GHSA-3VXG-X5F8-F5QF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 01:01 – Updated: 2026-04-14 01:01Summary
PaymentsController::actionPay discloses some order data to unauthenticated users when an order number is provided and the email check fails during an anonymous payment.
The JSON error response includes the serialized order object (order), which contains some sensitive fields such as customer email, shipping address, and billing address.
Details
I manually audited frontend payment flows and found that actionPay() retrieves orders by number before authorization is fully enforced.
Code path:
- Load order by
number. - Evaluate whether payment is authorized for completed orders (
number + matching email). - If unauthorized, return failure.
- Failure response still includes
cartArray($order), which serializes sensitive order data.
Why is this a vulnerability?
- Authorization logic says the requester is not allowed to pay for a completed order without an email.
- But the response still returns the same completed order’s contents.
Impact
Type: Information Disclosure / Broken Access Control
Who is impacted:
- Any Commerce deployment where completed order numbers can be obtained or leaked.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.5.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/commerce"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.10.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/commerce"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32270"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T01:01:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-13T20:16:33Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`PaymentsController::actionPay` discloses some order data to unauthenticated users when an order number is provided and the email check fails during an anonymous payment.\n\nThe JSON error response includes the serialized order object (`order`), which contains some sensitive fields such as customer email, shipping address, and billing address.\n\n### Details\n\nI manually audited frontend payment flows and found that `actionPay()` retrieves orders by number before authorization is fully enforced.\n\nCode path:\n\n1. Load order by `number`.\n2. Evaluate whether payment is authorized for completed orders (`number + matching email`).\n3. If unauthorized, return failure.\n4. Failure response still includes `cartArray($order)`, which serializes sensitive order data.\n\nWhy is this a vulnerability?\n\n- Authorization logic says the requester is not allowed to pay for a completed order without an email.\n- But the response still returns the same completed order\u2019s contents.\n\n### Impact\n\nType: Information Disclosure / Broken Access Control\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- Any Commerce deployment where completed order numbers can be obtained or leaked.",
"id": "GHSA-3vxg-x5f8-f5qf",
"modified": "2026-04-14T01:01:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T01:01:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/security/advisories/GHSA-3vxg-x5f8-f5qf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/commit/48a5d946419964e2af1ac64a8e1acc2a32ca0a08"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/releases/tag/4.11.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/releases/tag/5.6.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craft Commerce has an unauthenticated information disclosure that can leak some customer order data on anonymous payments"
}
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