GHSA-3R85-565G-4JHQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 15:32 – Updated: 2026-06-01 18:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler

The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3 or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round follows).

ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each round.

Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed the buffer.

Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays") fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31622"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-120"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T15:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler\n\nThe NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3\nor 4 bytes to target-\u003enfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade\nrounds is controlled entirely by the peer device.  The peer sets the\ncascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the\ncascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round\nfollows).\n\nISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target-\u003enfcid1 is\nsized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver\nactually enforces this.  This means a malicious peer can keep the\ncascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each\nround.\n\nFix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed\nthe buffer.\n\nCommit e329e71013c9 (\"NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays\")\nfixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path.",
  "id": "GHSA-3r85-565g-4jhq",
  "modified": "2026-06-01T18:31:27Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T15:32:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31622"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bec5698b55aa2be5c3b983dba657c01d0fd3dbc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20663102c14566e900e1d2f679e30b7f1694f387"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2819f34e08bdffb6f06a51c67948ec5737fb166a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46ce8be2ced389bccd84bcc04a12cf2f4d0c22d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a59bf70c38ee1eb4be03bab830bbc3a6f0bd1f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d9d9bf3565271ca7ab9c716a94e87296177e7ba"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ba6bb09e00b922d902f684f575779e5433fe6e3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc024a3de265ef6c58957f4990eccb9f806208cb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f83b399aa05a0712e3b1569a30d3d90b3533d2ef"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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