GHSA-65G7-H87V-V85M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-13 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: Disallow toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on an existing memslot
Reject attempts to disable KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on a memslot that was initially created with a guest_memfd binding, as KVM doesn't support toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on existing memslots. KVM prevents enabling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, but doesn't prevent clearing the flag.
Failure to reject the new memslot results in a use-after-free due to KVM not unbinding from the guest_memfd instance. Unbinding on a FLAGS_ONLY change is easy enough, and can/will be done as a hardening measure (in anticipation of KVM supporting dirty logging on guest_memfd at some point), but fixing the use-after-free would only address the immediate symptom.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881111ae908 by task repro/745
CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 745 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-115d5de2eef3-next-kasan #3 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60 print_report+0xcb/0x5c0 kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0 kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm] __fput+0x2fa/0x9d0 task_work_run+0x12c/0x200 do_exit+0x6ae/0x2100 do_group_exit+0xa8/0x230 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 x64_sys_call+0x737/0x740 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f581f2eac31
Allocated by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.746971s: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50 __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90 kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x652/0x1110 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
Freed by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.747467s: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50 __kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3b/0x60 kfree+0xf5/0x440 kvm_set_memslot+0x3c2/0x1160 [kvm] kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x86a/0x1110 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T16:16:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: Disallow toggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on an existing memslot\n\nReject attempts to disable KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on a memslot that was\ninitially created with a guest_memfd binding, as KVM doesn\u0027t support\ntoggling KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD on existing memslots. KVM prevents enabling\nKVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD, but doesn\u0027t prevent clearing the flag.\n\nFailure to reject the new memslot results in a use-after-free due to KVM\nnot unbinding from the guest_memfd instance. Unbinding on a FLAGS_ONLY\nchange is easy enough, and can/will be done as a hardening measure (in\nanticipation of KVM supporting dirty logging on guest_memfd at some point),\nbut fixing the use-after-free would only address the immediate symptom.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm]\n Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881111ae908 by task repro/745\n\n CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 745 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6-115d5de2eef3-next-kasan #3 NONE\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x60\n print_report+0xcb/0x5c0\n kasan_report+0xb4/0xe0\n kvm_gmem_release+0x362/0x400 [kvm]\n __fput+0x2fa/0x9d0\n task_work_run+0x12c/0x200\n do_exit+0x6ae/0x2100\n do_group_exit+0xa8/0x230\n __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50\n x64_sys_call+0x737/0x740\n do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n RIP: 0033:0x7f581f2eac31\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n Allocated by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.746971s:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90\n kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x652/0x1110 [kvm]\n kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0\n do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n\n Freed by task 745 on cpu 6 at 9.747467s:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x13/0x50\n __kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x50\n __kasan_slab_free+0x3b/0x60\n kfree+0xf5/0x440\n kvm_set_memslot+0x3c2/0x1160 [kvm]\n kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x86a/0x1110 [kvm]\n kvm_vm_ioctl+0x14b0/0x3290 [kvm]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x1a0\n do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x900\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53",
"id": "GHSA-65g7-h87v-v85m",
"modified": "2026-01-13T18:31:04Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T18:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89dbbe6ff323fc34659621a577fe0af913f47386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9935df5333aa503a18de5071f53762b65c783c4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb51bef465d8ec60a968507330e01020e35dc127"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
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