GHSA-66HX-CHF7-3332

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:38 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:38
VLAI?
Summary
pyLoad has Stale Session Privilege After Role/Permission Change (Privilege Revocation Bypass)
Details

Summary

pyLoad caches role and permission in the session at login and continues to authorize requests using these cached values, even after an admin changes the user's role/permissions in the database.

As a result, an already logged-in user can keep old (revoked) privileges until logout/session expiry, enabling continued privileged actions.

This is a core authorization/session-consistency issue and is not resolved by toggling an optional security feature.

Details

The WebUI auth flow stores authorization state in session:

  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:187-200
  • set_session(...) writes:
    • "role": user_info["role"]
    • "perms": user_info["permission"]

Authorization checks later trust cached session values:

  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:134-151
  • parse_permissions(...) reads session.get("role") / session.get("perms")
  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:225-230
  • is_authenticated(...) only verifies authenticated and api.user_exists(user) (existence), not fresh role/permission
  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:267-275
  • login_required(...) uses parse_permissions(s) for allow/deny decisions
  • src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:356-365
  • API session auth path also trusts s["role"] and s["perms"]

Role/permission updates are written to DB but active sessions are not invalidated/refreshed:

  • src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:389-434
  • update_users(...) calls api.set_user_permission(...) and returns
  • src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1643-1645
  • set_user_permission(...) updates DB role/permission only

Default exposure window is long:

  • src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:47
  • session_lifetime = 44640 minutes (~31 days)

Therefore, privilege revocation is not enforced immediately for active sessions.

Note on duplicates: - This appears distinct from CVE-2023-0227 (session validity after user deletion) because this report is about stale authorization after role/permission changes while the user still exists.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Repro: stale session privilege after role/permission changes.

This PoC is source-based and leaves no persistent state.
It validates that:
1) Role/permission are cached into session at login.
2) Authorization checks read role/permission from session, not fresh DB values.
3) User updates write DB permission/role without invalidating active sessions.
4) Default session lifetime is long, increasing stale-privilege exposure window.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import pathlib
import re
from typing import Iterable


ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "pyload" / "src" / "pyload"


def read(rel: str) -> str:
    return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")


def has_any(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
    return all(re.search(p, text, re.MULTILINE) for p in patterns)


def main() -> None:
    helpers = read("webui/app/helpers.py")
    json_blueprint = read("webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py")
    api_init = read("core/api/__init__.py")
    default_cfg = (ROOT / "core/config/default.cfg").read_text(encoding="utf-8")

    checks = {
        "set_session_caches_role_perms": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+set_session\\(',
                r'"role"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["role"\\]',
                r'"perms"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["permission"\\]',
            ],
        ),
        "is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+is_authenticated\\(',
                r'api\\s*=\\s*flask\\.current_app\\.config\\["PYLOAD_API"\\]',
                r'return\\s+authenticated\\s+and\\s+api\\.user_exists\\(user\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "parse_permissions_reads_session_cache": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+parse_permissions\\(',
                r'session\\.get\\("role"\\)\\s*==\\s*Role\\.ADMIN',
                r'session\\.get\\("perms"\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'def\\s+login_required\\(',
                r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
                r'perms\\s*=\\s*parse_permissions\\(s\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms": has_any(
            helpers,
            [
                r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
                r'"role"\\s*:\\s*s\\["role"\\]',
                r'"permission"\\s*:\\s*s\\["perms"\\]',
            ],
        ),
        "update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation": has_any(
            json_blueprint,
            [
                r'def\\s+update_users\\(',
                r'api\\.set_user_permission\\(name,\\s*data\\["permission"\\],\\s*data\\["role"\\]\\)',
                r'return\\s+jsonify\\(True\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "set_user_permission_only_updates_db": has_any(
            api_init,
            [
                r'def\\s+set_user_permission\\(',
                r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_permission\\(user,\\s*permission\\)',
                r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_role\\(user,\\s*role\\)',
            ],
        ),
        "default_session_lifetime_long": re.search(
            r'session_lifetime\\s*:\\s*"Session lifetime \\(minutes\\)"\\s*=\\s*44640',
            default_cfg,
            re.MULTILINE,
        )
        is not None,
    }

    for name, ok in checks.items():
        print(f"{name}={ok}")

    stale_privilege_repro_success = all(checks.values())
    print(f"stale_privilege_repro_success={stale_privilege_repro_success}")

