{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "zeptoclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32232"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-62"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:37:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWorkspace boundary enforcement currently has three related bypass risks. This issue tracks fixing all three in one pull request.\n\n### Details\n\n#### R1 - Dangling Symlink Component Bypass\n- What happens: Path validation can miss dangling symlink components during traversal checks.\n- Why it matters: A symlink that is unresolved at validation time can later resolve to an external location.\n- Impact: Read and write operations may escape workspace boundaries.\n- Affected area: src/security/path.rs (check_symlink_escape).\n\n#### R2 - TOCTOU Between Validation and Use\n- What happens: The path is validated first, then used later for filesystem operations.\n- Why it matters: A concurrent filesystem change can swap path components after validation but before open/write.\n- Impact: Race-based workspace escape is possible.\n- Affected area: Filesystem and file-consuming tools that call validate_path_in_workspace before I/O.\n\n#### R3 - Hardlink Alias Bypass\n- What happens: A file inside workspace can be a hardlink to an inode outside the intended workspace trust boundary.\n- Why it matters: Prefix and symlink checks can pass while data access still mutates or reads external content.\n- Impact: Policy bypass for read/write operations.\n- Affected area: Any tool that reads or writes via validated paths.\n\n#### Risk Matrix\n\n| ID | Risk | Severity | Likelihood | Impact |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| R1 | Dangling symlink component bypass | High | Medium | Workspace boundary escape for read/write |\n| R2 | Validate/use TOCTOU race | High | Medium | Race-based boundary escape during file I/O |\n| R3 | Hardlink alias bypass | Medium | Low-Medium | External inode read/write through in-workspace path |\n\n### PoC\n\n#### R1 - Dangling symlink component bypass\n1. Create a symlink inside workspace pointing to a missing target.\n2. Validate a path traversing that symlink.\n3. Create the target directory outside workspace after validation.\n4. Perform file operation and observe potential boundary escape if not fail-closed.\n\n#### R2 - TOCTOU between validation and use\n1. Validate a candidate in-workspace path.\n2. Before open/write, replace an intermediate component with a link to external location.\n3. Continue with the file operation.\n4. Observe boundary escape if operation trusts only stale validation result.\n\n#### R3 - Hardlink alias bypass\n1. Place a hardlink inside workspace that points to an external inode.\n2. Validate the in-workspace hardlink path.\n3. Read or write through this path.\n4. Observe external inode access through a path that appears in-scope.\n\n### Impacts\nUnauthorized cross path boundary\n\n## Credit\n[@zpbrent](https://github.com/zpbrent)\n\n### Patch\n[f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8](https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8)",
  "id": "GHSA-2m67-cxxq-c3h8",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T13:36:00Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T16:37:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2m67-cxxq-c3h8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32232"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/pull/324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/bf004a20d3687a0c1a9e052ec79536e30d6de134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/commit/f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/qhkm/zeptoclaw/releases/tag/v0.7.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ZeptoClaw: Path boundary checks bypass via symlink, TOCTOU, and hardlink"
}