GHSA-59WX-RWXR-9VQ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix ERTM re-init and zero pdu_len infinite loop
l2cap_config_req() processes CONFIG_REQ for channels in BT_CONNECTED state to support L2CAP reconfiguration (e.g. MTU changes). However, since both CONF_INPUT_DONE and CONF_OUTPUT_DONE are already set from the initial configuration, the reconfiguration path falls through to l2cap_ertm_init(), which re-initializes tx_q, srej_q, srej_list, and retrans_list without freeing the previous allocations and sets chan->sdu to NULL without freeing the existing skb. This leaks all previously allocated ERTM resources.
Additionally, l2cap_parse_conf_req() does not validate the minimum value of remote_mps derived from the RFC max_pdu_size option. A zero value propagates to l2cap_segment_sdu() where pdu_len becomes zero, causing the while loop to never terminate since len is never decremented, exhausting all available memory.
Fix the double-init by skipping l2cap_ertm_init() and l2cap_chan_ready() when the channel is already in BT_CONNECTED state, while still allowing the reconfiguration parameters to be updated through l2cap_parse_conf_req(). Also add a pdu_len zero check in l2cap_segment_sdu() as a safeguard.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31498"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T14:16:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: Fix ERTM re-init and zero pdu_len infinite loop\n\nl2cap_config_req() processes CONFIG_REQ for channels in BT_CONNECTED\nstate to support L2CAP reconfiguration (e.g. MTU changes). However,\nsince both CONF_INPUT_DONE and CONF_OUTPUT_DONE are already set from\nthe initial configuration, the reconfiguration path falls through to\nl2cap_ertm_init(), which re-initializes tx_q, srej_q, srej_list, and\nretrans_list without freeing the previous allocations and sets\nchan-\u003esdu to NULL without freeing the existing skb. This leaks all\npreviously allocated ERTM resources.\n\nAdditionally, l2cap_parse_conf_req() does not validate the minimum\nvalue of remote_mps derived from the RFC max_pdu_size option. A zero\nvalue propagates to l2cap_segment_sdu() where pdu_len becomes zero,\ncausing the while loop to never terminate since len is never\ndecremented, exhausting all available memory.\n\nFix the double-init by skipping l2cap_ertm_init() and\nl2cap_chan_ready() when the channel is already in BT_CONNECTED state,\nwhile still allowing the reconfiguration parameters to be updated\nthrough l2cap_parse_conf_req(). Also add a pdu_len zero check in\nl2cap_segment_sdu() as a safeguard.",
"id": "GHSA-59wx-rwxr-9vq7",
"modified": "2026-04-28T15:30:47Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T15:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31498"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/042e2cd4bb11e5313b19b87593616524949e4c52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25f420a0d4cfd61d3d23ec4b9c56d9f443d91377"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52667c859fe33f70c2e711cb81bbd505d5eb8e75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/900e4db5385ec2cacd372345a80ab9c8e105b3a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9760b83cfd24b38caee663f429011a0dd6064fa9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a21a631ee034b1573dce14b572a24943dbfd7ae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de37e2655b7abc3f59254c6b72256840f39fc6d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e7aab23b7df89a3d754a5f0a7d2237548b328bd0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.