    # Cleanup: this PoC creates/modifies no runtime/data files.
    print("cleanup_done=True")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
set_session_caches_role_perms=True
is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists=True
parse_permissions_reads_session_cache=True
login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session=True
api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms=True
update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation=True
set_user_permission_only_updates_db=True
default_session_lifetime_long=True
stale_privilege_repro_success=True
cleanup_done=True

Impact

  • Privilege revocation is not immediate for active sessions.
  • A user can continue using stale, previously granted privileges (including admin) after downgrade/restriction.
  • This can allow continued access to privileged WebUI/API actions until session expiry or manual logout/session reset.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pyload-ng"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.5.0b3.dev97"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-613"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:38:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\npyLoad caches `role` and `permission` in the session at login and continues to authorize requests using these cached values, even after an admin changes the user\u0027s role/permissions in the database.\n\nAs a result, an already logged-in user can keep old (revoked) privileges until logout/session expiry, enabling continued privileged actions.\n\nThis is a core authorization/session-consistency issue and is not resolved by toggling an optional security feature.\n\n### Details\nThe WebUI auth flow stores authorization state in session:\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:187-200`\n  - `set_session(...)` writes:\n    - `\"role\": user_info[\"role\"]`\n    - `\"perms\": user_info[\"permission\"]`\n\nAuthorization checks later trust cached session values:\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:134-151`\n  - `parse_permissions(...)` reads `session.get(\"role\")` / `session.get(\"perms\")`\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:225-230`\n  - `is_authenticated(...)` only verifies `authenticated` and `api.user_exists(user)` (existence), not fresh role/permission\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:267-275`\n  - `login_required(...)` uses `parse_permissions(s)` for allow/deny decisions\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:356-365`\n  - API session auth path also trusts `s[\"role\"]` and `s[\"perms\"]`\n\nRole/permission updates are written to DB but active sessions are not invalidated/refreshed:\n\n- `src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:389-434`\n  - `update_users(...)` calls `api.set_user_permission(...)` and returns\n- `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1643-1645`\n  - `set_user_permission(...)` updates DB role/permission only\n\nDefault exposure window is long:\n\n- `src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:47`\n  - `session_lifetime = 44640` minutes (~31 days)\n\nTherefore, privilege revocation is not enforced immediately for active sessions.\n\nNote on duplicates:\n- This appears distinct from CVE-2023-0227 (session validity after **user deletion**) because this report is about stale authorization after **role/permission changes** while the user still exists.\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nRepro: stale session privilege after role/permission changes.\n\nThis PoC is source-based and leaves no persistent state.\nIt validates that:\n1) Role/permission are cached into session at login.\n2) Authorization checks read role/permission from session, not fresh DB values.\n3) User updates write DB permission/role without invalidating active sessions.\n4) Default session lifetime is long, increasing stale-privilege exposure window.