GHSA-656W-6F6C-M9R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 17:29 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:44Summary
OneUptime's GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled state and installation_id values and updates Project.gitHubAppInstallationId with isRoot: true without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project's GitHub App installation binding.
Related GitHub endpoints also lack effective authorization, so a valid installation ID can be used to enumerate repositories and create CodeRepository records in an arbitrary project.
Details
The callback decodes unsigned base64 JSON from state and uses the embedded projectId directly:
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L34-L112
It then writes the supplied installation_id into the target project with root privileges:
await ProjectService.updateOneById({
id: new ObjectID(projectId),
data: { gitHubAppInstallationId: installationId },
props: { isRoot: true },
});
The userId in state is only checked for presence, not authenticity:
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L73-L79
The install flow also generates state as plain base64 JSON, not a signed or session-bound token:
- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L127-L165
The follow-on endpoints are also vulnerable:
- Repository listing: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L179-L258
- Repository connect: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L260-L356
- Middleware allows requests with no token to continue as
Public: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization.ts#L205-L211 - Installation tokens are minted from any valid installation ID: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHub.ts#L347-L425
PoC
Minimal proof of unauthorized project tampering:
STATE=$(printf '%s' '{"projectId":"<victim-project-uuid>","userId":"x"}' | base64 | tr -d '\n')
curl -isk "https://<host>/api/github/auth/callback?installation_id=999999999&state=${STATE}"
Expected result:
- Server returns a
302redirect to/dashboard/<victim-project-uuid>/code-repository?installation_id=999999999 - The target project's
gitHubAppInstallationIdis overwritten
Impact
- Unauthorized modification of
Project.gitHubAppInstallationId - Temporary GitHub integration breakage if a bogus installation ID is set
- Cross-project binding of attacker-controlled GitHub App installations
- Repository metadata disclosure for a supplied valid installation ID
- Unauthorized creation of
CodeRepositoryrecords in arbitrary projects
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@oneuptime/common"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T17:29:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T17:40:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nOneUptime\u0027s GitHub App callback trusts attacker-controlled `state` and `installation_id` values and updates `Project.gitHubAppInstallationId` with `isRoot: true` without validating that the caller is authorized for the target project. This allows an attacker to overwrite another project\u0027s GitHub App installation binding.\n\nRelated GitHub endpoints also lack effective authorization, so a valid installation ID can be used to enumerate repositories and create `CodeRepository` records in an arbitrary project.\n\n### Details\n\nThe callback decodes unsigned base64 JSON from `state` and uses the embedded `projectId` directly:\n\n- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L34-L112\n\nIt then writes the supplied `installation_id` into the target project with root privileges:\n\n```ts\nawait ProjectService.updateOneById({\n id: new ObjectID(projectId),\n data: { gitHubAppInstallationId: installationId },\n props: { isRoot: true },\n});\n```\n\nThe `userId` in `state` is only checked for presence, not authenticity:\n\n- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L73-L79\n\nThe install flow also generates `state` as plain base64 JSON, not a signed or session-bound token:\n\n- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L127-L165\n\nThe follow-on endpoints are also vulnerable:\n\n- Repository listing: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L179-L258\n- Repository connect: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L260-L356\n- Middleware allows requests with no token to continue as `Public`: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization.ts#L205-L211\n- Installation tokens are minted from any valid installation ID: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHub.ts#L347-L425\n\n### PoC\n\nMinimal proof of unauthorized project tampering:\n\n```bash\nSTATE=$(printf \u0027%s\u0027 \u0027{\"projectId\":\"\u003cvictim-project-uuid\u003e\",\"userId\":\"x\"}\u0027 | base64 | tr -d \u0027\\n\u0027)\ncurl -isk \"https://\u003chost\u003e/api/github/auth/callback?installation_id=999999999\u0026state=${STATE}\"\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n- Server returns a `302` redirect to `/dashboard/\u003cvictim-project-uuid\u003e/code-repository?installation_id=999999999`\n- The target project\u0027s `gitHubAppInstallationId` is overwritten\n\n### Impact\n\n- Unauthorized modification of `Project.gitHubAppInstallationId`\n- Temporary GitHub integration breakage if a bogus installation ID is set\n- Cross-project binding of attacker-controlled GitHub App installations\n- Repository metadata disclosure for a supplied valid installation ID\n- Unauthorized creation of `CodeRepository` records in arbitrary projects",
"id": "GHSA-656w-6f6c-m9r6",
"modified": "2026-03-10T18:44:14Z",
"published": "2026-03-09T17:29:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-656w-6f6c-m9r6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30920"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L127-L165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L179-L258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L260-L356"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L34-L112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/API/GitHubAPI.ts#L73-L79"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization.ts#L205-L211"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/master/Common/Server/Utils/CodeRepository/GitHub/GitHub.ts#L347-L425"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OneUptime has broken access control in GitHub App installation flow that allows unauthorized project binding"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.