GHSA-3J46-WX9H-X693
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix constant blinding for PROBE_MEM32 stores
BPF_ST | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 immediate stores are not handled by bpf_jit_blind_insn(), allowing user-controlled 32-bit immediates to survive unblinded into JIT-compiled native code when bpf_jit_harden >= 1.
The root cause is that convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites BPF_ST|BPF_MEM to BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 for arena pointer stores during verification, before bpf_jit_blind_constants() runs during JIT compilation. The blinding switch only matches BPF_ST|BPF_MEM (mode 0x60), not BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 (mode 0xa0). The instruction falls through unblinded.
Add BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 cases to bpf_jit_blind_insn() alongside the existing BPF_ST|BPF_MEM cases. The blinding transformation is identical: load the blinded immediate into BPF_REG_AX via mov+xor, then convert the immediate store to a register store (BPF_STX).
The rewritten STX instruction must preserve the BPF_PROBE_MEM32 mode so the architecture JIT emits the correct arena addressing (R12-based on x86-64). Cannot use the BPF_STX_MEM() macro here because it hardcodes BPF_MEM mode; construct the instruction directly instead.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23417"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T12:16:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Fix constant blinding for PROBE_MEM32 stores\n\nBPF_ST | BPF_PROBE_MEM32 immediate stores are not handled by\nbpf_jit_blind_insn(), allowing user-controlled 32-bit immediates to\nsurvive unblinded into JIT-compiled native code when bpf_jit_harden \u003e= 1.\n\nThe root cause is that convert_ctx_accesses() rewrites BPF_ST|BPF_MEM\nto BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 for arena pointer stores during verification,\nbefore bpf_jit_blind_constants() runs during JIT compilation. The\nblinding switch only matches BPF_ST|BPF_MEM (mode 0x60), not\nBPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 (mode 0xa0). The instruction falls through\nunblinded.\n\nAdd BPF_ST|BPF_PROBE_MEM32 cases to bpf_jit_blind_insn() alongside the\nexisting BPF_ST|BPF_MEM cases. The blinding transformation is identical:\nload the blinded immediate into BPF_REG_AX via mov+xor, then convert\nthe immediate store to a register store (BPF_STX).\n\nThe rewritten STX instruction must preserve the BPF_PROBE_MEM32 mode so\nthe architecture JIT emits the correct arena addressing (R12-based on\nx86-64). Cannot use the BPF_STX_MEM() macro here because it hardcodes\nBPF_MEM mode; construct the instruction directly instead.",
"id": "GHSA-3j46-wx9h-x693",
"modified": "2026-04-24T15:32:20Z",
"published": "2026-04-02T12:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23417"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2321a9596d2260310267622e0ad8fbfa6f95378f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56af722756ed82fee2ae5d5b4d04743407506195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccbf29b28b5554f9d65b2fb53b994673ad58b3bf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de641ea08f8fff6906e169d2576c2ac54e562fbb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.