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport pathlib\nimport re\nfrom typing import Iterable\n\n\nROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / \"pyload\" / \"src\" / \"pyload\"\n\n\ndef read(rel: str) -\u003e str:\n    return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\n\ndef has_any(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -\u003e bool:\n    return all(re.search(p, text, re.MULTILINE) for p in patterns)\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n    helpers = read(\"webui/app/helpers.py\")\n    json_blueprint = read(\"webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py\")\n    api_init = read(\"core/api/__init__.py\")\n    default_cfg = (ROOT / \"core/config/default.cfg\").read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\n    checks = {\n        \"set_session_caches_role_perms\": has_any(\n            helpers,\n            [\n                r\u0027def\\\\s+set_session\\\\(\u0027,\n                r\u0027\"role\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*user_info\\\\[\"role\"\\\\]\u0027,\n                r\u0027\"perms\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*user_info\\\\[\"permission\"\\\\]\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists\": has_any(\n            helpers,\n            [\n                r\u0027def\\\\s+is_authenticated\\\\(\u0027,\n                r\u0027api\\\\s*=\\\\s*flask\\\\.current_app\\\\.config\\\\[\"PYLOAD_API\"\\\\]\u0027,\n                r\u0027return\\\\s+authenticated\\\\s+and\\\\s+api\\\\.user_exists\\\\(user\\\\)\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"parse_permissions_reads_session_cache\": has_any(\n            helpers,\n            [\n                r\u0027def\\\\s+parse_permissions\\\\(\u0027,\n                r\u0027session\\\\.get\\\\(\"role\"\\\\)\\\\s*==\\\\s*Role\\\\.ADMIN\u0027,\n                r\u0027session\\\\.get\\\\(\"perms\"\\\\)\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session\": has_any(\n            helpers,\n            [\n                r\u0027def\\\\s+login_required\\\\(\u0027,\n                r\u0027if\\\\s+is_authenticated\\\\(s\\\\):\u0027,\n                r\u0027perms\\\\s*=\\\\s*parse_permissions\\\\(s\\\\)\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms\": has_any(\n            helpers,\n            [\n                r\u0027if\\\\s+is_authenticated\\\\(s\\\\):\u0027,\n                r\u0027\"role\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*s\\\\[\"role\"\\\\]\u0027,\n                r\u0027\"permission\"\\\\s*:\\\\s*s\\\\[\"perms\"\\\\]\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation\": has_any(\n            json_blueprint,\n            [\n                r\u0027def\\\\s+update_users\\\\(\u0027,\n                r\u0027api\\\\.set_user_permission\\\\(name,\\\\s*data\\\\[\"permission\"\\\\],\\\\s*data\\\\[\"role\"\\\\]\\\\)\u0027,\n                r\u0027return\\\\s+jsonify\\\\(True\\\\)\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"set_user_permission_only_updates_db\": has_any(\n            api_init,\n            [\n                r\u0027def\\\\s+set_user_permission\\\\(\u0027,\n                r\u0027self\\\\.pyload\\\\.db\\\\.set_permission\\\\(user,\\\\s*permission\\\\)\u0027,\n                r\u0027self\\\\.pyload\\\\.db\\\\.set_role\\\\(user,\\\\s*role\\\\)\u0027,\n            ],\n        ),\n        \"default_session_lifetime_long\": re.search(\n            r\u0027session_lifetime\\\\s*:\\\\s*\"Session lifetime \\\\(minutes\\\\)\"\\\\s*=\\\\s*44640\u0027,\n            default_cfg,\n            re.MULTILINE,\n        )\n        is not None,\n    }\n\n    for name, ok in checks.items():\n        print(f\"{name}={ok}\")\n\n    stale_privilege_repro_success = all(checks.values())\n    print(f\"stale_privilege_repro_success={stale_privilege_repro_success}\")\n\n    # Cleanup: this PoC creates/modifies no runtime/data files.\n    print(\"cleanup_done=True\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```\n\n```text\nset_session_caches_role_perms=True\nis_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists=True\nparse_permissions_reads_session_cache=True\nlogin_required_uses_parse_permissions_session=True\napi_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms=True\nupdate_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation=True\nset_user_permission_only_updates_db=True\ndefault_session_lifetime_long=True\nstale_privilege_repro_success=True\ncleanup_done=True\n```\n\n### Impact\n- Privilege revocation is not immediate for active sessions.\n- A user can continue using stale, previously granted privileges (including admin) after downgrade/restriction.\n- This can allow continued access to privileged WebUI/API actions until session expiry or manual logout/session reset.",
  "id": "GHSA-66hx-chf7-3332",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:38:35Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:38:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-66hx-chf7-3332"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/e95804fb0d06cbb07d2ba380fc494d9ff89b68c1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pyLoad has Stale Session Privilege After Role/Permission Change (Privilege Revocation Bypass)"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…