GHSA-4RJ2-GPMH-QQ5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:36 – Updated: 2026-03-10 22:21Summary
An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.
Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm):<= 2026.2.1- Fixed in:
>= 2026.2.2
Details
In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.
This allowed two bypasses:
- Missing/empty
fromvalues normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed. - Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.
Proof Of Concept
- Configure the voice-call extension with
inboundPolicy: allowlistandallowFrom: ["+15550001234"]. - Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
- Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with
15550001234(for example+99915550001234). The call is accepted.
Impact
Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.
Fix
The fix hardens inbound policy handling:
- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.
Fix commit(s):
f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb
Thanks @simecek for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:36:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:16Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.\n\nDeployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.\n\nThis allowed two bypasses:\n\n1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.\n2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [\"+15550001234\"]`.\n2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.\n3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix hardens inbound policy handling:\n\n- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.\n- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).\n- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- `f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x",
"modified": "2026-03-10T22:21:59Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T21:36:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inbound-allowlist-policy-bypass-in-voice-call-extension-via-empty-caller-id"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.