GHSA-665X-PPC4-685W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 15:20 – Updated: 2026-04-21 15:20
VLAI?
Summary
OpenMage LTS: Cross-user wishlist import leads to private option & file disclosure
Details

Cross-user wishlist item import via shared wishlist code, leading to private option disclosure and file-disclosure variant

Summary

The shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public sharing_code, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global wishlist_item_id and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code.

This lets an attacker use:

  • a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A
  • a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B

to import victim item B into the attacker's cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A.

Because the victim item's stored buyRequest is reused during cart import, the victim's private custom-option data is copied into the attacker's quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound.

Vulnerability Type

  • Broken object-level authorization / IDOR
  • Cross-user data disclosure
  • Cross-user file disclosure variant

Root Cause

In app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/SharedController.php, the shared flow does:

$item = Mage::getModel('wishlist/item')->load($itemId);
$wishlist = Mage::getModel('wishlist/wishlist')->loadByCode($code);
...
$item->addToCart($cart);

Relevant lines:

  • SharedController.php:86 loads the wishlist item by global ID
  • SharedController.php:87 loads the wishlist by shared code
  • SharedController.php:99 imports the item into cart

There is no check that:

$item->getWishlistId() == $wishlist->getId()

The safe owner flow in app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/IndexController.php:521-528 does preserve this binding by deriving the wishlist from item->getWishlistId().

The imported item keeps its original buyRequest because app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/Model/Item.php:370-372 passes that stored request directly into:

$cart->addProduct($product, $buyRequest);

Security Impact

Baseline impact

An attacker can import another user's private wishlist item into the attacker's own cart, using an unrelated shared wishlist code.

This is a clear cross-user authorization bypass. The victim item's private configuration is copied into the attacker's quote, including custom-option values such as personalized text.

Stronger variant: cross-user file disclosure

If the victim item contains a custom option of type file, the imported quote item preserves file metadata such as:

  • quote_path
  • order_path
  • secret_key

The file option renderer in app/code/core/Mage/Catalog/Model/Product/Option/Type/File.php:547-552 generates a download URL from:

  • the imported sales/quote_item_option ID
  • the preserved secret_key

The downloader in app/code/core/Mage/Sales/controllers/DownloadController.php:150-185:

  • loads quote item option by global ID
  • verifies only product option type and secret_key
  • reads the file from order_path or quote_path

It does not verify ownership of the quote item, order, or original wishlist item. This creates a cross-user file disclosure path once victim file metadata has been imported.

Steps To Reproduce

Lab data

  • shared wishlist A:
  • wishlist_id = 1
  • customer_id = 2
  • sharing_code = 6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412
  • victim wishlist B:
  • wishlist_id = 2
  • customer_id = 3
  • victim item:
  • wishlist_item_id = 1
  • wishlist_id = 2
  • product_id = 2
  • victim private text option marker:
  • VICTIM-MARKER-49040822

Reproduction

Send:

GET /wishlist/shared/cart/?code=6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412&item=1

Where:

  • code belongs to shared wishlist A
  • item=1 belongs to victim wishlist B

Expected result

The request should be rejected because the item does not belong to the shared wishlist referenced by the sharing_code.

Actual result

The application imports victim item 1 into the attacker's quote anyway.

Verified Evidence

Baseline variant

Previously verified at quote/option level in lab:

option_1 = VICTIM-MARKER-49040822

This shows that the attacker's cart received victim-private custom-option data from another user's wishlist item.

File-disclosure variant

Previously verified in lab after importing a victim file-option payload:

/sales/download/downloadCustomOption/id/9/key/86fca9b61c0b891b52fb/

This URL was generated from imported quote item option data containing the victim file metadata and secret key.

Why This Is A Valid Bug

This is not a timing issue and does not depend on non-default security settings.

The bug is a direct authorization failure:

  • authorization is based on wishlist A's share code
  • the acted-on object is item B from another wishlist
  • there is no item-to-wishlist binding check
  • victim-controlled item state is then copied into attacker-controlled cart state

That is a broken object-level authorization issue with clear cross-user impact.

Remediation

In SharedController::cartAction(), reject any request where the loaded item does not belong to the wishlist loaded from the share code:

$item = Mage::getModel('wishlist/item')->load($itemId);
$wishlist = Mage::getModel('wishlist/wishlist')->loadByCode($code);

if (!$item->getId() || !$wishlist->getId() || (int) $item->getWishlistId() !== (int) $wishlist->getId()) {
    return $this->_forward('noRoute');
}

Defense in depth:

