GHSA-579Q-H82J-R5V2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 16:45 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:37In versions of dd-trace-java prior to 1.60.3, the RMI instrumentation registered a custom endpoint that deserialized incoming data without applying serialization filters. On JDK version 16 and earlier, an attacker with network access to a JMX or RMI port on an instrumented JVM could exploit this to potentially achieve remote code execution. All three of the following conditions must be true to exploit this vulnerability:
1. dd-trace-java is attached as a Java agent (-javaagent) on Java 16 or earlier
2. A JMX/RMI port has been explicitly configured via -Dcom.sun.management.jmxremote.port and is network-reachable
3. A gadget-chain-compatible library is present on the classpath
Impact
Arbitrary remote code execution with the privileges of the user running the instrumented JVM.
Recommendation
- For JDK >= 17: No action is required, but upgrading is strongly encouraged.
- For JDK >= 8u121 < JDK 17: Upgrade to dd-trace-java version 1.60.3 or later.
- For JDK < 8u121 and earlier where serialization filters are not available, apply the workaround described below.
Workarounds
Set the following environment variable to disable the RMI integration: DD_INTEGRATION_RMI_ENABLED=false
Credits
This vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by Mohamed Amine ait Ouchebou (mrecho) (Indiesecurity) via the Datadog bug bounty program.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.datadoghq:dd-java-agent"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.40.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.60.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33728"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T16:45:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T01:16:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In versions of dd-trace-java prior to 1.60.3, the RMI instrumentation registered a custom endpoint that deserialized incoming data without applying serialization filters. On JDK version 16 and earlier, an attacker with network access to a JMX or RMI port on an instrumented JVM could exploit this to potentially achieve remote code execution.\u00a0All three of the following conditions must be true to exploit this vulnerability:\n1. dd-trace-java is attached as a Java agent (`-javaagent`) on Java 16 or earlier\n2. A JMX/RMI port has been explicitly configured via `-Dcom.sun.management.jmxremote.port` and is network-reachable\n3. A gadget-chain-compatible library is present on the classpath\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary remote code execution with the privileges of the user running the instrumented JVM.\n\n### Recommendation\n- For JDK \u003e= 17: No action is required, but upgrading is strongly encouraged.\n- For JDK \u003e= 8u121 \u003c JDK 17: Upgrade to dd-trace-java version 1.60.3 or later.\n- For JDK \u003c 8u121 and earlier where serialization filters are not available, apply the workaround described below.\n\n### Workarounds\nSet the following environment variable to disable the RMI integration: `DD_INTEGRATION_RMI_ENABLED=false`\n\n### Credits\nThis vulnerability was responsibly disclosed by Mohamed Amine ait Ouchebou (mrecho) (Indiesecurity) via the Datadog bug bounty program.",
"id": "GHSA-579q-h82j-r5v2",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:37:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T16:45:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-java/security/advisories/GHSA-579q-h82j-r5v2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33728"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-java"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-java/releases/tag/v1.60.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "dd-trace-java: Unsafe deserialization in RMI instrumentation may lead to remote code execution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.