GHSA-55FH-FMPQ-W8H6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()
In flush_write_buffer, &p->frag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store function is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store(). This function called filp_open(), following which these functions were called (in reverse order), according to the call trace:
down_read __configfs_open_file do_dentry_open vfs_open do_open path_openat do_filp_open file_open_name filp_open target_core_item_dbroot_store flush_write_buffer configfs_write_iter
target_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by trying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug report shows:
db_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot
indicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it is currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore of the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in flush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner and a possibility of recursive locking.
Fix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path() instead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific function __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix compatible.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: target: Fix recursive locking in __configfs_open_file()\n\nIn flush_write_buffer, \u0026p-\u003efrag_sem is acquired and then the loaded store\nfunction is called, which, here, is target_core_item_dbroot_store(). This\nfunction called filp_open(), following which these functions were called\n(in reverse order), according to the call trace:\n\n down_read\n __configfs_open_file\n do_dentry_open\n vfs_open\n do_open\n path_openat\n do_filp_open\n file_open_name\n filp_open\n target_core_item_dbroot_store\n flush_write_buffer\n configfs_write_iter\n\ntarget_core_item_dbroot_store() tries to validate the new file path by\ntrying to open the file path provided to it; however, in this case, the bug\nreport shows:\n\ndb_root: not a directory: /sys/kernel/config/target/dbroot\n\nindicating that the same configfs file was tried to be opened, on which it\nis currently working on. Thus, it is trying to acquire frag_sem semaphore\nof the same file of which it already holds the semaphore obtained in\nflush_write_buffer(), leading to acquiring the semaphore in a nested manner\nand a possibility of recursive locking.\n\nFix this by modifying target_core_item_dbroot_store() to use kern_path()\ninstead of filp_open() to avoid opening the file using filesystem-specific\nfunction __configfs_open_file(), and further modifying it to make this fix\ncompatible.",
"id": "GHSA-55fh-fmpq-w8h6",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T12:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/142eacb50fb903a4c10dee7e67b6e79ebb36a582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/14d4ac19d1895397532eec407433c5d74d9da53b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3161ef61f121d4573cad5b57c92188dcd9b284b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4fcfa424a581d823cb1a9676e3eefe6ca17e453a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a5641024fbfd9b24fe65984ad85fea10a3ae438"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8ef82cb6443d5f3260b1b830e17f03dda4229ea"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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