GHSA-3C37-WWVX-H642
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-23 20:23 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:38
VLAI?
Summary
cbor2 has a Denial of Service via Uncontrolled Recursion in cbor2.loads
Details
Summary
- The
cbor2library is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack caused by uncontrolled recursion when decoding deeply nested CBOR structures. - This vulnerability affects both the pure Python implementation and the C extension (
_cbor2). The C extension correctly uses Python's C-API for recursion protection (Py_EnterRecursiveCall), but this mechanism is designed to prevent a stack overflow by raising aRecursionError. In some environments, this exception is not caught, thus causing the service process to terminate. - While the library handles moderate nesting, it lacks a configurable, data-driven depth limit independent of Python's global recursion setting. An attacker can supply a crafted CBOR payload containing thousands of nested arrays (e.g.,
0x81). Whencbor2.loads()attempts to parse this, it hits the interpreter's recursion limit, causing the call to raise aRecursionError. - By sending a stream of small (<100KB) malicious packets, an attacker can repeatedly crash worker processes faster than they can be restarted, resulting in a complete and sustained Denial of Service.
Details
- The vulnerability stems from the recursive design of the
CBORDecoderclass, specifically how it decodes nested container types like Arrays and Maps. - Inside
decode_array(and similarlydecode_map), the decoder iterates through the number of elements specified in the CBOR header. For each element, it callsself.decode()again to parse the nested item. This recursive call lacks a depth-tracking mechanism. - Vulnerable Code Locations:
cbor2/decoder.py(Pure Python implementation)source/decoder.c(C extension implementation)- Execution Flow:
- The
cbor2.loads()function initializes aCBORDecoderand calls itsdecode()method. - The
decode()method reads the initial byte and dispatches control to a specific handler based on the major type. For an Array (Major Type 4), it callsdecode_array. decode_arrayloops and callsself.decode()for each item, leading to deep recursion when parsing a payload like[...[...[1]...]...].
PoC
import cbor2
DEPTH = 1000
payload = b'\x81' * DEPTH + b'\x01'
print(f"[*] Payload size: {len(payload) / 1024:.2f} KB")
print("[*] Triggering decoder...")
try:
cbor2.loads(payload)
print("[+] Parsed successfully (Not Vulnerable)")
except RecursionError:
print("\n[!] VULNERABLE: RecursionError triggered!")
except Exception as e:
print(f"\n[-] Unexpected Error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}")
Impact
- Scope: This vulnerability affects any application using
cbor2to parse untrusted data. Common use cases include IoT data processing, WebAuthn (FIDO2) authentication flows, and inter-service communication over COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption). - Attack Vector: A remote, unauthenticated attacker can achieve a full Denial of Service with a highly efficient, low-bandwidth attack. A payload under 100KB is sufficient to reliably terminate a Python worker process.
Credit
This issue was discovered by Kevin Tu of TMIR at ByteDance. The patch was developed by @agronholm.
Severity ?
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.8.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "cbor2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26209"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-23T20:23:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n- The `cbor2` library is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack caused by uncontrolled recursion when decoding deeply nested CBOR structures.\n- This vulnerability affects both the pure Python implementation and the C extension (`_cbor2`). The C extension correctly uses Python\u0027s C-API for recursion protection (`Py_EnterRecursiveCall`), but this mechanism is designed to prevent a stack overflow by raising a `RecursionError`. In some environments, this exception is not caught, thus causing the service process to terminate.\n- While the library handles moderate nesting, it lacks a configurable, data-driven depth limit independent of Python\u0027s global recursion setting. An attacker can supply a crafted CBOR payload containing thousands of nested arrays (e.g., `0x81`). When `cbor2.loads()` attempts to parse this, it hits the interpreter\u0027s recursion limit, causing the call to raise a `RecursionError`.\n- By sending a stream of small (\u003c100KB) malicious packets, an attacker can repeatedly crash worker processes faster than they can be restarted, resulting in a complete and sustained Denial of Service.\n\n### Details\n\n- The vulnerability stems from the recursive design of the `CBORDecoder` class, specifically how it decodes nested container types like Arrays and Maps.\n- Inside `decode_array` (and similarly `decode_map`), the decoder iterates through the number of elements specified in the CBOR header. For each element, it calls `self.decode()` again to parse the nested item. This recursive call lacks a depth-tracking mechanism.\n- Vulnerable Code Locations:\n - `cbor2/decoder.py` (Pure Python implementation)\n - `source/decoder.c` (C extension implementation)\n- Execution Flow:\n 1. The `cbor2.loads()` function initializes a `CBORDecoder` and calls its `decode()` method.\n 2. The `decode()` method reads the initial byte and dispatches control to a specific handler based on the major type. For an Array (Major Type 4), it calls `decode_array`.\n 3. `decode_array` loops and calls `self.decode()` for each item, leading to deep recursion when parsing a payload like `[...[...[1]...]...]`.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport cbor2\n\nDEPTH = 1000\n\npayload = b\u0027\\x81\u0027 * DEPTH + b\u0027\\x01\u0027\nprint(f\"[*] Payload size: {len(payload) / 1024:.2f} KB\")\nprint(\"[*] Triggering decoder...\")\n\ntry:\n cbor2.loads(payload)\n print(\"[+] Parsed successfully (Not Vulnerable)\")\nexcept RecursionError:\n print(\"\\n[!] VULNERABLE: RecursionError triggered!\")\nexcept Exception as e:\n print(f\"\\n[-] Unexpected Error: {type(e).__name__}: {e}\")\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Scope: This vulnerability affects any application using `cbor2` to parse untrusted data. Common use cases include IoT data processing, WebAuthn (FIDO2) authentication flows, and inter-service communication over COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption).\n- Attack Vector: A remote, unauthenticated attacker can achieve a full Denial of Service with a highly efficient, low-bandwidth attack. A payload under 100KB is sufficient to reliably terminate a Python worker process.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was discovered by Kevin Tu of TMIR at ByteDance. The patch was developed by @agronholm.",
"id": "GHSA-3c37-wwvx-h642",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:38:41Z",
"published": "2026-03-23T20:23:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/security/advisories/GHSA-3c37-wwvx-h642"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26209"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/pull/275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/commit/e61a5f365ba610d5907a0ae1bc72769bba34294b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agronholm/cbor2/releases/tag/5.9.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "cbor2 has a Denial of Service via Uncontrolled Recursion in cbor2.loads"
}
Loading…
Loading…
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Loading…
Loading…