GHSA-26J2-HMHF-7CC5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-01-13 18:31
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

f2fs: fix return value of f2fs_recover_fsync_data()

With below scripts, it will trigger panic in f2fs:

mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs touch /mnt/f2fs/foo sync echo 111 >> /mnt/f2fs/foo f2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/foo f2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs umount /mnt/f2fs mount -o ro,norecovery /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs or mount -o ro,disable_roll_forward /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs

F2FS-fs (vdd): f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, check_only: 0 F2FS-fs (vdd): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7f5c361f F2FS-fs (vdd): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 0 F2FS-fs (vdd): f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, check_only: 1 Filesystem f2fs get_tree() didn't set fc->root, returned 1 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/super.c:1761! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 722 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #721 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vfs_get_tree.cold+0x18/0x1a Call Trace: fc_mount+0x13/0xa0 path_mount+0x34e/0xc50 __x64_sys_mount+0x121/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x84/0x800 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fa6cc126cfe

The root cause is we missed to handle error number returned from f2fs_recover_fsync_data() when mounting image w/ ro,norecovery or ro,disable_roll_forward mount option, result in returning a positive error number to vfs_get_tree(), fix it.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68769"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T16:15:56Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix return value of f2fs_recover_fsync_data()\n\nWith below scripts, it will trigger panic in f2fs:\n\nmkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd\nmount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs\ntouch /mnt/f2fs/foo\nsync\necho 111 \u003e\u003e /mnt/f2fs/foo\nf2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/foo\nf2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs\numount /mnt/f2fs\nmount -o ro,norecovery /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs\nor\nmount -o ro,disable_roll_forward /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs\n\nF2FS-fs (vdd): f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, check_only: 0\nF2FS-fs (vdd): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7f5c361f\nF2FS-fs (vdd): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 0\nF2FS-fs (vdd): f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, check_only: 1\nFilesystem f2fs get_tree() didn\u0027t set fc-\u003eroot, returned 1\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at fs/super.c:1761!\nOops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI\nCPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 722 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #721 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:vfs_get_tree.cold+0x18/0x1a\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n fc_mount+0x13/0xa0\n path_mount+0x34e/0xc50\n __x64_sys_mount+0x121/0x150\n do_syscall_64+0x84/0x800\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\nRIP: 0033:0x7fa6cc126cfe\n\nThe root cause is we missed to handle error number returned from\nf2fs_recover_fsync_data() when mounting image w/ ro,norecovery or\nro,disable_roll_forward mount option, result in returning a positive\nerror number to vfs_get_tree(), fix it.",
  "id": "GHSA-26j2-hmhf-7cc5",
  "modified": "2026-01-13T18:31:03Z",
  "published": "2026-01-13T18:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01fba45deaddcce0d0b01c411435d1acf6feab7b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4560db9678a2c5952b6205fbca468c6805c2ba2a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/473550e715654ad7612aa490d583cb7c25fe2ff3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bc246018aaa3b46a7710428d0a2196c229f9d49"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a4c67d96f92eefcfa5596a08f069e77b743c5865"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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