GHSA-5Q48-Q4FM-G3M6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:04 – Updated: 2026-04-08 00:04
VLAI?
Summary
File Browser has an access rule bypass via HasPrefix without trailing separator in path matching
Details

Hi,

The Matches() function in rules/rules.go uses strings.HasPrefix() without a trailing directory separator when matching paths against access rules. A rule for /uploads also matches /uploads_backup/, granting or denying access to unintended directories. Verified against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).

Details

At rules/rules.go:29-35:

func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {
    if r.Regex {
        return r.Regexp.MatchString(path)
    }
    return strings.HasPrefix(path, r.Path)
}

When a rule has Path: "/uploads", any path starting with /uploads matches, including /uploads_backup/secret.txt. The regex variant at line 31 uses proper matching, but the non-regex path uses a prefix check without ensuring the match ends at a directory boundary.

The Check() function at http/data.go:29-48 iterates all rules with last-match-wins semantics. No secondary validation exists beyond this prefix check.

PoC

Admin configures: allow rule Path: "/shared" for a restricted user.

Filesystem contains: - /shared/ (intended to be accessible) - /shared_private/ (intended to be restricted)

User requests /shared_private/secret.txt: - strings.HasPrefix("/shared_private/secret.txt", "/shared") returns true - Allow rule applies - Access granted to the unintended directory

Impact

Authenticated users can access files in sibling directories that share a common prefix with an allowed directory, bypassing the admin's intended access configuration.

Prior art

Prior advisories GHSA-4mh3-h929-w968 (path-based access control bypass) and GHSA-9f3r-2vgw-m8xp (path traversal in copy/rename) addressed related access control issues. This HasPrefix prefix-collision is a distinct, unreported variant.

Suggested Fix

func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {
    if r.Regex {
        return r.Regexp.MatchString(path)
    }
    prefix := r.Path
    if prefix != "/" && !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, "/") {
        prefix += "/"
    }
    return path == r.Path || strings.HasPrefix(path, prefix)
}

Koda Reef

Update: Fix submitted as PR #5889.

Severity ?
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.63.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35605"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:04:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Hi,\n\nThe `Matches()` function in `rules/rules.go` uses `strings.HasPrefix()` without a trailing directory separator when matching paths against access rules. A rule for `/uploads` also matches `/uploads_backup/`, granting or denying access to unintended directories. Verified against v2.62.2 (commit 860c19d).\n\n## Details\n\nAt `rules/rules.go:29-35`:\n\n    func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {\n        if r.Regex {\n            return r.Regexp.MatchString(path)\n        }\n        return strings.HasPrefix(path, r.Path)\n    }\n\nWhen a rule has `Path: \"/uploads\"`, any path starting with `/uploads` matches, including `/uploads_backup/secret.txt`. The regex variant at line 31 uses proper matching, but the non-regex path uses a prefix check without ensuring the match ends at a directory boundary.\n\nThe `Check()` function at `http/data.go:29-48` iterates all rules with last-match-wins semantics. No secondary validation exists beyond this prefix check.\n\n## PoC\n\nAdmin configures: allow rule `Path: \"/shared\"` for a restricted user.\n\nFilesystem contains:\n- `/shared/` (intended to be accessible)\n- `/shared_private/` (intended to be restricted)\n\nUser requests `/shared_private/secret.txt`:\n- `strings.HasPrefix(\"/shared_private/secret.txt\", \"/shared\")` returns true\n- Allow rule applies\n- Access granted to the unintended directory\n\n## Impact\n\nAuthenticated users can access files in sibling directories that share a common prefix with an allowed directory, bypassing the admin\u0027s intended access configuration.\n\n## Prior art\n\nPrior advisories GHSA-4mh3-h929-w968 (path-based access control bypass) and GHSA-9f3r-2vgw-m8xp (path traversal in copy/rename) addressed related access control issues. This HasPrefix prefix-collision is a distinct, unreported variant.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n    func (r *Rule) Matches(path string) bool {\n        if r.Regex {\n            return r.Regexp.MatchString(path)\n        }\n        prefix := r.Path\n        if prefix != \"/\" \u0026\u0026 !strings.HasSuffix(prefix, \"/\") {\n            prefix += \"/\"\n        }\n        return path == r.Path || strings.HasPrefix(path, prefix)\n    }\n\nKoda Reef\n\n---\n\n**Update:** Fix submitted as PR #5889.",
  "id": "GHSA-5q48-q4fm-g3m6",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T00:04:49Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T00:04:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-5q48-q4fm-g3m6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/pull/5889"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "File Browser has an access rule bypass via HasPrefix without trailing separator in path matching"
}


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