GHSA-4FXQ-2X3X-6XQX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:08 – Updated: 2026-04-16 21:08
VLAI?
Summary
zrok: Reflected XSS in GitHub OAuth callback via unsanitized refreshInterval error rendering
Details

Summary The proxyUi template engine uses Go's text/template (which performs no HTML escaping) instead of html/template. The GitHub OAuth callback handlers in both publicProxy and dynamicProxy embed the attacker-controlled refreshInterval query parameter verbatim into an error message when time.ParseDuration fails, and render that error unescaped into HTML. An attacker can deliver a crafted login URL to a victim; after the victim completes the GitHub OAuth flow, the callback page executes arbitrary JavaScript in the OAuth server's origin.

  • Attack Vector: Network — the attack is delivered as a crafted URL over the internet.
  • Attack Complexity: Low — no race conditions or special environment prerequisites.
  • Privileges Required: None — the attacker needs no account on the zrok instance.
  • User Interaction: Required — the victim must click the crafted link and complete the GitHub OAuth flow.
  • Scope: Changed — the injected script executes in the OAuth server's origin, not the victim's share origin.
  • Confidentiality Impact: Low — the script runs in the OAuth server origin after a failed flow; no session cookie is set at this point, limiting what can be exfiltrated to what is visible in the DOM and what can be requested from the OAuth server.
  • Integrity Impact: Low — the script can initiate new OAuth flows or submit forms on behalf of the victim in the OAuth server origin.
  • Availability Impact: None.

Affected Components

  • endpoints/proxyUi/template.go — init() / WriteTemplate (lines 8, 18, 99) — text/template used for HTML rendering
  • endpoints/proxyUi/template.html — line 119 — {{ .Error }} in HTML without escaping
  • endpoints/publicProxy/providerGithub.go — login callback closure (lines 93, 128, 130)
  • endpoints/dynamicProxy/providerGithub.go — loginHandler() (lines 110, 146, 148)
Severity ?
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openziti/zrok"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/openziti/zrok/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40302"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:08:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Summary**\nThe proxyUi template engine uses Go\u0027s text/template (which performs no HTML escaping) instead of html/template. The GitHub OAuth callback handlers in both publicProxy and dynamicProxy embed the attacker-controlled refreshInterval query parameter verbatim into an error message when time.ParseDuration fails, and render that error unescaped into HTML. An attacker can deliver a crafted login URL to a victim; after the victim completes the GitHub OAuth flow, the callback page executes arbitrary JavaScript in the OAuth server\u0027s origin.\n\n- Attack Vector: Network \u2014 the attack is delivered as a crafted URL over the internet.\n- Attack Complexity: Low \u2014 no race conditions or special environment prerequisites.\n- Privileges Required: None \u2014 the attacker needs no account on the zrok instance.\n- User Interaction: Required \u2014 the victim must click the crafted link and complete the GitHub OAuth flow.\n- Scope: Changed \u2014 the injected script executes in the OAuth server\u0027s origin, not the victim\u0027s share origin.\n- Confidentiality Impact: Low \u2014 the script runs in the OAuth server origin after a failed flow; no session cookie is set at this point, limiting what can be exfiltrated to what is visible in the DOM and what can be requested from the OAuth server.\n- Integrity Impact: Low \u2014 the script can initiate new OAuth flows or submit forms on behalf of the victim in the OAuth server origin.\n- Availability Impact: None.\n\n**Affected Components**\n\n- endpoints/proxyUi/template.go \u2014 init() / WriteTemplate (lines 8, 18, 99) \u2014 text/template used for HTML rendering\n- endpoints/proxyUi/template.html \u2014 line 119 \u2014 {{ .Error }} in HTML without escaping\n- endpoints/publicProxy/providerGithub.go \u2014 login callback closure (lines 93, 128, 130)\n- endpoints/dynamicProxy/providerGithub.go \u2014 loginHandler() (lines 110, 146, 148)",
  "id": "GHSA-4fxq-2x3x-6xqx",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T21:08:55Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T21:08:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok/security/advisories/GHSA-4fxq-2x3x-6xqx"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openziti/zrok"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "zrok: Reflected XSS in GitHub OAuth callback via unsanitized refreshInterval error rendering"
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.