Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-42FJ-XXGC-M676

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 12:31 – Updated: 2026-03-10 21:32

Details

In this case, cooperating processes in the two jails may establish a connection using a unix domain socket and exchange directory descriptors with each other.

When performing a filesystem name lookup, at each step of the lookup, the kernel checks whether the lookup would descend below the jail root of the current process. If the jail root directory is not encountered, the lookup continues.

In a configuration where processes in two different jails are able to exchange file descriptors using a unix domain socket, it is possible for a jailed process to receive a directory for a descriptor that is below that process' jail root. This enables full filesystem access for a jailed process, breaking the chroot.

Note that the system administrator is still responsible for ensuring that an unprivileged user on the jail host is not able to pass directory descriptors to a jailed process, even in a patched kernel.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15576"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-09T12:16:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "If two sibling jails are restricted to separate filesystem trees, which is to say that neither of the two jail root directories is an ancestor of the other, jailed processes may nonetheless be able to access a shared directory via a nullfs mount, if the administrator has configured one.\n\nIn this case, cooperating processes in the two jails may establish a connection using a unix domain socket and exchange directory descriptors with each other.\n\nWhen performing a filesystem name lookup, at each step of the lookup, the kernel checks whether the lookup would descend below the jail root of the current process.  If the jail root directory is not encountered, the lookup continues.\n\nIn a configuration where processes in two different jails are able to exchange file descriptors using a unix domain socket, it is possible for a jailed process to receive a directory for a descriptor that is below that process\u0027 jail root.  This enables full filesystem access for a jailed process, breaking the chroot.\n\nNote that the system administrator is still responsible for ensuring that an unprivileged user on the jail host is not able to pass directory descriptors to a jailed process, even in a patched kernel.",
  "id": "GHSA-42fj-xxgc-m676",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T21:32:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-09T12:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15576"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:04.jail.asc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2025-15576 (GCVE-0-2025-15576)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-09 11:54 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:56

Title

Jail chroot escape via fd exchange with a different jail

Summary

If two sibling jails are restricted to separate filesystem trees, which is to say that neither of the two jail root directories is an ancestor of the other, jailed processes may nonetheless be able to access a shared directory via a nullfs mount, if the administrator has configured one. In this case, cooperating processes in the two jails may establish a connection using a unix domain socket and exchange directory descriptors with each other. When performing a filesystem name lookup, at each step of the lookup, the kernel checks whether the lookup would descend below the jail root of the current process. If the jail root directory is not encountered, the lookup continues. In a configuration where processes in two different jails are able to exchange file descriptors using a unix domain socket, it is possible for a jailed process to receive a directory for a descriptor that is below that process' jail root. This enables full filesystem access for a jailed process, breaking the chroot. Note that the system administrator is still responsible for ensuring that an unprivileged user on the jail host is not able to pass directory descriptors to a jailed process, even in a patched kernel.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

CWE

CWE-269 - Improper Privilege Management
CWE-488 - Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session
CWE-790 - Improper Filtering of Special Elements

Assigner

freebsd

References

URL

Tags

https://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-S…

vendor-advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	FreeBSD	FreeBSD	Affected: 14.3-RELEASE , < p9 (release) Affected: 13.5-RELEASE , < p10 (release)

Date Public ?

2026-02-24 17:00

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
              "attackVector": "LOCAL",
              "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
              "baseScore": 7.5,
              "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
              "scope": "CHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
              "version": "3.1"
            }
          },
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2025-15576",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-10T18:56:28.342905Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-10T18:56:48.250Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unknown",
          "modules": [
            "jail"
          ],
          "product": "FreeBSD",
          "vendor": "FreeBSD",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "p9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "14.3-RELEASE",
              "versionType": "release"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "p10",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "13.5-RELEASE",
              "versionType": "release"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "datePublic": "2026-02-24T17:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "If two sibling jails are restricted to separate filesystem trees, which is to say that neither of the two jail root directories is an ancestor of the other, jailed processes may nonetheless be able to access a shared directory via a nullfs mount, if the administrator has configured one.\n\nIn this case, cooperating processes in the two jails may establish a connection using a unix domain socket and exchange directory descriptors with each other.\n\nWhen performing a filesystem name lookup, at each step of the lookup, the kernel checks whether the lookup would descend below the jail root of the current process.  If the jail root directory is not encountered, the lookup continues.\n\nIn a configuration where processes in two different jails are able to exchange file descriptors using a unix domain socket, it is possible for a jailed process to receive a directory for a descriptor that is below that process\u0027 jail root.  This enables full filesystem access for a jailed process, breaking the chroot.\n\nNote that the system administrator is still responsible for ensuring that an unprivileged user on the jail host is not able to pass directory descriptors to a jailed process, even in a patched kernel."
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-269",
              "description": "CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-488",
              "description": "CWE-488: Exposure of Data Element to Wrong Session",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-790",
              "description": "CWE-790: Improper Filtering of Special Elements",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-09T11:54:20.630Z",
        "orgId": "63664ac6-956c-4cba-a5d0-f46076e16109",
        "shortName": "freebsd"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:04.jail.asc"
        }
      ],
      "title": "Jail chroot escape via fd exchange with a different jail",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "63664ac6-956c-4cba-a5d0-f46076e16109",
    "assignerShortName": "freebsd",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-15576",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-09T11:54:20.630Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-02-09T17:48:45.726Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-10T18:56:48.250Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-42FJ-XXGC-M676

CVE-2025-15576 (GCVE-0-2025-15576)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature