{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@novu/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:22:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe conditions filter webhook at `libs/application-generic/src/usecases/conditions-filter/conditions-filter.usecase.ts` line 261 sends POST requests to user-configured URLs using raw `axios.post()` with no SSRF validation. The HTTP Request workflow step in the same codebase correctly uses `validateUrlSsrf()` which blocks private IP ranges. The conditions webhook was not included in this protection.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`conditions-filter.usecase.ts` line 261:\n```typescript\nreturn await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config).then((response) =\u003e {\n  return response.data as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e;\n});\n```\n\nNo call to `validateUrlSsrf()`. The `webhookUrl` comes from the workflow condition configuration with zero validation.\n\n## Protected Code (for contrast)\n\n`execute-http-request-step.usecase.ts` line 130:\n```typescript\nconst ssrfValidationError = await validateUrlSsrf(url);\nif (ssrfValidationError) {\n  // blocked\n}\n```\n\nThis function resolves DNS and checks against private ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16). It exists in the codebase but is not applied to the conditions webhook path.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Create a workflow with a condition step\n2. Configure the condition\u0027s webhook URL to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n3. Trigger the workflow by sending a notification event\n4. The worker evaluates the condition and calls `axios.post()` to the metadata endpoint\n5. The response data is stored in execution details and accessible via the execution details API\n\n## Impact\n\nFull-read SSRF. The response body is returned as `Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e` for condition evaluation and stored in the execution details `raw` field. The `GET /execution-details` API returns this data.\n\nThe POST method limits some metadata endpoints (GCP requires GET, Azure requires GET), but AWS IMDSv1 accepts POST and returns credentials. Internal services accepting POST are also reachable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nExtract `validateUrlSsrf()` to a shared utility and call it before the axios.post in conditions-filter.usecase.ts:\n\n```typescript\nconst ssrfError = await validateUrlSsrf(child.webhookUrl);\nif (ssrfError) {\n  throw new Error(\u0027Webhook URL blocked by SSRF protection\u0027);\n}\nreturn await axios.post(child.webhookUrl, payload, config)...\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:22:48Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:22:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu/security/advisories/GHSA-4x48-cgf9-q33f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu/commit/87d965eb88340ac7cd262dd52c8015acd092dc68"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/novuhq/novu"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Novu has SSRF via conditions filter webhook bypasses validateUrlSsrf() protection"
}