GHSA-2M67-CXXQ-C3H8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 16:37 – Updated: 2026-03-13 13:36Summary
Workspace boundary enforcement currently has three related bypass risks. This issue tracks fixing all three in one pull request.
Details
R1 - Dangling Symlink Component Bypass
- What happens: Path validation can miss dangling symlink components during traversal checks.
- Why it matters: A symlink that is unresolved at validation time can later resolve to an external location.
- Impact: Read and write operations may escape workspace boundaries.
- Affected area: src/security/path.rs (check_symlink_escape).
R2 - TOCTOU Between Validation and Use
- What happens: The path is validated first, then used later for filesystem operations.
- Why it matters: A concurrent filesystem change can swap path components after validation but before open/write.
- Impact: Race-based workspace escape is possible.
- Affected area: Filesystem and file-consuming tools that call validate_path_in_workspace before I/O.
R3 - Hardlink Alias Bypass
- What happens: A file inside workspace can be a hardlink to an inode outside the intended workspace trust boundary.
- Why it matters: Prefix and symlink checks can pass while data access still mutates or reads external content.
- Impact: Policy bypass for read/write operations.
- Affected area: Any tool that reads or writes via validated paths.
Risk Matrix
| ID | Risk | Severity | Likelihood | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Dangling symlink component bypass | High | Medium | Workspace boundary escape for read/write |
| R2 | Validate/use TOCTOU race | High | Medium | Race-based boundary escape during file I/O |
| R3 | Hardlink alias bypass | Medium | Low-Medium | External inode read/write through in-workspace path |
PoC
R1 - Dangling symlink component bypass
- Create a symlink inside workspace pointing to a missing target.
- Validate a path traversing that symlink.
- Create the target directory outside workspace after validation.
- Perform file operation and observe potential boundary escape if not fail-closed.
R2 - TOCTOU between validation and use
- Validate a candidate in-workspace path.
- Before open/write, replace an intermediate component with a link to external location.
- Continue with the file operation.
- Observe boundary escape if operation trusts only stale validation result.
R3 - Hardlink alias bypass
- Place a hardlink inside workspace that points to an external inode.
- Validate the in-workspace hardlink path.
- Read or write through this path.
- Observe external inode access through a path that appears in-scope.
Impacts
Unauthorized cross path boundary
Credit
Patch
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "zeptoclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32232"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-62"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:37:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWorkspace boundary enforcement currently has three related bypass risks. This issue tracks fixing all three in one pull request.\n\n### Details\n\n#### R1 - Dangling Symlink Component Bypass\n- What happens: Path validation can miss dangling symlink components during traversal checks.\n- Why it matters: A symlink that is unresolved at validation time can later resolve to an external location.\n- Impact: Read and write operations may escape workspace boundaries.\n- Affected area: src/security/path.rs (check_symlink_escape).\n\n#### R2 - TOCTOU Between Validation and Use\n- What happens: The path is validated first, then used later for filesystem operations.\n- Why it matters: A concurrent filesystem change can swap path components after validation but before open/write.\n- Impact: Race-based workspace escape is possible.\n- Affected area: Filesystem and file-consuming tools that call validate_path_in_workspace before I/O.\n\n#### R3 - Hardlink Alias Bypass\n- What happens: A file inside workspace can be a hardlink to an inode outside the intended workspace trust boundary.\n- Why it matters: Prefix and symlink checks can pass while data access still mutates or reads external content.\n- Impact: Policy bypass for read/write operations.\n- Affected area: Any tool that reads or writes via validated paths.\n\n#### Risk Matrix\n\n| ID | Risk | Severity | Likelihood | Impact |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R1 | Dangling symlink component bypass | High | Medium | Workspace boundary escape for read/write |\n| R2 | Validate/use TOCTOU race | High | Medium | Race-based boundary escape during file I/O |\n| R3 | Hardlink alias bypass | Medium | Low-Medium | External inode read/write through in-workspace path |\n\n### PoC\n\n#### R1 - Dangling symlink component bypass\n1. Create a symlink inside workspace pointing to a missing target.\n2. Validate a path traversing that symlink.\n3. Create the target directory outside workspace after validation.\n4. Perform file operation and observe potential boundary escape if not fail-closed.\n\n#### R2 - TOCTOU between validation and use\n1. Validate a candidate in-workspace path.\n2. Before open/write, replace an intermediate component with a link to external location.\n3. Continue with the file operation.\n4. Observe boundary escape if operation trusts only stale validation result.\n\n#### R3 - Hardlink alias bypass\n1. Place a hardlink inside workspace that points to an external inode.\n2. Validate the in-workspace hardlink path.\n3. Read or write through this path.\n4. Observe external inode access through a path that appears in-scope.\n\n### Impacts\nUnauthorized cross path boundary\n\n## Credit\n[@zpbrent](https://github.com/zpbrent)\n\n### Patch\n[f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8)",
"id": "GHSA-2m67-cxxq-c3h8",
"modified": "2026-03-13T13:36:00Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T16:37:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2m67-cxxq-c3h8"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32232"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/pull/324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/bf004a20d3687a0c1a9e052ec79536e30d6de134"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ZeptoClaw: Path boundary checks bypass via symlink, TOCTOU, and hardlink"
}
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