GHSA-3M3Q-X3GJ-F79X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:01
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw optional voice-call plugin: webhook verification may be bypassed behind certain proxy configurations
Details

Affected Packages / Versions

This issue affects the optional voice-call plugin only. It is not enabled by default; it only applies to installations where the plugin is installed and enabled.

  • Package: @openclaw/voice-call
  • Vulnerable versions: < 2026.2.3
  • Patched versions: >= 2026.2.3

Legacy package name (if you are still using it):

  • Package: @clawdbot/voice-call
  • Vulnerable versions: <= 2026.1.24
  • Patched versions: none published under this package name; migrate to @openclaw/voice-call

Summary

In certain reverse-proxy / forwarding setups, webhook verification can be bypassed if untrusted forwarded headers are accepted.

Impact

An external party may be able to send voice-call webhook requests that are accepted as valid, which can result in spoofed webhook events being processed.

Root Cause

Some deployments implicitly trusted forwarded headers (for example Forwarded / X-Forwarded-*) when determining request properties used during webhook verification. If those headers are not overwritten by a trusted proxy, a client can supply them directly and influence verification.

Resolution

Ignore forwarded headers by default unless explicitly trusted and allowlisted in configuration. Keep any loopback-only development bypass restricted to local development only. Upgrade to a patched version.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, strip Forwarded and X-Forwarded-* headers at the edge so clients cannot supply them directly.

Fix Commit(s)

  • a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f

Credits

Thanks @0x5t for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@openclaw/voice-call"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@clawdbot/voice-call"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "2026.1.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28465"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:31:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Affected Packages / Versions\n\nThis issue affects the optional voice-call plugin only. It is not enabled by default; it only applies to installations where the plugin is installed and enabled.\n\n- Package: `@openclaw/voice-call`\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c 2026.2.3`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.3`\n\nLegacy package name (if you are still using it):\n\n- Package: `@clawdbot/voice-call`\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.1.24`\n- Patched versions: none published under this package name; migrate to `@openclaw/voice-call`\n\n## Summary\n\nIn certain reverse-proxy / forwarding setups, webhook verification can be bypassed if untrusted forwarded headers are accepted.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn external party may be able to send voice-call webhook requests that are accepted as valid, which can result in spoofed webhook events being processed.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nSome deployments implicitly trusted forwarded headers (for example `Forwarded` / `X-Forwarded-*`) when determining request properties used during webhook verification. If those headers are not overwritten by a trusted proxy, a client can supply them directly and influence verification.\n\n## Resolution\n\nIgnore forwarded headers by default unless explicitly trusted and allowlisted in configuration. Keep any loopback-only development bypass restricted to local development only. Upgrade to a patched version.\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, strip `Forwarded` and `X-Forwarded-*` headers at the edge so clients cannot supply them directly.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f`\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks `@0x5t` for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-3m3q-x3gj-f79x",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T01:01:21Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:31:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3m3q-x3gj-f79x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28465"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a749db9820eb6d6224032a5a34223d286d2dcc2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-voice-call-webhook-verification-bypass-via-forwarded-headers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw optional voice-call plugin: webhook verification may be bypassed behind certain proxy configurations"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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