lifetime \\\\(minutes\\\\)\"\\\\s*=\\\\s*44640\u0027,\n default_cfg,\n re.MULTILINE,\n )\n is not None,\n }\n\n for name, ok in checks.items():\n print(f\"{name}={ok}\")\n\n stale_privilege_repro_success = all(checks.values())\n print(f\"stale_privilege_repro_success={stale_privilege_repro_success}\")\n\n # Cleanup: this PoC creates/modifies no runtime/data files.\n print(\"cleanup_done=True\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\n```text\nset_session_caches_role_perms=True\nis_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists=True\nparse_permissions_reads_session_cache=True\nlogin_required_uses_parse_permissions_session=True\napi_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms=True\nupdate_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation=True\nset_user_permission_only_updates_db=True\ndefault_session_lifetime_long=True\nstale_privilege_repro_success=True\ncleanup_done=True\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Privilege revocation is not immediate for active sessions.\n- A user can continue using stale, previously granted privileges (including admin) after downgrade/restriction.\n- This can allow continued access to privileged WebUI/API actions until session expiry or manual logout/session reset.",
"id": "GHSA-66hx-chf7-3332",
"modified": "2026-04-14T23:38:35Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T23:38:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-66hx-chf7-3332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/e95804fb0d06cbb07d2ba380fc494d9ff89b68c1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pyLoad has Stale Session Privilege After Role/Permission Change (Privilege Revocation Bypass)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.