GHSA-63MG-XP9J-JFCM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 00:01 – Updated: 2026-04-01 00:01
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw: Google Chat and Zalouser group sender allowlist bypass via policy downgrade
Details

Summary

When only a route-level group allowlist was configured, sender policy resolution silently downgraded from allowlist to open instead of preserving the configured group policy.

Impact

Any member of an allowlisted Google Chat space or Zalouser group could interact with the bot even when the operator intended sender-level restrictions.

Affected Component

extensions/googlechat/src/monitor-access.ts, extensions/zalouser/src/monitor.ts

Fixed Versions

  • Affected: <= 2026.3.24
  • Patched: >= 2026.3.28
  • Latest stable 2026.3.28 contains the fix.

Fix

Fixed by commit e64a881ae0 (Channels: preserve routed group policy).

Severity ?
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33578"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T00:01:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T15:16:14Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen only a route-level group allowlist was configured, sender policy resolution silently downgraded from `allowlist` to `open` instead of preserving the configured group policy.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny member of an allowlisted Google Chat space or Zalouser group could interact with the bot even when the operator intended sender-level restrictions.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n`extensions/googlechat/src/monitor-access.ts, extensions/zalouser/src/monitor.ts`\n\n## Fixed Versions\n\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.3.24`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.3.28`\n- Latest stable `2026.3.28` contains the fix.\n\n## Fix\n\nFixed by commit `e64a881ae0` (`Channels: preserve routed group policy`).",
  "id": "GHSA-63mg-xp9j-jfcm",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T00:01:10Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T00:01:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-63mg-xp9j-jfcm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33578"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/e64a881ae0fb8af18e451163f4c2d611d60cc8e4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-sender-policy-allowlist-bypass-via-policy-downgrade-in-google-chat-and-zalouser-extensions"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Google Chat and Zalouser group sender allowlist bypass via policy downgrade"
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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