  • bind sales/download/downloadCustomOption to the current quote/order owner instead of trusting only id + secret_key
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "openmage/magento-lts"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.17.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40098"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T15:20:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T17:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Cross-user wishlist item import via shared wishlist code, leading to private option disclosure and file-disclosure variant\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public `sharing_code`, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global `wishlist_item_id` and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code.\n\nThis lets an attacker use:\n\n- a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A\n- a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B\n\nto import victim item B into the attacker\u0027s cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A.\n\nBecause the victim item\u0027s stored `buyRequest` is reused during cart import, the victim\u0027s private custom-option data is copied into the attacker\u0027s quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound.\n\n## Vulnerability Type\n\n- Broken object-level authorization / IDOR\n- Cross-user data disclosure\n- Cross-user file disclosure variant\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/SharedController.php`, the shared flow does:\n\n```php\n$item = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/item\u0027)-\u003eload($itemId);\n$wishlist = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/wishlist\u0027)-\u003eloadByCode($code);\n...\n$item-\u003eaddToCart($cart);\n```\n\nRelevant lines:\n\n- `SharedController.php:86` loads the wishlist item by global ID\n- `SharedController.php:87` loads the wishlist by shared code\n- `SharedController.php:99` imports the item into cart\n\nThere is no check that:\n\n```php\n$item-\u003egetWishlistId() == $wishlist-\u003egetId()\n```\n\nThe safe owner flow in `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/IndexController.php:521-528` does preserve this binding by deriving the wishlist from `item-\u003egetWishlistId()`.\n\nThe imported item keeps its original `buyRequest` because `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/Model/Item.php:370-372` passes that stored request directly into:\n\n```php\n$cart-\u003eaddProduct($product, $buyRequest);\n```\n\n## Security Impact\n\n### Baseline impact\n\nAn attacker can import another user\u0027s private wishlist item into the attacker\u0027s own cart, using an unrelated shared wishlist code.\n\nThis is a clear cross-user authorization bypass. The victim item\u0027s private configuration is copied into the attacker\u0027s quote, including custom-option values such as personalized text.\n\n### Stronger variant: cross-user file disclosure\n\nIf the victim item contains a custom option of type `file`, the imported quote item preserves file metadata such as:\n\n- `quote_path`\n- `order_path`\n- `secret_key`\n\nThe file option renderer in `app/code/core/Mage/Catalog/Model/Product/Option/Type/File.php:547-552` generates a download URL from:\n\n- the imported `sales/quote_item_option` ID\n- the preserved `secret_key`\n\nThe downloader in `app/code/core/Mage/Sales/controllers/DownloadController.php:150-185`:\n\n- loads quote item option by global ID\n- verifies only product option type and `secret_key`\n- reads the file from `order_path` or `quote_path`\n\nIt does not verify ownership of the quote item, order, or original wishlist item. This creates a cross-user file disclosure path once victim file metadata has been imported.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n### Lab data\n\n- shared wishlist A:\n  - `wishlist_id = 1`\n  - `customer_id = 2`\n  - `sharing_code = 6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412`\n- victim wishlist B:\n  - `wishlist_id = 2`\n  - `customer_id = 3`\n- victim item:\n  - `wishlist_item_id = 1`\n  - `wishlist_id = 2`\n  - `product_id = 2`\n- victim private text option marker:\n  - `VICTIM-MARKER-49040822`\n\n### Reproduction\n\nSend:\n\n```http\nGET /wishlist/shared/cart/?code=6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412\u0026item=1\n```\n\nWhere:\n\n- `code` belongs to shared wishlist A\n- `item=1` belongs to victim wishlist B\n\n### Expected result\n\nThe request should be rejected because the item does not belong to the shared wishlist referenced by the `sharing_code`.\n\n### Actual result\n\nThe application imports victim item `1` into the attacker\u0027s quote anyway.\n\n## Verified Evidence\n\n### Baseline variant\n\nPreviously verified at quote/option level in lab:\n\n```text\noption_1 = VICTIM-MARKER-49040822\n```\n\nThis shows that the attacker\u0027s cart received victim-private custom-option data from another user\u0027s wishlist item.\n\n### File-disclosure variant\n\nPreviously verified in lab after importing a victim file-option payload:\n\n```text\n/sales/download/downloadCustomOption/id/9/key/86fca9b61c0b891b52fb/\n```\n\nThis URL was generated from imported quote item option data containing the victim file metadata and secret key.\n\n## Why This Is A Valid Bug\n\nThis is not a timing issue and does not depend on non-default security settings.\n\nThe bug is a direct authorization failure:\n\n- authorization is based on wishlist A\u0027s share code\n- the acted-on object is item B from another wishlist\n- there is no item-to-wishlist binding check\n- victim-controlled item state is then copied into attacker-controlled cart state\n\nThat is a broken object-level authorization issue with clear cross-user impact.\n\n## Remediation\n\nIn `SharedController::cartAction()`, reject any request where the loaded item does not belong to the wishlist loaded from the share code:\n\n```php\n$item = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/item\u0027)-\u003eload($itemId);\n$wishlist = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/wishlist\u0027)-\u003eloadByCode($code);\n\nif (!$item-\u003egetId() || !$wishlist-\u003egetId() || (int) $item-\u003egetWishlistId() !== (int) $wishlist-\u003egetId()) {\n    return $this-\u003e_forward(\u0027noRoute\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nDefense in depth:\n\n- bind `sales/download/downloadCustomOption` to the current quote/order owner instead of trusting only `id + secret_key`",
  "id": "GHSA-665x-ppc4-685w",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T15:20:41Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T15:20:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/security/advisories/GHSA-665x-ppc4-685w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/pull/5446"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/releases/tag/v20.17.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenMage LTS: Cross-user wishlist import leads to private option \u0026 file disclosure"
}


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