{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/monetr/monetr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-770",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T19:57:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in monetr\u0027s Lunch Flow integration allowed any authenticated user on\na self-hosted instance to cause the monetr server to issue HTTP GET requests to arbitrary URLs supplied by the caller,\nwith the response body from non-200 upstream responses reflected back in the API error message.\n\nThe URL validator on `POST /api/lunch_flow/link` only checked the URL scheme and rejected query parameters; it did not\nfilter loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-provider metadata addresses. The outbound HTTP client read the response\nbody via an unbounded `io.ReadAll`, and the controller intentionally surfaced the resulting error (which contained the\nupstream body) as the JSON `error` field of the API response.\n\n**Who is affected:** self-hosted monetr deployments running the default configuration. Out of the box,\n`LunchFlow.Enabled=true`, `AllowSignUp=true`, and billing is not enforced, so any user who can register on the instance\ncan reach the vulnerable endpoint. Deployments running in a cloud environment where instance metadata is reachable from\nthe pod (e.g. AWS EC2 without IMDSv2 enforced) expand the impact to include potential exposure of instance metadata\nthrough the reflected error body.\n\n**Who is NOT affected:** the hosted `my.monetr.app` service, which runs with `LunchFlow.Enabled=false`. Self-hosted\noperators who had already disabled public sign-up (`MONETR_ALLOW_SIGN_UP=false`) substantially reduce their exposure\nsince only operator-trusted users can reach the endpoint.\n\nA secondary denial-of-service vector also existed: because the outbound response body was read with no size cap, an\nattacker-influenced upstream could return a multi-GB body that monetr would fully buffer into memory.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in monetr `v1.12.5`. Users should upgrade to this release or later.\n\nThe fix introduces a new config field `LunchFlow.AllowedApiUrls` (a list of permitted Lunch Flow API URLs) with a\ndefault of `[\"https://lunchflow.app/api/v1\"]`. URLs outside the allowlist are rejected both at link-creation time and at\nclient-construction time, with a server-side warning log on rejection. Response body reads are capped at 10 MiB for both\nsuccess and error paths. The UI renders the API URL field as a disabled pre-filled input when a single URL is allowed,\nor a dropdown when multiple are allowed, so operators who need to use a staging or self-hosted Lunch Flow API opt in\nexplicitly via config.\n\n**Upgrade note for self-hosters with a custom Lunch Flow URL:** if your existing `LunchFlowLink` records point at a URL\nother than `https://lunchflow.app/api/v1`, set your `lunchFlow.allowedApiUrls` in your yaml config to include your\ncustom URL before upgrading. Otherwise existing links will fail on next refresh or sync with a `\"Rejected Lunch Flow API\nURL that is not in the configured allowlist\"` warning in the server log.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nFor operators who cannot upgrade immediately, any of the following materially reduces or eliminates exposure:\n\n- **Disable public sign-up:** set `MONETR_ALLOW_SIGN_UP=false` so only operator-trusted users can reach the vulnerable\nendpoint. Recommended in general for internet-exposed self-hosted deployments.\n- **Disable Lunch Flow entirely:** set `lunchFlow.enabled: false` in your config file. The endpoints will return 404 for\nall callers.\n- **Network-level egress restriction:** restrict outbound HTTP egress from the monetr pod/container to only\n`lunchflow.app` (or whichever legitimate Lunch Flow hosts you use). Blocks the SSRF primitive regardless of\napplication-layer validation.\n- **On AWS EC2 specifically:** enforce IMDSv2 on the instance. This eliminates the cloud-metadata exfil path even if the\nSSRF primitive remains reachable.",
  "id": "GHSA-29v9-frvh-c426",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T19:57:54Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T19:57:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr/security/advisories/GHSA-29v9-frvh-c426"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr/pull/3122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr/commit/c260caa3c573a4a396ec2d264c7641a5d958385b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr/releases/tag/v1.12.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:L/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "monetr: Server-side request forgery in Lunch Flow link creation and refresh"
}