{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34362"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-613"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-30T17:35:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T17:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `verifyTokenSocket()` function in `plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php` has its token timeout validation commented out, causing WebSocket tokens to never expire despite being generated with a 12-hour timeout. This allows captured or legitimately obtained tokens to provide permanent WebSocket access, even after user accounts are deleted, banned, or demoted from admin. Admin tokens grant access to real-time connection data for all online users including IP addresses, browser info, and page locations.\n\n## Details\n\nWebSocket tokens are generated via `getEncryptedInfo()` which calls `getToken(43200)` to create a token with a 12-hour expiration window. The token is encrypted and contains security-critical claims: `isAdmin`, `from_users_id`, `user_name`, IP, browser, and device ID.\n\nThe regular HTTP token verification at `objects/functions.php:3437-3439` enforces the timeout:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php:3437-3439\nif (!($time \u003e= $obj-\u003etime \u0026\u0026 $time \u003c= $obj-\u003etimeout)) {\n    _error_log(\"verifyToken token timout...\");\n    return false;  // \u003c-- enforced\n}\n```\n\nBut the WebSocket-specific verification at `plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:65-82` has the enforcement commented out:\n\n```php\n// plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80\nif (!($time \u003e= $obj-\u003etime \u0026\u0026 $time \u003c= $obj-\u003etimeout)) {\n    //_error_log(\"verifyToken token timout...\");\n    //return false;  // \u003c-- NOT enforced, always falls through to return true\n}\nreturn true;\n```\n\n**Execution flow:**\n\n1. Client connects to WebSocket with `?webSocketToken=TOKEN` in URL query\n2. `onOpen()` (Message.php:34) calls `getDecryptedInfo($wsocketGetVars[\u0027webSocketToken\u0027])` (line 48)\n3. `getDecryptedInfo()` (functions.php:49) decrypts the token and calls `verifyTokenSocket($json-\u003etoken)` (line 54)\n4. `verifyTokenSocket()` validates the salt (passes) but the timeout check at line 77 evaluates the condition without acting on failure \u2014 `return false` is commented out\n5. Function returns `true` \u2014 connection established with all token claims (`isAdmin`, `from_users_id`) trusted\n\n**Impact amplification via isAdmin:**\n\nWhen a connection has `isAdmin=true` (from token, Message.php:58), the `getTotals()` function (Message.php:419-432) includes detailed data about every connected client in periodic broadcast messages:\n\n```php\n// Message.php:419-432\nif ($isAdmin) {\n    $index = md5($client[\u0027selfURI\u0027]);\n    // Exposes: selfURI, yptDeviceId, users_id, user_name, browser, ip, location\n    $return[\u0027users_uri\u0027][$index][$client[\u0027yptDeviceId\u0027]][$client[\u0027users_id\u0027]] = $client;\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, the `webSocketToken` message type (Message.php:212-217) allows anonymous connections (`users_id=0`) to upgrade their identity by providing a captured token, meaning stolen tokens work from new connections indefinitely.\n\nThe 10-minute inactivity timeout (Message.php:135-143) is not a mitigation \u2014 it only closes idle connections and resets on every message (line 243).\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Obtain a WebSocket token as any authenticated user\ncurl -s -b \u0027PHPSESSID=VALID_SESSION\u0027 \\\n  \u0027https://target.com/plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.webSocketToken\u0027\n# Save as TOKEN=\u003coutput\u003e\n\n# Step 2: Wait for the token to expire (\u003e12 hours)\n# In a real scenario, the attacker already has a previously captured token\n\n# Step 3: Connect with the expired token \u2014 succeeds because verifyTokenSocket() skips timeout\nwscat -c \u0027ws://target.com:8888/?webSocketToken=TOKEN\u0027\n\n# Step 4: Verify the connection is established and receiving broadcasts\n# The server will send periodic getTotals data\n\n# Step 5: If the token was from an admin, the getTotals response includes\n# all connected clients\u0027 selfURI, IP, browser, device ID, user_name, and location\n\n# Step 6: Any user can also enumerate connected users without admin:\n# Send: {\"msg\":\"getClientsList\",\"webSocketToken\":\"TOKEN\"}\n# Response includes all users_id, isAdmin status, and usernames\n```\n\n**Scenario: Demoted admin retains permanent admin WebSocket access**\n1. Admin user obtains WebSocket token (contains `isAdmin: true`)\n2. Admin is demoted to regular user via the web interface\n3. Admin\u0027s WebSocket token still works indefinitely \u2014 the `isAdmin` claim in the token is never re-validated\n4. Demoted user continues receiving all connected users\u0027 IPs, locations, and browsing activity\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Permanent access after credential revocation:** Deleted, banned, or suspended users retain WebSocket access with their original identity and privilege level, undermining account lifecycle management.\n- **Privilege persistence after demotion:** Admin users who are demoted retain admin-level WebSocket access indefinitely. The `isAdmin` flag baked into the token is never re-checked against the database.\n- **Real-time surveillance via admin tokens:** Admin-level tokens expose all connected users\u0027 IP addresses, geographic locations (if User_location plugin enabled), current page URLs (selfURI), browser fingerprints, and device IDs \u2014 enabling real-time tracking of user activity.\n- **Extended attack window for token theft:** Any vulnerability that leaks a WebSocket token (XSS, log exposure, network interception) provides permanent rather than 12-hour access, significantly increasing the impact of token compromise.\n- **Identity hijacking:** The `webSocketToken` message type allows using a stolen token to assume another user\u0027s identity on new connections, enabling impersonation in chat and messaging.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nUncomment the timeout enforcement in `verifyTokenSocket()` at `plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80`:\n\n```php\nfunction verifyTokenSocket($token) {\n    global $global;\n    $obj = _json_decode(decryptString($token));\n    if (empty($obj)) {\n        _error_log(\"verifyToken invalid token\");\n        return false;\n    }\n    if ($obj-\u003esalt !== $global[\u0027salt\u0027]) {\n        _error_log(\"verifyToken salt fail\");\n        return false;\n    }\n    $time = time();\n    if (!($time \u003e= $obj-\u003etime \u0026\u0026 $time \u003c= $obj-\u003etimeout)) {\n        _error_log(\"verifyToken token timeout time = $time; obj-\u003etime = $obj-\u003etime; obj-\u003etimeout = $obj-\u003etimeout\");\n        return false;  // \u003c-- uncomment this line\n    }\n    return true;\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider:\n1. Adding an admin check to the `getClientsList` handler (Message.php:219) so only admins can enumerate connected users.\n2. Re-validating the `isAdmin` claim against the database periodically rather than trusting the token claim for the lifetime of the connection.",
  "id": "GHSA-2mg4-pfgx-64cf",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T17:35:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-30T17:35:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-2mg4-pfgx-64cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34362"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5d5237121bf82c24e9e0fdd5bc1699f1157783c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo\u0027s WebSocket Token Never Expires Due to Commented-Out Timeout Validation in verifyTokenSocket()"
}